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ABSTRACT 
Hyun Seok Lee: Essays on Retail Operations Management 
(Under the direction of Saravanan Kesavan) 
 
Under the competitive nature, retailers need to consider numerous aspects to make better 
operational decisions. Retailers should understand customers’ needs to provide better service; 
have the right amount of labor to match supply with demand; and anticipate investors’ responses 
on the announcement of revealing private information such as building excess inventory to 
maximize retailers’ objective. This dissertation empirically examines these three aspects – 
customer behavior, labor scheduling, and excess inventory announcement where there appears to 
be limited empirical research in the literature. I utilize individual retailer’s micro-level 
proprietary data across multiple stores as well as publicly available firm-level financial data for 
multiple retailers.  
In the first essay, I identify a new phenomenon called thwarting behavior, defined as a 
systematic change in customers’ behavior when they experience congestion that imposes 
negative externalities on other customers. I provide empirical evidence for the thwarting 
behavior by analyzing archival data obtained from a retailer and by conducting a field study 
where I observe customer directly. I then quantify its impact on sales drop by running a field 
experiment.  
In the second essay, I examine the impact of incentives for store managers on their labor 
scheduling decisions. I find empirical evidence that incentive improves outcomes of store 
iv 
 
managers’ labor scheduling decisions and this finding is mainly driven by effort effect rather 
than selection mechanism. I also find that the financial incentives have differential impact on 
underlying decisions that led to the labor scheduling outcomes such as forecasting, labor 
planning, and execution.  
In the third essay, I analyze the determinants of excess inventory announcement and the 
stock market reaction to the announcement in the U.S. retail sector. I find that operationally 
competent retailers, measured by total factor productivity, have a lower probability of 
announcing excess inventory in the following year. In addition, the stock market penalizes 
excess inventory announcements made by operationally competent retailers more severely than 
those made by their less competent peers. Finally, providing action information, which the firm 
has taken or plans to take to deal with excess inventory, moderates the negative association 
between firm’s operational competence and abnormal returns due to the announcement. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Facing enormous competitive pressures from online retailers, brick-and-mortar retailers 
are experiencing tough times. According to the recent report
1
, nearly 80 percent of Americans do 
at least some shopping on the internet, with 43 percent shopping online on a regular basis such as 
“weekly” or “a few times a month.” It is a significant increase as just 22 percent of Americans 
had made a purchase online in 2000. In addition, customers are capable of comparing price and 
products within the reach of their pocket in the new digital era stemming from big data, mobile 
commerce, and the explosion of omni-channel retailing. This makes retailers’ margin thinner. 
Such intense competition and declining margins have forced many retailers to critically examine 
and redesign their operations in an effort to improve their performance. 
To this end, retailers need to consider numerous aspects into account when they make 
operational decisions. They should understand customers’ need to provide better service so that 
retain their existing customers and earning a bigger share of the customer’s wallet. They want to 
have the right amount of labor to match supply with demand as overstaffing can increase store 
expenses and understaffing can result in lost sales and poor service. In the higher strategic level, 
retailers need to anticipate investors’ responses on their decisions of revealing private 
information such as building excess inventory to make better decisions. This dissertation 
empirically examines these three aspects – customer behavior, labor scheduling, and excess 
                                                          
1
 See “Online Shopping and E-Commerce” by Aaron Smith and Monica Anderson, Pew Research Center, December 
19,2016 
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inventory announcement – aiming to provide valuable insights to retailers helping them in better 
decision making.  
In this empirical study, we utilize individual retailer’s micro-level proprietary data across 
multiple stores as well as publicly available firm-level financial data for multiple retailers. This 
dissertation research consists of three chapters. In what follows, I briefly describe each chapter in 
sequence. 
1.1 Dissertation Overview 
1.1.1 Understanding and managing customer-induced negative externalities in congested 
self-service environments 
 
In this essay I identify a new phenomenon called thwarting behavior, defined as a 
systematic change in customers’ behavior when they experience congestion that imposes 
negative externalities on other customers.  Using point-of-sale (POS), traffic, and labor data 
obtained from a retail technology platform firm, RetailNext, and one of its clients, I demonstrate 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between fitting room traffic and sales. This is consistent with 
thwarting behavior and shows that managing congestion in fitting rooms is critical for store 
performance. To provide the direct evidence for thwarting behavior, I conduct a field study 
observing customer behavior at another retailer. This field study provides evidence that 
customers indeed change their behavior during congestion that lead to increased waiting time for 
others and phantom stockouts. Finally, I run a field experiment to show that these phantom 
stockouts cause significant lost sales in retail stores. I quantify that mitigating phantom stockouts 
in the fitting room area using an associate increases checkout-counter-level hourly sales by 
22.6%. 
 
 
3 
 
1.1.2 Can incentives improve labor scheduling decisions? Evidence from a quasi-
experiment 
 
There are conflicting views on the role of incentives in improving performance. 
Theoretical literature on agency theory, expectancy theory and goal-setting theory argue that 
incentives make agents exert more effort that leads to better performance whereas psychologists 
and behaviorists contend that extrinsic rewards have a negative effect on intrinsic motivation. 
However, there is limited research in operations management literature that has examined the 
role of pay-for-performance incentives on improving operational outcomes with field data. Here, 
I use detailed weekly scheduling data from a quasi-experimental setting at the retail chain to 
examine the impact of financial incentives on operational decisions, specifically labor scheduling 
decisions. I find that store managers make better labor scheduling decisions under the strong 
incentive scheme, indicating that incentives for store managers help them improve labor 
scheduling decisions. I further find that improvement in labor scheduling decisions due to 
incentive is mainly driven by change in effort rather than selection mechanism. Finally, I find 
that the financial incentive has differential impact on three underlying decisions (i.e., forecasting, 
labor planning, and execution) that lead outcomes of overall labor scheduling decisions. 
1.1.3 Determinants of excess inventory announcement and stock market reaction in the 
retail sector 
 
In this essay, I empirically analyze the determinants of excess inventory announcement 
and the stock market reaction to the announcement in the U.S. retail sector. I examine if the 
firm’s operational competence, as measured by total factor productivity (TFP), can explain the 
retailer’s excess inventory announcement. I also investigate if the stock market reaction to such 
announcements is conditional on the operational competence of the announcing firm. I use a 
combined dataset on excess inventory announcements, annual financial statements, and daily 
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stock prices of publicly traded retailers in the U.S. between 1990 and 2011. I find that 
operationally competent retailers have a lower probability of announcing excess inventory in the 
following year. In addition, the stock market penalizes excess inventory announcements made by 
operationally competent retailers more severely than those made by their less competent peers. 
Finally, providing action information, which the firm has taken or plans to take to deal with the 
excess inventory, moderates the negative association between firm’s operational competence and 
abnormal returns due to the announcement whereas I do not find such moderating effect with 
reason information.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Understanding and Managing Customer-Induced Negative Externalities in  
Congested Self-Service Environments 
2.1 Introduction 
Congestion management is an important endeavor in service settings. Since congestion 
occurs when there is variability in inter-arrival times or service times, researchers have identified 
several ways to reduce or accommodate this variability to relieve congestion (Hassin and Haviv 
2003; Lu et al. 2013). In these settings, customers are typically assumed to be either passive – 
simply waiting for service and receiving it – or strategic, but only to the extent of deciding to 
balk or renege from queues (Kulkarni 2009; Aksin et al. 2013; Dong et al. 2015; Batt and 
Terwiesch 2015; 2016). However, customers could show other types of strategic behavior during 
congestion different from balking and reneging. More importantly, some of those strategic 
behaviors may exacerbate congestion by imposing negative externalities on other customers, 
unlike balking and reneging that have a positive externality on other customers. We call such 
strategic behavior as thwarting behavior and define it as a systematic change in customers’ 
behavior when they experience congestion in a way that imposes negative externalities on other 
customers.  
Anecdotal evidence of such thwarting behavior can be found in popular press and 
literature. Transportation researchers find that drivers tend to exhibit aggressive behaviors such 
as honking at other cars and tailgating during congestion, which leads to accidents and 
exacerbates congestion (Hennessy and Wiesenthal 1997). In call centers, irritated customers due 
to long wait have been known to demand longer service (Dong et al. 2015) that could increase 
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waiting time for others. It is unclear whether retail customers exhibit any thwarting behavior 
when stores become congested.   
In this paper, we examine the phenomenon of thwarting behavior in fitting rooms of 
apparel retailers. We choose fitting rooms as they are usually self-service environments in most 
retail stores with little or no monitoring where we may be able to observe this behavior. During 
congestion, two thwarting behaviors may manifest in fitting rooms. Customers might take more 
clothes to try on in a fitting room when they experience congestion because they do not want to 
make multiple visits and are afraid of losing items. This requires them to occupy fitting rooms 
longer (service slowdown), increasing waiting time for other customers who want to use fitting 
rooms. In addition, they could leave behind clothes in fitting rooms if they do not purchase them 
or replace those items back in the shelf or a recovery rack. Such misplaced items could result in 
phantom stockouts when they are the last units of inventory in the store.  Lost sales could 
increase due to these two types of thwarting behavior as it would lead to increased 
balking/reneging due to increased waiting time for other customers and more phantom stockouts 
(DeHoratius and Ton 2015) due to misplaced inventory.  
We first analyze archival data on fitting room traffic and sales to detect a decline in sales 
expected with thwarting behavior. Although we expect sales to decline due to thwarting behavior 
in fitting rooms, it is possible that the sales drop might be driven by other factors such as 
crowded checkout counters, phantom stockouts in the rest of the store, or overall poor service 
level due to understaffing. Since it is impossible to rule out all alternative explanations without 
detailed data on every part of the store, we further conduct a field study and a field experiment to 
provide direct evidence for the thwarting behavior and to quantify its impact on store sales.  
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In the field study we directly observe the behaviors of customers entering the fitting room 
area at a major retailer. We measure the extent to which customers change their behavior during 
congestion by taking more clothes into the fitting room and leaving behind more unwanted 
clothes in the fitting room. We also measure the increase in waiting time to other customers and 
the phantom stockouts that occur due to thwarting behavior. While our field study can detect 
whether customers change their behavior when they face congestion, it does not directly reveal 
the impact of thwarting behavior on sales decline. So, we subsequently perform a field 
experiment to show its impact on sales.  
Our data were obtained through collaborations with three companies. RetailNext is a 
leading in-store analytics provider to retailers. It collects traffic information from video cameras 
in retail stores to codify customer-arrival patterns as well as customer pathways in retail stores. 
In addition, they collate customer traffic information and point-of-sale (POS) data. These data 
were obtained from one of its clients, a large U.S.-based retailer (retailer A). This retailer’s stores 
are about 50,000 sq. ft. in size and primarily carry men’s, women’s, and children’s apparel, along 
with some home furnishing goods. The data obtained from RetailNext and retailer A helped us 
provide initial evidence for the presence of thwarting behavior and its impact on store sales. We 
further observe customers directly through a field study and conduct a field experiment at 
another department store retail chain (retailer B).  
Our primary findings are as follows. First, we observe an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between fitting room traffic and sales. Sales initially increase with fitting room traffic as more 
customers intend to purchase. Beyond a certain point, however, we observe a decline in sales 
when fitting rooms become congested. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that more traffic 
drives more store sales, we identify that too much traffic in fitting rooms can hurt store sales. 
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This observation shows that managing congestion in fitting rooms is critical for brick-and-mortar 
apparel retailers.  
Second, we identify two mechanisms that drive the inverted-U relationship observed in 
our data. By observing 209 customers who used fitting rooms for 24 non-continuous hours 
spanning 3 weekends, we find that customers, on average, take additional 1.38 (23.96%) clothes 
into the fitting room when they experience congestion, which requires them to occupy fitting 
rooms an average of 1.87 (18.61%) minutes longer. This behavior imposes a negative externality 
on other customers as overall waiting time increases. Our investigation of misplaced inventory 
shows that customers, on average, leave behind 2.69 (54%) items more in the fitting rooms 
during congested periods. So, customers take a few more extra items into the fitting rooms and 
leave behind many more unwanted items when they experience congestion, suggesting that the 
sales from fitting room users will be low during congested periods. In addition, further decline in 
sales occurs as the inventory left behind in the fitting rooms could result in phantom stockouts. 
We observe a 38.6% of phantom stockout rate among items left behind in the fitting room area. 
Further analysis shows that those misplaced items were high-price merchandise with significant 
opportunity costs. These two mechanisms are consistent with thwarting behavior that we define 
in the paper. 
Finally, our field experiment shows that mitigating phantom stockouts in the fitting room 
area alone can significantly improve store sales. By comparing the treatment to control groups, 
we find that an addition of a backend recovery operation for items left behind in the fitting rooms 
using an associate increases checkout-counter-level hourly sales by $186.93 (22.6%). The large 
increase in sales from reducing phantom stockouts shows that thwarting behavior can 
significantly hurt store sales during congested periods.  
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Our research makes several contributions to the operations management literature. Our 
first contribution is the identification and demonstration of customers’ thwarting behavior. 
Researchers have identified that customers exhibit strategic behaviors, e.g., balking or reneging, 
in the queue based on their service experience, which affects their attitude such as anxiety and 
fairness (e.g., Rafaeli et al. 2002; Bitran et al. 2008). While balking and reneging lead to positive 
externalities for other customers, none of the papers have empirically identified this specific 
strategic behavior, thwarting, which imposes a negative externality on others. We provide the 
first direct evidence for the presence of thwarting behavior in retail stores. Identification of 
thwarting behavior enables us to show a new dimension of customer impact in service operations 
as it reveals that customer-induced service slowdown, in contrast to server-driven slowdowns 
(Kc and Terwiesch 2009; Anand et al. 2011; Tan and Netessine 2014; Batt and Terwiesch 2016), 
can be an important reason for service slowdowns in retail settings.  
Second, we measure instore-based phantom stockouts in retail stores, which is different 
from backroom-based phantom stockouts identified in prior literature (DeHoratius and Raman 
2008; Ton and Raman 2010). While phantom stockouts are expected to result in lost sales, the 
magnitude of the lost sales has not been estimated before. By using a field experiment we show 
that mitigating phantom stockouts in the fitting room area during congested periods can lead to 
significant increase in store sales.  
Third, we contribute to the expanding literature on retail labor (Fisher et al. 2007; Ton 
2009; Netessine et al. 2010; Kesavan et al. 2014; Mani et al. 2015) by conducting the first field 
experiment in this line of research. While prior literature has argued for increasing store labor to 
drive sales, we use a field experiment to show that specifically using labor to perform a backend 
recovery operation in fitting rooms can increase sales significantly. In addition, field studies 
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present important advantages over lab experiments to examine thwarting behavior of individual 
customers as the treatment effects are expected to interact with participant characteristics (Al-
Ubaydli and List 2015). Since thwarting behavior causes negative externality on other customers, 
it is likely that this behavior is harder to study in a lab setting. Participants in the lab may either 
change behavior when they are aware of being observed or may result in systematically opting 
out, causing biases in our inferences. Due to the covert nature of the field, we can observe 
customers in their natural environment and understand the degree to which customers engage in 
thwarting behavior.  
2.2 Prior Literature  
Researchers have identified several ways to relieve congestion. In these settings, 
customers are typically assumed to be either passive or strategic, but only to the extent of 
deciding to balk or renege from queues, which have a positive externality for other customers. 
Examples of analytical works with passive arrivals are Deo and Gurvich (2011) and Lee et al. 
(2012) while those of empirical works include Chan et al. (2014) and Batt and Terwiesch (2016). 
Models with balking and reneging can be found in many books, e.g., Kulkarni (2009). Recent 
empirical works on this topic include Aksin et al. (2013) and Batt and Terwiesch (2015). 
However, customers show other types of strategic behavior in retail settings different from 
balking and reneging, which impose negative externalities on other customers. For example, 
Allon and Hanany (2012) analytically studied customer’s behavior of cutting the line that can 
increase waiting time for other customers. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first 
paper that empirically identifies and demonstrates customers’ behavior change, when they 
experience congestion, in a way that imposes a negative externality on other customers; we call it 
thwarting. Thwarting is distinctive from a negative externality caused by joining the queue that 
11 
 
has been studied in the prior literature. Thwarting deals with additional negative externalities on 
other customers, beyond joining the queue, due to change in customers’ behavior when they 
experience congestion. 
Sasser (1976) identified customers as a “mixed blessing” in operating environments. On 
the one hand, customers could be a source of productive capacity by providing labor for self-
service; on the other hand, they could introduce variability and uncertainty into operations. Frei 
(2006) further classified such customer-introduced variability into five categories (i.e., arrival, 
request, capability, effort, and subjective preference). We identify yet another type of variability 
induced by customers who face congestion. More importantly, this type of variability is driven 
by willful behavioral changes on part of strategic customers who are responding to the 
congestion they face.  
Staffing problems have been studied in other service systems such as call center and 
healthcare settings (Gans et al. 2003; Green 2004). Recently Batt and Terwiesch (2016) 
empirically found that service rate is dependent on workload in a hospital’s emergency 
department. Earlier papers have argued that high congestion levels may require servicepersons 
(hereafter, “servers”) to multitask in parallel, which involves a cognitive switching cost (Kc 2013; 
Batt and Terwiesch 2016) and fatigue (Kc and Terwiesch 2009) that lead to server slowdown. 
Because customers themselves perform most activities in a fitting room, a self-service 
environment in general, servers do not cause an increase in service time in our research setting. 
Our paper therefore emphasizes customer-induced service slowdowns as opposed to server-
driven slowdowns. 
The importance of labor as a key execution issue in stores has been highlighted in Raman 
et al. (2001). Other examples of store execution issues are inventory record inaccuracy 
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(DeHoratius and Raman 2008) and phantom stockouts (Ton and Raman 2010), which were 
found to significantly impact retail store performance negatively. Using survey data collected 
from a small-appliance and furnishings retail store, Fisher et al. (2007) showed that labor issues, 
as an example of store execution issues, considerably affect both customer satisfaction and sales. 
In an apparel setting, overcrowded fitting rooms often result in temporary phantom stockouts 
within the store. Such customer-induced misplaced inventory within the store, different from 
phantom inventory in the backroom (Ton and Raman 2010), is expected to be one driver of the 
inverted-U relationship that we observe in our setting. 
Ton and Huckman (2008) provided further evidence of the importance of store labor by 
demonstrating a link between an increase in employee turnover and a decrease in profit margin 
and customer service. In addition, Ton (2009) showed that an increase in store labor is associated 
with higher profits. Our paper is consistent with this work in demonstrating that fitting room 
associates can help improve store performance. More importantly, we conduct a field experiment 
involving labor intervention that has not been conducted in this stream of research thus far. 
While prior literature has argued for increasing store labor to drive sales, our field experiment 
shows that specifically using labor to perform a backend recovery operation of misplaced items 
in fitting rooms can increase sales significantly. 
Recently, several authors have used retail traffic data in their empirical analyses. 
Perdikaki et al. (2012) studied relationships between sales, traffic, and labor for apparel retail 
stores. By decomposing sales into conversion rate and basket value, they found that, at an 
aggregate level, store sales have an increasing concave relationship with traffic; conversion rate 
decreases nonlinearly with increasing traffic; and labor moderates the impact of traffic on sales. 
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Our research results suggest that, beyond plateauing, sales decline when a self-service 
environment, a fitting room area in particular, is highly congested. 
Tan and Netessine (2014) studied the impact of workload on servers’ performance in a 
restaurant chain. They found that servers exert more effort on sales by sacrificing service speed 
when the overall workload is small, whereas servers start to reduce sales effort and increase 
service speed as workload increases. Our paper differs from previous papers in two ways. First, 
we focus more on how customer behavior affects service rates; previous work has emphasized 
servers. Second, while previous studies mostly used overall store traffic data, we demonstrate the 
value of in-store traffic data by showing the negative impact of congestion in fitting rooms on 
sales. Furthermore, we provide evidence for two thwarting behaviors through a field study 
observing customer behavior, which can explain the inverted U-shaped relationship observed in 
our data. 
Finally, a stream of literature has focused on the self-service setting. Given traditional 
service (e.g., a teller in banking), most prior papers have studied the impact of introducing self-
service technology (e.g., online banking) on customer satisfaction and retention in a number of 
settings (Buell et al. 2010). Buell and Norton (2011) revealed that engaging in operational 
transparency, which they termed labor illusion, is sufficient to increase perceived value. While 
those papers focus on the impact of operational change on consumer behavior, our work 
emphasizes the impact of customers’ behavior change on operations. Also, as some prior 
literature (Moon and Frei 2000; Frei 2006; 2008) has consistently pointed out the importance of 
customers’ impacts on operations, our paper adds to this stream by identifying another type of 
customer’s impacts on operations during congested periods that we call thwarting behavior.  
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2.3 Theory Development and Hypotheses 
We formalize our definition of thwarting behavior using a simple conceptual model in 
Figure 2.1 and then explain the hypotheses we plan to test. Consider a store where store traffic is 
𝜆 per hour. Assume that a fraction (𝛾, where 0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1) of those customers enter the fitting 
room area. We call this 𝜆𝛾 as fitting room traffic. The remaining customers, 𝜆(1 − 𝛾), leave the 
store without entering a fitting room. Assume that the conversion rate of customers who use 
fitting rooms to be 𝑞1 and those who do not to be 𝑞0. Let 𝛽1 and 𝛽0 be the basket values of the 
purchases made by customers who use fitting rooms and those who do not, respectively. We 
assume 𝑞1 > 𝑞0 as recent paper (Musalem et al. 2016) finds higher conversion rate of fitting 
room users than non-users. We also assume 𝛽1 > 𝛽0 as anecdotal evidence suggests that 
customers might need to use fitting rooms when they purchase high price clothes (e.g., formal 
suit) whereas they might not need to try on when they purchase low price clothes (e.g., basic 
white t-shirt). Finally, we assume that 𝛾 depends upon the waiting time in the fitting room area 
for impatient customers while conversion rate and basket value parameters are affected by 
product availability. The store sales in any given hour are the sum of sales from customers who 
used fitting rooms and those who did not, i.e., 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = 𝜆𝛾𝑞1𝛽1 + 𝜆(1 − 𝛾)𝑞0𝛽0.   
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Model 
 
Now we construct hypotheses to investigate the relationship between fitting room traffic 
and store sales using this simple setup. We consider three possible scenarios.  
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Scenario 1: Traditional operations management literature assumes that customers are passive 
(i.e., patient) or have limited strategic behavior where they can only balk or renege (i.e., 
impatient). We consider the implications of this assumption on the relationship between fitting 
room traffic and sales in this scenario.  
Fitting rooms play a critical role for apparel retailers as customers experience the product 
and evaluate alternatives there to complete their purchase. These steps have been identified as 
part of the core pathway in the consumer purchase decision process. Hence, as fitting room 
traffic increases, sales are expected to increase initially, since more shoppers reveal their 
intention to purchase. In the conceptual model, we see that sales increases with 𝛾. If customers 
are assumed to be passive, sales are expected to increase linearly with fitting room traffic till 
fitting room capacity is reached. Once it’s reached, customers may passively queue outside the 
fitting rooms so sales will flatten. In the case of limited strategic behaviors such as balking and 
reneging, sales would have an increasing concave relationship with fitting room traffic. For 
example, our model can capture balking by setting 𝛾 to decrease with the level of congestion. 
Those customers who balk or renege will end up not using fitting rooms. As the expected sales 
are higher for fitting room users than non-users, we anticipate sales to be increasing at a 
diminishing rate with higher fitting room traffic. 
Since we expect some customers to balk and renege, we propose the following 
relationship based on operations management literature: 
Hypothesis 1a: There is an increasing concave relationship between fitting room traffic and 
store sales. 
Scenario 2: In this scenario, we consider the case where customers exhibit thwarting, beyond 
reneging and balking. Specifically, we assume that customers change their behavior when they 
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experience congestion in ways that impose negative externalities on other customers that causes 
sales to decline. 
Customers could become strategic by taking more clothes into the fitting room when they 
experience congestion. When the store is congested, customers might anticipate longer waiting 
time to secure a fitting room. So they may take more alternatives with them to reduce the chance 
of returning back to the selling floor. They may also take more alternatives for fear of stocking 
out when many customers are around. Taking more clothes into the fitting room would increase 
waiting time for the rest of the customers as the service time would increase. In this case where 
service time is state-dependent, the waiting time for other customers could grow much faster 
than usual, which will increase abandonments significantly (much smaller 𝛾). This could lead to 
decline in sales at higher levels of fitting room traffic. 
Furthermore, there is another type of strategic behavior that could affect product 
availability in the store leading to lower sales at higher levels of congestion. Customers could 
leave behind more unwanted clothes in the fitting room when they face congestion, instead of 
purchasing more or replacing those items back in the shelf or a recovery rack. Even those 
customers, who secure a fitting room but are unhappy with the fit, color, or design of their initial 
selections, may be reluctant to go back into the store to find alternatives due to the crowd. 
Literature in psychology has shown that customers in crowded stores feel disoriented (Dion 
1999), less satisfied (Eroglu and Machleit 1990), more stressed, and tenser (Langer and Saegert 
1977). So, they may just leave those unwanted clothes in the fitting room. Though store 
associates may eventually return these clothes to the proper locations, temporary phantom 
stockouts (Ton and Raman 2010) are likely to occur and affect sales, especially during congested 
periods when associates may be preoccupied with other customer-facing tasks. This phantom 
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stockout could increase lost sales as customers cannot find the items they are looking for, 
resulting in lower conversion rates and basket sizes for both fitting room users as well as others. 
Leaving behind more clothes in the fitting room could also make rooms dirty. It might 
cause customers to avoid some fitting rooms and increase waiting time for other rooms. This 
could lead to an increase in abandonments (smaller 𝛾). Accordingly, we propose the following 
relationship based on thwarting: 
Hypothesis 1b: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between fitting room traffic and 
store sales. 
Although Hypothesis 1b is based on thwarting behavior, there are other reasons that 
could drive inverted-U shaped relationship between fitting room traffic and store sales. For 
example, the rest of the store is likely to be congested when the fitting room is congested so the 
store sales could drop due to decrease in 𝑞0 and 𝛽0 as a result of poor customer service in the rest 
of the store, phantom stockouts in the rest of the store, or long waiting times in the checkout 
counter. So, the presence of an inverted-U relationship is not by itself an evidence of thwarting 
behavior. 
Scenario 3: Next we argue for an alternate relationship between fitting room traffic and sales in 
which sales has an increasing convex relationship with fitting room traffic based on a different 
underlying consumer behavior. This could happen if customers who visit the store during 
congested hours are unable to find an unoccupied fitting room to try on the clothes at the store so 
they decide to purchase multiple items with an intention of returning some later (𝑞0 and 𝛽0 
increase as traffic increases). Further, even customers who find a fitting room may decide to 
purchase more as they take more items into the fitting room when they face congestion (𝑞1 and 
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𝛽1 increase as traffic increases). Both explanations would increase sales non-linearly when the 
fitting rooms are busy. Accordingly, we propose the following relationship: 
Hypothesis 1c: There is an increasing convex relationship between fitting room traffic and store 
sales. 
2.4 Data and Methodology for Archival Data Analysis 
2.4.1 Data sources 
We test our hypotheses using archival data obtained from RetailNext and one of its retail 
clients. RetailNext is a leading in-store analytics provider to retailers such as Sears. It collects 
traffic information from video cameras in retail stores to codify customer arrival patterns and 
customer pathways in the stores. In addition to traffic data, we further obtain POS and labor data 
from one of their clients, a large U.S.-based retailer (retailer A). Retailer A is an apparel retail 
chain that sells primarily women’s, men’s, and children’s apparel, along with some home décor 
goods. We worked closely with both companies by interacting with the retailer’s senior 
management, corporate planners, and store management team. The study period is from July 
2012 to October 2013. 
We obtain the following data for retailer A during the study period. First, we obtain all 
POS information recorded through scanner. We aggregate it to hourly level to possess store sales 
volume per hour ($). Second, we obtain labor data which allow us to calculate the number of 
employees in the store. Finally, we possess traffic data. Retailer A installed video cameras at 
store entrances to count the number of visitors. All retailer A’s stores had this entrance camera 
during our study period. Only one store, however, had additional cameras installed within the 
store to track customer movement. We therefore focus on this store to study the impact of fitting 
room traffic on store sales. These cameras capture only the entrance of the fitting room area and 
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nothing within fitting rooms’ interiors. The first picture of Figure 2.2 shows the fitting room area 
at retailer A used in this study, located at the center of the store for ease of approach. The store 
has 16 fitting rooms in total in this area.  
Figure 2.2: Fitting Room Areas   
(Retailer A: Centralized fitting room layout) 
 
Note. Fitting rooms are located at the center of the store. This store has 16 fitting rooms in total. 
(Retailer B: Decentralized fitting room layout) 
  
Note. Fitting rooms are located near each brand. This fitting room area has 3 rooms in total. 
Traffic cameras used in this study were able to differentiate between incoming and 
outgoing traffic by tracking the direction of customers’ movements. Figure 2.3 shows how this 
technology can distinguish incoming from outgoing traffic. Each camera has two sensors, and if 
a customer goes through both, she is counted. The camera captures the direction of movement by 
determining the order in which a customer’s motion is detected by the two sensors. Consider the 
two outlines around the entrance door in Figure 2.3. If a customer goes through the outside line 
(i.e., farther from the entrance) and then the inside line (i.e., closer to the entrance), in that order, 
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then she is categorized as an “out-count,” and vice versa. We had this time-stamp records for 
every individual who passes the two sensors. We aggregate the time-stamp data to the hourly 
level, to match the other data. RetailNext audits the data regularly by manually counting the 
number of visitors and comparing that count to the numbers from the automated sensors, 
ensuring that the accuracy is at least 95%.  
Figure 2.3: Distinguishing Incoming from Outgoing Traffic 
 
2.4.2 Variables 
We conduct our econometrics analysis at the hourly level.  
2.4.2.1 Dependent variables  
We measure the store performance on day t at hour h by sales in dollars (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡ℎ). We 
find that store hours are not fixed. For example, before the Christmas holiday, the store is open 
until midnight. In order to avoid the spurious correlation that could arise between variables as a 
result of systematic differences in business hours, we use only data between 9 AM and 10 PM, 
which are the normal store hours. 
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2.4.2.2 Key variables of interest 
We have in-count and out-count traffic measures for fitting room traffic (𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
𝐼𝑁 
and 𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
𝑂𝑈𝑇). We use an average between the in- and out-counts (𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ =
(𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
𝐼𝑁 + 𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
𝑂𝑈𝑇) 2⁄ ) as it would help mitigate concerns about measurement 
errors in the respective in- and out-count variables. As a robustness check, we repeat analysis by 
using in- or out-counts separately instead of their average and obtained consistent results.  
2.4.2.3 Control variables  
We next describe the rest of the controls used in our analysis. First, we need to control for 
store traffic to distinguish the impact on sales of fitting room traffic from overall store traffic. 
We use the average store traffic (𝐴_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ), similar to fitting room traffic, to control for the 
number of customers visited the store. Second, we control for store labor (𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ), defined as 
the number of employees working in the store, as that is known to affect sales (Perdikaki et al. 
2012). We eliminate backroom labor from our main model since that does not affect sales 
directly, though our results are similar when we include backroom employees in 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ. Since 
the retailer collected time-stamp data on when each associate started work, 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ can be 
fractional. For example, if one employee starts to work at 9:30 AM in the store, then we have a 
data point of 0.5 for 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ at h = 9.  
Third, store sales depend on promotions (Lam et al. 2001). We have information 
regarding the store’s promotional activities. Based on the information, we create a dummy 
variable 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 that is set to one on days, t, when a promotion was ongoing, and set to zero, 
otherwise. Finally, we control for seasonality by introducing hourly dummies, day-of-the-week 
dummies, and monthly dummies.  
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We trim our data by excluding extreme values to ensure that our analyses are not 
influenced by extreme outliers and to obtain more robust statistics and estimators, though all 
results are consistent when we use full data. We remove all data with standardized residuals 
more extreme than 3. This resulted in a drop of 1.5% of observations. We perform all further 
analysis on this data set. We check the robustness of our analysis with cutoffs for standardized 
residuals at 2 and 2.5 and obtain consistent results. 
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for all variables used in our analysis. Subscript t 
denotes each date and h, ranging from 9 to 21, denotes each hour. The average hourly sales 
volume is $1,887. The average hourly store traffic is 111, while the average fitting room traffic is 
66, indicating that majority of the customers use fitting rooms. Table 2.2 shows the Pearson 
correlation coefficients among all variables used in our analysis. Correlations between predictors 
are generally quite low, except for the correlation between 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ and 𝐴_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ, 
which is quite high (0.79). This may pose multicollinearity problem. We explain how we deal 
with it in the next section. After taking care of it, we find the variance inflation factors (VIFs) to 
be below 10, indicating we are not likely to have multicollinearity problems. 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of the Variables (Retailer A) 
Variable name Mean Std. dev. P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡ℎ 1887.41 1317.21 271.37 986.5 1627.89 2480.47 4403.71 
𝐴_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ   111.31 70.67 26 65.25 96.5 141.5 244 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ  65.97 41.13 16 37 57 86 143.5 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ  8.64 3.41 5 6 8 10 14 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 0 1 
Note. Number of observations is 5312.  
 
Table 2.2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (Retailer A) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (3) (4) 
(1) 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡ℎ   1.00     
(2) 𝐴_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 0.87 1.00    
(3) 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 0.71 0.79 1.00   
(4) 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ 0.54 0.61 0.39 1.00  
(5) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.20 1.00 
Note. Bold denote statistical significance at the 1% level.  
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2.4.3 Test of inverted-U relationship 
There are many ways proposed in the literature to test for the inverted-U relationship, 
though none of them is perfect. The most common method is a quadratic functional form 
regression using the coefficient estimates of the linear and quadratic terms. Two confirmatory 
tests for the inverted-U relationship can be performed by ensuring the sign flips within the range 
of the data. One is to verify that the slopes of either side of the peak point are significant and of 
opposite signs (Aiken and West 1991) and the other is to confirm that the confidence interval of 
the peak point lies within the sample (Lind and Mehlum 2010). While these tests have been 
performed by thousands of papers, they suffer from the disadvantage that they are all based on 
the assumption of quadratic form. We may avoid this quadratic assumption and test for inverted-
U relationship using spline regressions, a simple two-line test proposed in Simonsohn (2016), or 
including higher order powers. In this paper, we use all of these methods to test for the inverted-
U relationship. Our primary results are based on the quadratic model and the robustness checks 
consider the various alternate approaches. 
We propose the following model to relate store sales to fitting room traffic, with control 
variables: 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ + 𝛽2𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2 + 𝛽3𝐴_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
+ 𝛽4𝐴_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ + 𝑾𝒕𝒉
′𝜷𝟔 + 𝜀𝑡ℎ 
(2.1) 
where 𝑾𝒕𝒉 is a column vector of control variables that includes promotion indicator, hourly 
dummies, day-of-the-week dummies, and monthly dummies. The availability of promotion 
variable is especially valuable as it enables us to overcome endogeneity concerns between traffic 
and sales.  
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An important consideration in the choice of our model specification is multicollinearity. 
This concern is especially significant in our model because we not only use store traffic and 
fitting room traffic which are highly correlated (0.79) but also use quadratic terms of these 
variables. An additional source of multicollinearity concern is that labor schedules are typically 
highly correlated with the hour of the day. Using all of these variables in (2.1) results in some 
variables’ VIFs exceeding 10. So, we mitigate multicollinearity concerns in the following way. 
First, we mean center 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ and 𝐴_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ with their quadratic terms because 
mean centering can potentially alleviate multicollinearity issues (Aiken and West 1991). This 
significantly reduces VIFs, but some of them are still above 10. So, we further remove hourly 
dummies and replace with hour-block dummies. We clustered 9 AM–12:59 PM, 1 PM–5:59 PM, 
and 6 PM–10 PM based on common traffic patterns across hours in those blocks. The average 
store traffic across these three blocks of hours are 97.23, 147.49, and 79.87. So, the second block 
captures the store’s peak hours. By using mean centered variables and hour-block dummies, we 
ensure VIF of all variables to be below 10 in all models. In addition, we interact the hour-block 
dummies with day-of-the-week dummies to capture the heterogeneity in customers across 
different days of the week during same periods. We finally ensure that our finding (i.e., inverted-
U relationship between fitting room traffic and sales) is robust with hourly dummies (see Table 
5.1.1 in the Appendix). 
We test Hypothesis 1a-1c, the relationship between fitting room traffic and store sales, 
using estimates of coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. Since some customers may purchase without entering 
the fitting room, we control for store traffic in the model. We also add the quadratic term of store 
traffic, 𝐴_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2 , as Perdikaki et al. (2012) found non-linear relationship between store 
traffic and sales.  
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Finally, the coefficient of labor (𝛽5) is subject to endogeneity bias. So, we use an 
instrumental variable two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique to estimate this model where we 
consider two sets of instruments. The first instrument is a lagged labor variable from 7 days 
before. We argue lagged labor variables are valid instruments for the following reasons. First, the 
labor schedules do not change drastically from week to week so the current schedule is a good 
predictor of one-week ahead schedule for workers. Second, lagged labor variables satisfy the 
exclusion condition since they do not impact current period’s sales. Lastly, lagged values of 
labor have been commonly used as instruments in many settings (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007; 
Siebert and Zubanov 2010; Tan and Netessine 2012). This instrument is not ideal in the present 
of common demand shocks that are correlated over time. So, we add a second set of instruments.  
The second instrument is the labor variable of other store located in the same county 
under the same retail chain. As the labor cost within a county would be highly correlated, this 
market-based instrument serves as an exogenous cost-based labor-supply shifter. We chose 
county-level, as opposed to state-level because labor costs would be different across stores in 
different counties resulting in weak instruments. As stores in the same county face the same 
labor market condition, the labor schedule at one store could well predict the other store’s 
schedule. This instrument also satisfies the exclusion restriction since it does not impact the focal 
store’s sales. In addition, this market-based instrument has been commonly used in many settings 
(Nevo and Wolfram 2002). We assess the validity of the instrument and strength of it, and report 
the results in the next section.  
2.5 Results: The Negative Impact of Congestion 
First, we run (2.1) to test Hypothesis 1a-1c using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
methodology, which does not correct for endogeneity (columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.3). 
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Column (1) comprises only control variables. We then enter the fitting room traffic and its square 
in columns (2) so this model can serve as full model. 
The results from column (2) support our conjecture that fitting room traffic has an 
inverted-U relationship with sales. In this model, we find that the coefficients of 
A_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ (1.69, p<0.01) and 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2  (-0.04, p<0.01) are both statistically 
significant. Since our variables are mean-centered, the coefficients imply that the peak point of 
sales is about 1.69/(2*0.04) ≈ 24.02 of fitting room traffic. This is about 58% of one standard 
deviation (41.13) above the sample mean (65.97) and lies well within the support of the data, 
indicating an inverted-U relationship. In other words, for low levels of fitting room traffic, sales 
increase with increasing fitting room traffic; however, beyond the peak point, we find that an 
increase in fitting room traffic is associated with lower sales. This reveals the negative impact of 
congestion in the fitting room. Too much traffic in the fitting room can hurt store sales 
(Hypothesis 1b).  
We find that the estimated coefficients of the control variables are in the expected 
direction. In column (1) we find that store traffic has an increasing concave relationship with 
sales. This is consistent with Perdikaki et al. (2012). While Perdikaki et al. (2012) claim that 
decline in service quality is a driver of the diminishing return to store traffic, they do not provide 
any evidence. In our setting, when we add fitting room traffic and its square (columns (2) and (3)) 
we find that the quadratic term of the store traffic is no longer significant. It implies that the 
diminishing return to store traffic that was observed in column (1) is largely driven by the 
congestion-driven phenomenon in the fitting room area for this retailer. This further supports our 
claim that managing congestion in fitting rooms is crucial at this retailer.  
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Store labor is positively associated with sales (17.40, p<0.01). As we discussed earlier, 
coefficient of labor is biased due to endogeneity issues, so we will discuss it later using 
instruments. As expected, we find significant seasonality in store sales. For both models, we 
observe statistically significant monthly dummies and interactions between day-of-the-week 
dummies and hour-block dummies. We examine the individual dummy variables to endure that it 
is consistent with prior expectations of seasonality (available from the authors upon request). 
Consistent with prior literature (Perdikaki et al. 2012), promotions are negatively associated with 
sales (-106.81, p<0.01), meaning that for a given level of store traffic a randomly chosen shopper 
in the store is likely to spend less during promotional period. However, because of much higher 
traffic during the promotion, overall sales are higher. The adjusted R
2
 is 82.04%, indicating that 
our model fit is good. 
We now discuss the results from our instrumental variables regression (column (3)). Our 
main finding about the inverted-U shaped relationship between fitting room traffic and store 
sales is present, supporting Hypothesis 1b. All coefficients are quite similar with OLS estimation, 
but as expected, we find stronger impact of labor on store sales. After correcting for the 
endogeneity bias, the coefficient of labor variable is 112.85 (p<0.01).  
To assess the validity of the instruments, we perform several statistical tests to examine 
whether they meet the relevance criteria. First, the R
2
 value from the first stage regression of the 
endogenous labor variable is 0.69, indicating that the instruments have significant explanatory 
power. In this first stage regression, the coefficients of the instrumental variables are statistically 
significant with expected sign. We also check the simple correlation. The correlation between 
labor and other store’s labor is 0.62 and correlation between labor and 7-day-lagged labor is 0.74. 
Second, the F-statistics of the excluded instruments in the first stage regression is well over 10 in 
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our regressions, indicating that the instruments are not “weak” in the sense of Staiger and Stock 
(1997). Using lagged labor may not be an ideal instrument in the event of common demand 
shocks that are correlated over time. Although we use other instrument together with lagged 
labor, we adjust for these common demand shocks, which are basically trends (Villas-Boas and 
Winer 1999), in our models by adding monthly dummy variables, thus mitigating this concern. 
We further rule out serial correlation in our model by adding trend as a robustness check and 
obtain qualitatively the same results. Although not conclusive, these test statistics build our 
confidence that our instruments are valid.  
Table 2.3: Inverted-U Relationship (Retailer A) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Sales (𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒉) 
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) 2SLS 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ  1.69*** 1.53*** 
 (0.45) (0.58) 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2   -0.04*** -0.03*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
𝐴_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 14.33*** 13.71*** 11.81*** 
(0.21) (0.29) (0.38) 
𝐴_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2  -0.006*** 0.001 -0.001 
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ 22.63*** 17.40*** 112.85*** 
(3.49) (3.48) (12.50) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 -105.96*** -106.81*** -66.67** 
(24.29) (24.03) (28.71) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5312 5312 3696 
Adjusted R
2
 0.8156 0.8204 0.8294 
Note. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The 
following control variables were included in all of the regressions: interactions between hour-
block dummies and day-of-the-week dummies, and monthly dummies. Column (3) has fewer 
observations due to paucity of data on instruments. 
 
2.5.1 Robustness check: Alternative ways to test for inverted U-shaped relationship 
Up to this point, our conclusion about the presence of inverted U-shaped relationship was 
based on two criteria: (1) negative and significant coefficient of 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2  and (2) the 
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peak point, defined as the value of fitting room traffic at which sales are highest, lies within the 
data range. However, a quadratic approximation of a concave unimodal relationship could be 
erroneous in the presence of extreme observations. So, as we mentioned in §2.4.3., we use 
various alternative ways to test for the inverted U-shaped relationship between fitting room 
traffic and sales. The first two methods are based on the quadratic assumption while the 
remaining three methods avoid such assumption. 
First, we perform a robustness check based on Aiken and West’s (1991) procedure for 
testing curvilinear relationship. Herein we compute the slope of the curve for different values of 
the variable and ensure that the slope differs significantly from zero and has different signs on 
either side of the peak point. In model (1), the slope and the standard error can be obtained by 
𝛽1 + 2𝛽2𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ and √𝜎11 + 4𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2 𝜎22 + 4𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ𝜎12, 
respectively. Here 𝜎11 and 𝜎22 are the variance of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, respectively, and 𝜎12 is the 
covariance between 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. Table 2.4 shows that tests of the slopes for the (mean centered) 
fitting room traffic at the peak point, and ±1 SD, minimum, and maximum value in the sample. 
We find that the slopes are positive and significant in the region below the peak point while the 
slopes are negative and significant in the region above the peak point, confirming Hypothesis 1b. 
Second, we calculate the confidence interval of the peak point and ensure that it lies 
within the sample, following Lind and Mehlum (2010). We use the Fieller (1954) method, which 
has been recommended by Staiger et al. (1997) as the delta method is severely biased for the 
finite sample. Since the 95% confidence interval lies well within the range of the sample, [12.44, 
34.49], we again confirm the inverted U-shaped relationship.  
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Table 2.4: Robustness Checks for Inverted-U Relationship (Retailer A) 
 Sales Equation 
 Value Slope p-value 
Minimum value -64.65 6.24 0.000 
Peak point – 1 SD -17.11 2.89 0.000 
Peak point 24.02 0 0.99 
Peak point + 1 SD 65.15 -2.89 0.000 
Maximum value 309.85 -20.11 0.000 
Note. The p-values are based on one-tailed test on whether the slope is >0 or <0. 
Third, we run spline regressions as a further validation of the inverted U-shaped 
relationship. Spline regressions allow us to check if sales increase first and then drop as fitting 
room traffic increases. In spline regressions, we choose knots that split 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ into 
equal-sized groups. For example, one knot splits 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ into two equal-sized groups, 
then estimate a spline regression to fit piecewise linear functions of 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 1 (the 
lower 50%) and 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 2 (the higher 50%). The same idea applies to two knots case. 
In one knot case (column (1) in Table 2.5), we find that the coefficient of the first spline is 
positive and significant (p<0.01), whereas the second is negative and significant (p<0.01). It 
implies that as fitting room traffic increases, sales first increase and then drop, supporting 
inverted-U. The conclusions are similar when we consider two knots, as shown in column (2). 
Fourth, we perform two-line test (Simonsohn 2016). Herein, we estimate two separate 
regression lines, one for ‘low’ (i.e., below the peak point) and one for ‘high’ (i.e., above the peak 
point) values of 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ. The inverted-U shape is present if the ‘low’ slope is positive 
and significant; and the ‘high’ slope is negative and significant. In column (3) of Table 1.5, we 
find that 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ Low is positive and significant (p<0.05) and 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ High is 
negative and significant (p<0.01). It again supports the inverted U-shaped relationship. 
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Table 2.5: Robustness Checks without Quadratic Functional From Assumption (Retailer A) 
Dependent Variable: Sales (𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒉) 
 Spline Regressions (3) 
Two-Line Test 
(4) 
Higher Order 
Power 
(1) 
One knot 
(2) 
Two knots 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 1 4.30*** 6.60***   
(0.88) (1.23)   
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 2 -2.54*** 0.02   
(0.42) (0.96)   
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 3  -2.82***   
 (0.48)   
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ Low   1.58**  
  (0.63)  
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ High   -4.07***  
  (0.59)  
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ   20.57  
  (31.06)  
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ    1.64*** 
   (0.46) 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2     -0.03*** 
   (0.006) 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
3     -0.00002 
   (0.00002) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5312 5312 5312 5312 
Adjusted R
2
 0.8176 0.8181 0.8175 0.8203 
Note. The following control variables were included in all of the regressions: store traffic and its 
square, store labor, promotion indication, interactions between hour-block dummies and day-of-
the-week dummies, and monthly dummies. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Finally, we include cubic power for fitting room traffic in (1) to test for higher order 
effects in our model. In column (4) of Table 2.5, we still find that 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2   is negative 
and significant (p<0.01) whereas 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
3  is insignificantly differentiated from zero, 
again supporting the inverted U-shaped relationship. Including cubic term does not improve 
adjusted R
2
 indicating that the quadratic functional form is parsimonious. We do not add cubic 
power of store traffic in this model as the VIF increases above ten. Nonetheless, addition of this 
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variable does not change our conclusions about the inverted-U relationship between fitting room 
traffic and sales.   
In conclusion, we identify the negative impact of congestion by showing the inverted U-
shaped relationship between fitting room traffic and store sales consistent with thwarting 
behavior.  
2.5.2 Alternate explanations 
While the archival data help us demonstrate the presence of an inverted-U relationship 
between fitting room traffic and sales, these data do not help us draw any causal inferences 
between thwarting behavior and sales. In fact, there are possible alternate explanations why we 
may observe the inverted-U relationship between fitting room traffic and sales even when there 
is no thwarting behavior. The rest of the store is likely to be congested when the fitting room is 
congested so the store sales could decline as a result of poor service in the rest of the store, 
phantom stockouts in the rest of the store, long waiting times in the checkout counter, or 
customers may decide to purchase less because of the crowded environment (Eroglu and 
Machleit 1990). It is impossible to rule out all alternative explanations without detailed data of 
all events concurrently occurring in the store during congestion. So, we conduct a field study and 
a field experiment to provide direct evidence for the thwarting behavior and to quantify its 
impact on store sales. In the field study we directly observe the behaviors of customers to 
determine if they exhibit thwarting behavior. While the field study could show if customers 
indeed change their behavior when they experience congestion consistent with thwarting 
behavior, it does not explicitly reveal the impact of this change in behavior on sales decline. As 
we expect thwarting behavior to decrease sales due to increase in waiting time for others leading 
to balking and reneging as well as phantom stockouts, we subsequently run a field experiment to 
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isolate the impact of one of these factors on a decline in sales to show that thwarting behavior 
can indeed have a significant impact on store sales. 
2.6 Field Study: Evidence of Thwarting Behavior  
In this section, we describe a field study where we observe customer behavior when they 
experience congestion and when they do not in order to provide direct evidence for the presence 
of thwarting behavior. We use an observational study rather than a field experiment to study the 
impact of congestion on customer behavior due to the challenges involved in randomizing 
congestion across subjects (i.e., customers). We explain the ideal field experiment to study the 
problem and then present our research design, its limitations, and how we overcome potential 
selection biases in the next sections.  
2.6.1 Theory: Ideal experiment 
An ideal experiment would require randomizing the level of congestion perceived by 
each customer entering the fitting room area and their behavior noted. In other words, the 
treatment would be the level of congestion perceived by each customer and the outcome data 
would include the number of clothes taken inside the fitting room, amount of time spent in the 
fitting room, and the number of clothes left behind in the fitting room. We wish to measure the 
amount of time spent in the fitting room as it is unclear whether customers who take more 
clothes to fitting rooms speed up their trials as they are aware of waiting customers. This could 
cause waiting time for other customers to be unaffected even when more clothes are being taken 
into the fitting rooms. We follow Harrison and List (2004) to formalize the ideal experiment 
below. Let 𝑦𝑖1 and 𝑦𝑖0 be the outcomes of customer i under treatment (𝑇 = 1) and control (𝑇 =
0), respectively. Then the average treatment effect on the treated can be defined as 𝐴𝑇𝑇 =
𝔼(𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑖0|𝑇 = 1). Since one of counterfactuals is missing, we do not observe 𝔼(𝑦𝑖0|𝑇 = 1) 
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and 𝔼(𝑦𝑖1|𝑇 = 0) in our data. Therefore, the reported treatment effect on the treated is 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝔼(𝑦𝑖1|𝑇 = 1) − 𝔼(𝑦𝑖0|𝑇 = 0) = 𝔼(𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑖0|𝑇 = 1) + {𝔼(𝑦𝑖0|𝑇 = 1) −
𝔼(𝑦𝑖0|𝑇 = 0)}. The Reported ATT differs from the true ATT due to the presence of selection bias, 
{𝔼(𝑦𝑖0|𝑇 = 1) − 𝔼(𝑦𝑖0|𝑇 = 0)}. The normal approach used by experimentalists is to get rid of 
the selection bias using randomization. 
In our case, we could not randomize congestion in the retail store. The decision on how 
many items to carry into the fitting room would be made based on whether an individual 
perceived congestion or not. It may depend upon many factors including checkout queues, the 
number of customers entering the store along with them, and the number of customers shopping 
in the same section. Manipulating all of these factors to change individual consumers’ perception 
of congestion is hard for several reasons. First, the retailer we worked with insisted that we do 
not affect customer operations in anyway. Second, our analysis with archival data shows that 
congestion could lead to lower sales; hence, getting permission to run such an experiment would 
be difficult. So, we do not randomize congestion but let it be exogenously determined by store 
traffic. Since selection bias could be an issue in the absence of randomization of the treatment, 
we carefully design the field study to handle potential selection biases as explained in the next 
section. 
2.6.1.1 Handling selection biases 
A selection bias could occur when customers in the two groups, i.e., those who 
experience congestion and those who do not, are systematically different. This is possible as 
congestion is correlated with factors such as day-of-the-week and promotion as traffic tends to be 
higher during weekends and during promotional periods. Also, prior research shows that 
weekday (Monday-Friday) customers are different from weekend (Saturday-Sunday) customers 
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(Lam et al. 2001). So, we design our field study to observe customers under treatment and 
control conditions during the same day so that we remove any day-specific effects. In addition, it 
is possible that customers who arrive during peak hours, when there is congestion, could be 
different from those who arrive during non-peak hours, when it is less likely to have congestion. 
So, instead of defining congestion based on the time of arrival, we define it based on the state of 
congestion perceived by each customer when they decide to take clothes into the fitting room. 
The amount of congestion perceived by each customer could depend upon factors such as the 
number of visible customers in the store who were entering or leaving it, the length of the cashier 
line, and the number of customers who were shopping alongside them in the same area of the 
store. Since these factors are hard to measure, we adopt an alternate metric as a proxy for the 
level of congestion perceived by each customer in the store. We track the number of occupied 
fitting rooms when each customer enters the fitting room and use the utilization rate as a proxy 
for the level of congestion experienced by the customer. So, even within the same peak hour, as 
defined by the hour-of-the-day rather than traffic-based metrics, it is possible for some customers 
to experience congestion and for others to not. This measure of congestion also helps us mitigate 
another type of selection bias due to customer balking. If customers balk during highly congested 
periods, then the observed behavior is only of patient (or the most motivated) customers who 
may be different from the overall population. Since balking is more likely to be severe when 
there are long queues, we avoid an all-or-nothing approach to congestion but measure it at 
different levels based on room occupancy. Our assumption is that at lower levels of congestion, 
customers could still exhibit thwarting but they are less likely to balk.  
It is also possible that customers shopping in typically congested stores might be different 
from customers shopping in typically uncongested stores due to heterogeneity across stores such 
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as store management team, associates, and display of items. So, we observe customers in the two 
groups within the same store. Demographic differences such as gender and age might drive 
differences in customer behavior as well. So, we observe only a particular women’s fitting room 
area where fitting room users are all female and in a similar ages. Finally, another source of 
selection bias could occur when customers shopping in different part of the store are different 
populations. For example, the store manager at Retailer B informed us that customers who shop 
for formal dresses are generally different from those who shop for swimsuits or casual wear. So, 
we observe differences in behavior between customers who experience congestion and those 
who do not in the same fitting room area. 
2.6.2 Field study at retailer B 
We could not conduct a field study at retailer A due to lack of access, so we sought out 
another retailer, B, to conduct this part of the study. Retailer B permitted us to position a female 
research assistant (RA) in the women’s fitting room area who was able to collect customer-level 
and item-level data. After confirming the presence of the inverted-U relationship at retailer B 
(see Appendix), we use the observational data collected through our field study to provide direct 
evidence for thwarting behavior. Next, we provide background about retailer B and explain the 
field study design in detail.  
We conducted the field study observing customer behavior at one of Retailer B’s stores 
located in North Carolina in April and May 2015. Retailer B is a U.S.-based department store 
like retailer A, but larger. This retailer operated around 300 stores in the U.S. as of May 2015 
with the average store size being 100,000 sq. ft. The store in which we conducted the field study 
had two floors. The first floor was mainly for men’s, children’s apparel, and home goods and the 
second floor was primarily for women’s apparel, accessories, shoes, and cosmetics. The studied 
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store of retailer B had multiple smaller fitting room areas (bottom picture in Figure 2.2) with 3–4 
rooms inside each area. For example, Polo Ralph Lauren in the men’s apparel section had its 
own fitting room area, with 4 rooms.  
We chose two fitting room areas, one on the first floor (4 rooms) and the other on the 
second floor (3 rooms), where the apparel categories and brands around these areas were similar. 
We chose weekends for our study to observe both customers who experienced congestion and 
those who did not because we found limited evidence of congestion during weekdays in our 
preliminary observation. This store had higher traffic on Saturdays compared to Sundays. Both 
fitting room areas had their own checkout counters (see the bottom picture of Figure 2.2), where 
we collect POS information.  
2.6.2.1 Data collection  
A female RA stationed in the fitting room area collected customer-level data during the 
hours 12 PM–6 PM for four days spanning three weekends. She observed customers entering the 
fitting room area on two Saturdays and two Sundays. She recorded the times of entry and exit of 
customers from the fitting room and the number of clothes they were carrying. Since the RA 
could not interact with customers, the number of clothes carried by customers was only an 
estimate based on visual inspection. Because customers typically bring few items of clothes and 
do so with their hangers made it easy to count the number of clothes. 
On the contrary, it was difficult for us to track the number of clothes carried back by 
customers when they exited fitting rooms as they had typically removed clothes from their 
hangers. Furthermore, we could not count the clothes left-behind by each customer in the fitting 
room as this would require us to visit the fitting room each time a customer exited and cause 
disruption to other customers. Therefore, we use an alternative approach to obtain a proxy for the 
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number of items left-behind by each customer. We track the number of items brought by 
associates from fitting rooms to a recovery rack from 12 PM to 6 PM for two days. Because we 
knew the number of customers who used the fitting rooms between two consecutive recovery 
operations by an associate, we could calculate the average number of items left-behind by each 
customer. Since this analysis precludes the identification of congestion level experienced by each 
individual customer, we put together customers into two groups; those who shopped on Saturday 
and those who shopped on Sunday, with an assumption that those who shopped on Saturday 
experienced congestion while those on Sunday did not. Prior literature (Lam et al. 2001) finds 
that weekend shoppers may be different from weekday shoppers but no difference between 
Saturday and Sunday shoppers have been identified so far. Hence we assume that the shoppers 
are similar so there is no selection bias as a result of our design.  
We also measure the magnitude of phantom stockouts among items left behind in the 
fitting rooms to examine the impact of this thwarting behavior on lost sales. We do so by 
scanning each item left behind in the fitting rooms using a POS scanner to check the in-store 
availability of those SKUs.   
2.6.3 Results  
2.6.3.1 Thwarting behavior 1: Bringing more clothes into fitting rooms increases waiting 
time for other customers 
  
We observe a total of 209 customers over 24 non-continuous hours spanning three 
weekends. Using the definition of congestion based on the occupancy rate of the fitting rooms as 
a proxy for the congestion perceived by each customer (explained in §2.6.1.1.), Table 2.6 shows 
results of the two-sample t-test with an assumption of both equal and unequal variances between 
two groups. We find that customers brought an average of 4.38 items into the fitting room when 
they did not experience congestion, whereas they brought an average of 5.76 items into the 
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fitting room when they experienced congestion. So, customers who face congestion bring 1.38 
additional clothes into the fitting room (p<0.01). It is possible that customers who enter fitting 
room area during congestion might speed-up their trials as they are aware of others waiting to 
use the room. However, our results show that it is not the case as they occupy fitting rooms 1.87 
minutes longer (112 seconds, p<0.05) than those who enter the fitting rooms when there was no 
congestion. Thus, we find support that the waiting time for other customers increases during 
congested periods as customers take more clothes into the fitting rooms to try on.  
Table 2.6: Impact of Congestion on the Number of Items and Time Spent in the Fitting 
Room (Retailer B) 
  Mean (Std. dev.) 
 # obs 
(N=209) 
Number of items brought 
into the fitting room 
Time spent in the fitting 
room (Seconds) 
Non-congestion 143 4.38 (2.87) 490.45 (373.58) 
Congestion 66 5.76 (3.56) 602.61 (332.58) 
Difference  -1.38 -112.16 
t-test  p-value of H1 (Diff < 0) 
Equal (unequal) 
variances 
 0.0016 (0.0034) 0.0191 (0.0155) 
Congestion: fitting room occupancy of  3 & 4 for the first floor and 2 & 3 for the second floor. 
Non-congestion: fitting room occupancy of 0, 1, & 2 for the first floor and 0 & 1 for the second 
floor. 
 
We perform several robustness checks. First, even though we compare customers in the 
same store on the same day at the same hour, we also run a regression with hour and date 
controls to see whether our finding is affected by these factors. We still find that customers 
brought 1.42 extra clothes into the fitting rooms (p<0.01) and occupied fitting rooms 1.87 
minutes longer (112 seconds, p=0.057) when they experienced congestion. This result indicates 
that our model free evidence does not suffer from selection biases due to hour and date because 
we carefully dealt with them as explained in §2.6.1.1. 
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Second, we conduct a two-sample t-test on each floor separately and obtain consistent 
results. Third, we compare the average number of items brought by customers into the fitting 
room and time spent by them in the fitting room by each state of fitting room occupancy. 
Compared to low fitting room occupancy (i.e., 0 or 1 occupied rooms when a customer entered a 
fitting room), we still find that customers who entered the fitting room at the high fitting room 
occupancy state (i.e., 3 or 4 for the fitting room area on the 1
st
 floor and 2 or 3 for the fitting 
room area on the 2
nd
 floor) carried more items and occupied fitting rooms longer. Finally, we 
simply compare the average number of clothes brought by customers into the fitting room and 
time spent by them in the fitting room on Saturday (high traffic) with those on Sunday (low 
traffic) and obtain similar results. 
2.6.3.2 Thwarting behavior 2: Leaving behind more clothes in fitting rooms increases 
chance of lost sales due to phantom stockouts  
 
We note that evidence of customers taking more clothes into the fitting rooms during 
congestion does not automatically imply that customers will leave behind more clothes as well. 
This is because customers could either choose to purchase more or decide to replace the clothes 
back in the shelves or recovery rack. In both cases the sales would be high and phantom 
stockouts due to misplaced inventory will be low.  
We track an associate’s recovery operation of items left behind in the fitting room to the 
recovery rack from 12 PM to 6 PM on one weekend. So we have information about (1) the time 
at which an associate brought out misplaced items from the fitting room to the recovery rack and 
(2) the number of those items. We divide the total number of items that an associate brought out 
from the fitting rooms by the total number of customers who used fitting rooms during 
associate’s two consecutive cleanups to obtain the average number of items left behind in the 
fitting rooms by each customer for a given period. Then we compare the average of this metric 
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on Saturday with that on Sunday using a two-sample t-test. Consistent with our thwarting 
behavior argument, we find that, on average, customers left behind 2.69 items more in the fitting 
room on Saturday than Sunday (4.98 vs. 2.29, p=0.069).  
Having established that customers leave behind more clothes in the fitting room when 
they face congestion, we next turn our attention to the magnitude of phantom stockouts among 
those misplaced items. If the misplaced items in the fitting rooms happen to be the last available 
items in the store then lost sales can occur due to phantom stockouts. To check the magnitude of 
phantom stockouts among misplaced items in the fitting room, we scanned 559 items moved 
from fitting rooms to the recovery rack over another 12 hour period across two days (Table 2.7). 
Among 559 misplaced items, we find that 38.6% (216 items) were unique items in the store. In 
other words, 38.6% of the items left behind in the fitting rooms experienced phantom stockouts. 
We also find that 34.7% of these misplaced items had only one additional inventory in the store 
according to the POS system. Since inventory records are updated once a day, it is likely that 
many of these items might be the last inventory in the store, making our estimate of 38.6% 
phantom stockouts conservative.  
Table 2.7: Phantom Stockouts (Retailer B) 
# of items 
(%) 
Total 
items 
# of available items in the store 
1 2 3 4 Over 5 
Day 1 223 
(100%) 
78 
(34.98%) 
88 
(39.46%) 
25 
(11.21%) 
16 
(7.17%) 
16 
(7.17%) 
Day 2 336 
(100%) 
138 
(41.07%) 
106 
(31.55%) 
55 
(16.37%) 
22 
(6.55%) 
15 
(4.46%) 
Total 559 
(100%) 
216 
(38.64%) 
194 
(34.7%) 
80 
(14.31%) 
38 
(6.8%) 
31 
(5.55%) 
Note. Day 1 is Sunday and day 2 is Saturday. Detailed information (e.g., price) is obtained in day 
2. 
  The high volume of phantom stockouts that we observe can be especially costly to 
retailers if the misplaced items have high prices, so we next compare the prices of items 
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misplaced in the fitting rooms with the prices of other items in the immediate sales area. We 
collect price information for items left behind in the fitting rooms over a six hour period in day 2. 
In addition, we also collect information on size, clearance item or not, and the number of 
swimsuits because the store manager suspected that phantom stockouts could be driven by these 
factors. Of the 336 misplaced items in day 2 (Table 2.7), we found 138 items experienced 
phantom stockouts. Among these 138 items, 7% were clearance items (10 items) and 15% were 
swimwear (21 items). In addition, phantom stockouts occurred in all sizes, so they were not 
restricted to extreme sizes. The average price of items left behind in the fitting rooms was $53.77 
and the average price of phantom stockout items was $61.53. Using price data for all SKUs in 
the immediate selling floor near the fitting room area, we found the average price of 3,200 SKUs 
to be $46. This indicates that the items left behind in fitting rooms were indeed high-price items 
and the phantom stockout items are even expensive items with significant opportunity costs. This 
is consistent with our assumption on higher basket value for fitting room users in the conceptual 
model (Figure 2.1). Further details about phantom stockouts are available in the Appendix (see 
Tables 5.1.3 and 5.1.4).  
To summarize, we find evidence for two mechanisms that impose negative externalities 
on other customers due to the thwarting behavior of customers. Our results show that customers 
who face congestion carry a few more extra items (1.38) into the fitting rooms and leave more 
items behind (2.69) compared to those who did not face congestion. Recall that customers take 
5.76 clothes during congestion and leave behind 4.98 of them. These results suggest a double-
whammy effect where not only do customers purchase less when they face congestion, as they 
are leaving behind almost everything that they take inside during congested periods, but also 
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induce negative externality as they reduce the likelihood of purchase by other customers due to 
an increase in waiting time and phantom stockouts. 
2.7 Field Experiment: Mitigating the Negative Impact of Phantom Stockouts 
While the field study shows that customers exhibit thwarting behavior, it does not 
explicitly reveal the impact of this behavior on sales decline. As we explained earlier, there are 
several alternative explanations for sales decline so it is unclear whether thwarting behavior 
alone can cause significant drop in sales. In this section, we isolate the impact of thwarting 
behavior on store sales.  
We expect thwarting behavior to decrease sales due to increase in waiting time for others 
leading to balking and reneging as well as phantom stockouts. Quantifying lost sales directly is 
hard as it requires us to observe all incidences of balking, reneging, and phantom stockouts due 
to thwarting behavior. Hence we take an alternative approach. We mitigate the negative 
consequence of thwarting behavior and measure the increase in store sales. We may do so by 
speeding up customer operations to reduce waiting time for others and by providing a backend 
recovery operation in fitting rooms to move misplaced inventory to the recovery rack where it 
can be re-shelved. Retailer B did not wish to pursue any options that involve direct interactions 
with the customers so we could not speed-up customer operations. Instead we focus on an 
intervention aimed at reducing phantom stockouts by recovering misplaced items in the fitting 
room using an associate.  
While prior literature has shown the existence of phantom stockouts, its impact on lost 
sales has not been documented. This impact is not obvious because phantom stockouts do not 
necessarily lead to large lost sales as customers could contact store associates who might be able 
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to expend effort and find the products. Our experiment to document the impact of phantom 
stockouts on lost sales can therefore be valuable.    
2.7.1 Experimental design  
The goal of our experiment is to demonstrate that mitigating phantom stockouts in the 
fitting rooms, through a backend recovery operation using labor, can significantly improve store 
sales. This will help us demonstrate that thwarting behavior that causes increase in phantom 
stockouts has significant detrimental impact on store sales. So, in this experiment, the treatment 
condition involves use of an associate in the fitting room area to restock the left-behind 
merchandise and the control condition does not have an associate in the fitting room area. 
We choose two fitting room areas in the first and second floors to use one as the 
treatment and the other as the control during the same period. In other words, we track the sales 
during the intervention hours at both the treatment and control areas. This ensures that any time-
specific effects such as weather, day, peak-hour, or promotion are similar across customers in the 
treatment and control conditions. By choosing treatment and control in the same store, our design 
also allows us to control for store-specific factors such as management team, assortment, and 
competition. We choose two fitting room areas among 20 alternative areas where the apparel 
categories and brands around them were similar, to mitigate area-specific factors. Nonetheless, it 
is still possible for the customers using the treatment fitting room area to be different from those 
using the control fitting room area. So, we rotate the treatment and control between the fitting 
room areas in the first and second floors to mitigate any remaining area-specific effect. An added 
advantage of this approach is that we can minimize any spillover effects that can happen with 
customers drifting from treatment to control or vice versa as we choose treatment and control 
areas in different floors.  
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2.7.2 Implementation and methodology 
The implementation of our experiment presents a number of challenges. Enduring 
adherence to experimental design is harder to obtain in the case of experiments with labor as 
store associates may not follow the instructions we provide. For instance, we require the 
associate in our field experiment to perform a recovery operation of merchandise left behind in 
the fitting rooms but not interact with customers as it could confound our results. Further, we 
find that store managers placed greater emphasis on customer-facing tasks so they were tended to 
move the associate from fitting room area to tasks that involve directly helping customers. So, 
we had to be present in the store during the entire duration of the experiment to ensure adherence. 
This also limits the amount of time we can run the experiment. 
We run the experiment for three weekends in April and May 2015 from 12 PM to 6 PM. 
On one of the days, we could find the additional associate for only 5 hours, so our total number 
of hourly (treatment) observations was 35. Table 1.8 shows the design of the experiment, which 
lasted for a total of four weeks, including post-experimental period. We collect our last week of 
data in the absence of the associate, to further confirm that we were not capturing an overall 
time-trend effect. We obtained hourly sales information for two fitting room areas from their 
own checkout counters. 
Table 2.8: Experiment Design (Retailer B) 
 Fitting room on the 1
st
 floor Fitting room on the 2
nd
 floor 
Week 1 Treatment  Control 
Week 2 Control Treatment 
Week 3 Treatment Control 
Week 4 Control Control 
Control: Current staffing practice. Treatment: Having an associate restocking items left behind in 
the fitting room area. 
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We used the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator to measure the impact of 
mitigating phantom stockouts on sales in the corresponding checkout counter. The critical 
assumption underlying the DiD estimator is the existence of a parallel trend. That is, the two 
groups would follow the same trend in the absence of treatment. In our context, because the 
control and treatment fitting room areas were very similar in terms of products displayed around 
them and they were located in the same store, it was highly likely that the parallel trend 
assumption held. We also found evidence of a parallel trend from the statistical tests of 
difference in trends across these fitting room areas. 
If the null hypothesis is that, without treatment, sales generated by the fitting rooms on 
the 1
st
 floor (or 2
nd
 floor) over sales generated by the fitting rooms on the 2
nd
 floor (or 1
st
 floor) is 
constant, then we could use the following regression to examine the effect of treatment. 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑓𝑑ℎ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑓𝑑ℎ + 𝛼2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝛼4𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚ies + 𝛼5𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑓𝑑ℎ 
(2.2) 
where subscript f denotes floor, d denotes date, and h denotes hour. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑑ℎ = 1 in the 
first floor for weekends in weeks 1 and 3 and for the second floor for a weekend in week 2 from 
12 PM to 6 PM; otherwise, it equals zero. The coefficient of interest is 𝛼1, which can be 
interpreted as the sales change due to treatment. We control for other factors such as hour-of-the-
day, date, day-of-the-week, and month.  
2.7.3 Results  
Table 2.9 shows that an increase in sales for the checkout counter allocated to the treated 
fitting room area due to a backend recovery operation provided by an associate in the fitting 
room area varied from $186.93 (p<0.01, Model 1) to $177.7 (p<0.01, Model 2), depending on 
control variables included in the regression. We found that the $186.93 increase in sales 
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constituted a 22.6% increase in average hourly sales at this checkout counter during peak hours. 
Given that the wage rate was less than $15 per hour and the gross margin was about 40%, we 
show that this increase in labor in the fitting room area would be profitable. As a robustness 
check, we performed analysis for each floor and obtained consistent results. 
Table 2.9: Impact on Sales of Recovery Operations by Fitting Room Associate (Retailer B) 
Dependent Variable: Hourly Sales Model (1) Model (2) 
Treatment 186.93*** 177.70*** 
 (52.13) (52.49) 
Promotion 895.66*** 942.02*** 
 (97.60) (89.74) 
Second Floor -24.86 -25.18 
 (20.22) (20.57) 
Hour dummies Yes Yes 
Date dummies Yes No 
Week, Day-of-the-week, & Month 
dummies 
No Yes 
Number of observations 648 648 
Number of treatments 35 35 
Adjusted R
2
 0.4404 0.4207 
Note. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
We find that mitigating phantom stockouts in the fitting rooms can improve store sales 
significantly. This shows that thwarting behavior leading to phantom stockouts can be 
detrimental to store performance. 
2.8 Managerial Implications and Conclusion 
To summarize, our archival data analysis shows an inverted-U relationship between 
fitting room traffic and store sales, consistent with thwarting behavior. Our field study shows that 
consumers indeed change behavior during congestion that could lead to increased waiting time 
for others and phantom stockouts. Finally, our field experiment reveals that these phantom 
stockouts cause significant lost sales in retail stores.  
Our study has direct managerial impact at retailers. For example, we demonstrate the 
need for excellence in store execution by showing a large magnitude of phantom stockouts at 
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retailer B when the fitting rooms were not well attended. Although retailer B’s management was 
aware of the challenges posed by misplaced inventory, they did not realize the large impact on 
lost sales. Retailer B had therefore followed a policy of re-shelving items on the recovery racks 
just before the store closed when store is not crowded. Our study shows that such a policy would 
lead to significant phantom stockouts during congested periods, leading to lower sales. In 
response to our findings, retailer B changed its policy to continuously monitor fitting rooms and 
to pay special attention to them during congested hours. 
Other aspects of our findings can be further generalized to other retailers and other 
organizations in different industries. First, we identify thwarting behavior, defined as a change in 
customer’s behavior when they experience congestion in a way that induces negative 
externalities on other customers. Thwarting behavior is especially problematic if organizations 
have self-service operating systems with little or no monitoring, where customers determine their 
service speed. According to the recent report of Allied Market Research (Shende 2015), global 
self-service technology market will expand to $31.75B by 2020 with an annual growth rate of 
13.98% during the forecast period 2015–2020. Some of the self-service environments include 
ticketing kiosks at movie theaters, bus and train stations, and parking lots; ATMs; food-ordering 
kiosks at restaurants such as McDonald’s and Chili’s; self-checkout kiosks at retail outlets; DVD 
rental kiosks at redbox; gasoline stations; and bike-sharing programs. Future research can test for 
the presence of thwarting behavior in these settings. For example, thwarting behavior in bike-
sharing programs can manifest if customers had rather pay extra to retain bikes during congested 
periods rather than return and pick-up later for fear of losing bikes when they need them. In this 
particular case, while the sales may not be impacted in the short-term such strategic behavior 
may lead to long-term adoption problems. So, unlike recent studies (e.g., Gavett 2015 and 
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references therein) show that self-service technologies can benefit sales, our study argues for 
caution and a need for understanding customer behavior especially during congestion.  
Second, our paper offers insights on how labor can be used to boost store sales. Retailers 
tend to be budget-driven and view labor as a short-term expense rather than as a driver of sales 
(Ton 2009; Fisher and Raman 2010), resulting in understaffing chronically during peak hours 
(Mani et al. 2015). Under the environment of limited labor resource, using labor in a way to 
increase store sales is important. Our study demonstrates that the cost of having an associate in 
the fitting room area performing a backend recovery operation of misplaced merchandise in the 
fitting rooms could pay for itself and even more from the increase in sales. Using gross margin of 
40% for retailer B and less than $15 hourly wage, we can conclude that having an associate in 
the fitting room area yields a positive ROI. 
Like other empirical studies, our research has limitations related to data availability. Our 
store traffic and fitting room traffic data capture the total number of visits, not the number of 
visits by unique customers. In other words, if fitting room users make multiple trips to the store, 
they would be counted as multiple visits. Our results, however, are conservative, as we currently 
assume one visit per customer. If customers must make multiple visits before making their 
purchase, the impact of congestion on sales would be larger. Also, no extant technologies allow 
retailers to distinguish group shoppers, who may arrive with friends or family members to simply 
observe and offer opinions rather than to make purchases themselves, from single shoppers. This 
could cause measurement error in our variables for retailer A, but is not relevant for retailer B, 
where we observed every customer and identified group shoppers. Thus, our data analysis at 
retailer B relaxes some of these concerns. 
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Future research could have a number of venues. It would be interesting to understand the 
causes of thwarting behavior and ways to manage it. For example, how is the thwarting behavior 
linked to the patience threshold of customers? Researchers have pointed out that it is important 
for the OR and OM community to incorporate findings in behavioral literature in the design of 
queueing systems for service firms (Bitran et al. 2008). We hope that this new phenomenon 
identified in our paper, thwarting, is considered in the design of queueing systems.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Can Incentives Improve Labor Scheduling Decisions? Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment 
3.1 Introduction 
 Over the past several decades, the role of incentives in improving performance has been 
widely debated. On the one hand, theoretical literature on agency theory, expectancy theory, and 
goal-setting theory argue that incentives make agents exert more effort that leads to better 
performance (see Prendergast 1999 for an overview). These theoretical predictions have been 
validated by empirical research in economics, accounting, and marketing (for example, Banker et 
al. 2000, Lazear 2000, Paarsch and Shearer 2000, and Oettinger 2001). On the other hand, 
psychologists and behaviorists have provided a contrary viewpoint. Based on a meta-analysis of 
over one hundred experimental studies, Deci et al. (1999) conclude that in most instances 
extrinsic rewards have a negative effect on intrinsic motivation. Despite large empirical research 
around pay-for-performance incentives in other streams, there is limited empirical research in 
operations management (OM) that has examined the role of pay-for-performance incentives in 
improving operational outcomes with field data. 
 There are multiple reasons why examining the impact of pay-for-performance incentives 
on operational decisions would be valuable. First, large organizations often invest heavily in 
software based solutions to aid decision making. This trend is expected to increase with greater 
use of data analytics techniques such as machine learning and artificial intelligence for decision 
making. So, it is unclear whether financial incentives for managers are even required to obtain 
better decisions in organizations. Second, lab-based experiments have shown that the impact of 
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incentives on performance depends upon the type of tasks (Libby and Lipe 1992) and complexity 
of the task (Pelham and Neter 1995). Since operational tasks are often complex it is unclear 
whether incentives can improve operational outcomes. Finally, there is a long history of 
analytical research that designs optimal supply chain contract through economic incentives (see 
Cachon 2003 for an overview). This literature generally assumes that agents are self-interested 
and rational and react strongly to incentives. Examining how individual agents make operational 
decisions in the face of incentives is critical to substantiate the underlying assumptions of this 
large body of literature. 
 Using a novel dataset from a quasi-experimental setting at a retailer, we examine if 
incentives are effective in improving labor scheduling outcomes at a retailer that changed its 
incentive plan for store managers from strong financial incentives to meeting labor budget to 
almost zero financial incentives to meeting labor budget. Managers had to stay close to the labor 
budget as being under the labor budget could signal lower customer service due to understaffing 
and going over the labor budget implies overstaffing. Using weekly sales (actual and forecasts 
from manager and software) and labor (actual, planned, and budget) data for 75 stores over 47 
weeks, we test whether introduction of new weakened financial incentive plan is associated with 
worsening of overall labor scheduling outcomes and their underlying decisions (forecasting, 
labor planning, and execution). 
 Our field research site provides a nice quasi-experimental setting in which to address the 
research questions. In the old incentive plan, managers were paid a bonus based on two 
components. The first component is whether quarterly sales exceed sales in the same quarter in 
the previous year. For every 1% year-over-year sales growth rate, store managers are eligible to 
receive 1% of their annual salary as a bonus. The second component was based on the deviation 
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of actual labor from labor budget. The labor budget was calculated based on multiple factors 
such as actual sales, size of the store, and labor productivity. If store managers exceed their labor 
budget (after normalized by actual sales) by 0.1%, then their eligible bonus from the first step 
will be reduced by 10%. In the new incentive plan, stores became eligible for bonuses only when 
the firm made a profit in that quarter. Since the profit for this retailer had significantly dropped in 
the previous 5 quarters and became negative in the previous quarter, we argue that this new 
threshold significantly reduced financial incentives for managers. Thus, the quasi-experiment can 
be described as a change from a strong financial incentive plan tied to meeting store sales target 
and labor budget to a weak one
2
. Moreover, tasks, technology, management, monitoring of stores, 
and other operational practices were the same under both incentive schemes. 
 Our primary findings are as follows. First, we find that store managers make more 
accurate labor scheduling decisions under the strong incentive scheme, indicating that incentives 
for store managers indeed help improve labor scheduling decisions. We measure total error in 
labor outcomes by the absolute percentage error between actual labor and labor budget which 
can capture store managers’ effort on scheduling labor to be closer to labor budget as both 
understaffing and overstaffing are worse-off. Overstaffing can result in smaller amount of bonus 
while understaffing can draw district managers’ attention as it can signal lower customer service 
level. The total error in labor outcomes is 2.44% larger under the weak incentive scheme 
compared to the strong incentive scheme period. This is a substantial difference as the average 
total error in labor outcomes is 5.65% in our data. So, the weak incentives have resulted in 43.19% 
worsening of labor scheduling decisions by managers. Similar to economics literature that has 
                                                          
2 In the Appendix, we describe an alternative interpretation for the change in incentive and provide an analysis 
supporting our interpretation. 
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found huge impact of incentive on productivity (see survey in Prendergast 1999)
3
, our surprising 
finding is not so much that labor decisions become worse with weakening of pay-for-
performance incentives but by how much. 
 Second, we find that the impact of financial incentives on labor scheduling decisions 
occurs mainly due to change in effort instead of selection mechanism. By considering stores 
without change in managers during study period, the total error in labor outcomes is 2.29% 
larger under the weak incentive scheme compared to the strong incentive scheme. Again, 
comparing to the average total error on labor outcomes of 5.37% for these stores, the weak 
incentives have resulted in 42.64% worsening of labor scheduling decisions. By showing that 
labor scheduling decisions become worse-off even after removing selection mechanism, our 
results demonstrate that incentives play a vital role in making managers exert more effort 
towards labor scheduling decisions. 
 Third, by decomposing outcomes of overall labor scheduling into three underlying 
decisions, we observe that financial incentives have differential impact on forecasting, labor 
planning, and execution. We find no evidence that incentives improve the accuracy of managers’ 
sales forecast. However, we find that stronger incentives are associated with higher efforts 
towards forecasting although this higher effort does not translate into more accurate forecasting. 
The labor planning error, measured by the absolute percentage error between planned labor and 
labor budget, is 1.3% larger under the weak incentive scheme. Comparing to 5.6% of the average 
labor planning error, this result shows that weakening incentives have resulted in 23.21% 
worsening on labor planning decisions. Finally, we find that managers adjust their labor plan to 
the new information available in the last mile – in the time period between when plan is 
                                                          
3 For example, Prendergast (2011) says “the surprising thing in this literature is not that productivity seems to go up 
when there is pay for performance, it is that it goes up by so much. It is not unusual to see productivity numbers 
going up by 25 percent to 35 percent.” 
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generated and executed – during the strong incentive period whereas they do not adjust much 
during the weak incentive period. This suggests lower efforts during plan execution under the 
weak incentive scheme. 
 This paper contributes to the OM literature in the following ways. Our paper shows the 
importance of financial incentives for managers even when they are aided by underlying 
software. According to the recent report
4
, the global market of workforce management solutions 
is estimated to grow from $4,880.3 million in 2015 to $7,725.8 million by 2020, at a compound 
annual growth rate of 9.6%. Even with such large investments, the role of the store manager in 
making labor decisions is not diminished as these software decisions may potentially be 
improved by store managers. 
 Second, our paper shows that the impact of financial incentives on operational decisions 
depends upon the type of task. We observe an improvement in labor planning and execution 
decisions but do not see any improvement in forecasting decisions. Overall, our results show that 
financial incentives have differential impact on forecasting, labor planning and execution 
decisions of store managers as each task may require different types of effort and have different 
sensitivity to effort (Libby and Lipe 1992) and complexity (Pelham and Neter 1995). 
 Finally, our paper is one of the few studies that empirically examine the impact of 
incentive on operational outcomes as well as underlying decisions driving those outcomes. The 
study of pay-for-performance incentive on operational decision making is of great interest. Yet, 
empirical investigations in the OM literature are scarce partly due to the paucity of data. Notable 
exceptions include DeHoratius and Raman (2007), Guajardo et al. (2012) and Chan et al. (2014). 
                                                          
4
 See "Workforce Management Market by Solution, by Service, by Deployment, by Organization Size, by Vertical, 
by Region - Global Forecast to 2020" by marketsandmarkets.com, November 2015. 
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However, even these papers only examine the impact of incentives on outcomes while we are 
able to also study the impact on underlying decisions. 
3.2 Literature & Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Related literature 
Agency theory, among others such as expectancy theory and goal-setting theory, is one 
paradigm that suggests an effectiveness of performance-based incentive. In the basic agency 
model (for example, Basu et al. 1985, among others), a principal designs a contract to motivate 
an agent to exert unobservable efforts in a production process that is characterized by uncertainty. 
Given the performance-based incentive, the agent encounters a trade-off between his dis-utility 
for effort and his expected utility for higher compensation resulting from improved performance 
and risk bearing. 
Prior literature studied the impact of performance-based incentive on productivity in top 
executives level as well as front-line employee level. Studied by Abowd (1990), Brooks et al. 
(2001), Morgan and Poulsen (2001) find that the introduction of incentive for top executives that 
pays based on their performance results in increased performance. Research concerning front-
line employees also documents similar productivity gains from bonus-based incentive scheme 
consistent with effort effects. Banker et al. (1996) find an immediate increase in sales upon the 
adoption of bonus incentive plan for sales consultants. Lazear (2000) shows a rise in worker 
productivity upon the introduction of a piece-rate compensation plan for line employees at an 
installation facility. Paarsch and Shearer (2000) estimate higher productivity for workers under 
piece-rate at a tree-planting company. Oettinger (2001) finds that higher commission piece rates 
for vendors results in higher performance. Yet, the impact of performance-based incentive for 
middle-class managers such as store managers has studied little. As store managers play an 
57 
 
important role in retail context, understanding the value of incentive for store managers is vital 
for retail operations. 
One exception that studied store manager's incentive scheme is DeHoratius and Raman 
(2007). Using a quasi-experiment setting where retailer changed the incentive scheme to store 
managers, DeHoratius and Raman (2007) studied the impact of incentive on store managers' 
effort allocation between sales and inventory shrinkage. They found that when incentive is 
changed in a way that sales became more important than inventory shrinkage, store managers 
exert more effort on sales than inventory shrinkage. Our work is different from DeHoratius and 
Raman (2007) in the following aspects. First, while DeHoratius and Raman (2007) have a one-
way incentive, we have a two-way incentive. DeHoratius and Raman (2007) has a penalty if 
store has inventory shrinkage, thereby store managers try to minimize inventory shrinkage. 
Similarly, our setting has a penalty if store manager schedules too many labor than labor budget 
(i.e., overstaffing). In addition to a penalty, however, in our setting the bonus is contingent on 
sales (compared to its target) and understaffing could drive sales down. The district managers 
also monitor store managers’ performance and discuss it when it’s abnormal (e.g., severely 
understaffed or overstaffed). Hence, store managers try to be closer to the labor budget as both 
understaffing and overstaffing are inefficient. Second, while DeHoratius and Raman (2007) 
studied the impact of incentive on allocating efforts among multiple tasks, we estimate not only 
the impact of incentive change on labor outcomes, but also underlying decisions that led to those 
outcomes. 
Our paper is also related to empirical papers on the subject of supply chain contracting in 
the OM literature although it is scarce. In the context of maintenance service contract, Guajardo 
et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that the performance-based contract promotes reliability 
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improvement more than resource-based contract does using a dataset from a major commercial 
aircraft engine manufacturer. Chan et al. (2014) study similar issue of how different contracting 
mechanisms influence maintenance outcomes, but they focus on maintenance service contracts 
for medical equipment. Our work is different in two aspects. First, they study firm-to-firm setting, 
where customers pick contract from alternative contract options (e.g., performance-based 
contract vs. resource-based contract), while we consider within firm setting, where the incentive 
scheme for individuals changed. Second, they focus on the impact of contract change on 
operational outcomes such as reliability whereas we examine the impact of incentive change on 
both operational outcomes as well as its underlying decisions driving those outcomes. 
Finally, scholars have empirically studied a variety issues pertaining to workforce 
management in retail operations. Excellence in labor management has been identified as one of 
the key drivers of execution issues in store operations (Raman et al. 2001 and Fisher et al. 2007). 
Store labor has been found to increase profit (Ton and Huckman 2008, Kesavan et al. 2014, and 
Mani etal. 2015); sales (Kesavan et al. 2014, Tan and Netessine 2014, and Mani et al. 2015); 
basket value (Netessine et al. 2010); customer satisfaction (Ton and Huckman 2008); and service 
speed (Tan and Netessine 2014). Store labor also has been shown to decrease expenses (Kesavan 
et al. 2014) and phantom stockouts (Lee et al. 2017). Although numerous papers have examined 
labor issues in OM, there is no empirical research that has studied the role of incentives for store 
managers in their labor scheduling outcomes and their underlying operational decisions such as 
forecasting, labor planning, and execution. 
3.2.2 Hypotheses 
Store managers play a key role in managing labor in the retail industry. They are 
expected to hire the right person, train them, and schedule them to meet customer demand. Of 
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these activities, labor scheduling decision is particularly very important for retailer. Too little 
labor can result in lost sales and poor service, while too much labor can increase store expenses. 
Studies show that understaffed stores can lose 8.56% of sales (Mani et al. 2015) while 
overstaffed stores can lead to significant expenses as labor related expenses account for over 85% 
of the controllable store expense in one of the studies (Kesavan et al. 2014). In our research 
setting, store managers may expend considerable endeavor to maximize their bonus by 
scheduling the right amount of labor as labor scheduling decision is included in the incentive as a 
penalty. Once store managers hit the sales target, if they spend on labor exceeding labor budget, 
the amount of eligible bonus is reduced. Also the performance-based incentive plan in our 
research setting changed from strong to weak in the middle of the study period. Under the strong 
incentive scheme, 50% of eligible bonus was paid based on store performance and the remaining 
50% is paid based on retail chain performance, whereas under the weak incentive scheme, 100% 
of eligible bonus was paid based on retail chain performance. It is significant worsening because 
managers eligible to get the bonus due to higher store performance might not get the bonus if the 
retail organization does not perform well. Therefore, as growing evidence shows that 
performance-based incentive contracts lead to improved financial performance (Prendergast 
1999, Banker et al. 2000, Lazear 2000, Paarsch and Shearer 2000, and Oettinger 2001), the 
weakening of the bonus-based incentive plan for store managers will reduce managers’ desire to 
exert effort to improve outcomes of overall labor scheduling decisions. 
While the basic agency model of incentives predicts the negative impact of weakening 
the incentive on performance, store managers might continue to be motivated to keep their 
performance in a good shape as district managers provide (imperfect) monitoring and feedback 
of store managers' performance. Moreover, arguments from organization theory and cognitive 
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psychology support this viewpoint. In a meta-analysis of over one hundred experimental studies, 
Deci et al. (1999) conclude that in most cases rewards have a negative effect on intrinsic 
motivation. Some recent economic literature addresses the "hidden cost of incentives", focusing 
on agents' extrinsic rewards may "crowd out" any intrinsic motivation the agent has to complete 
the tasks (see Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2001) among others). 
Camerer and Hogarth (1999) also show that incentives hurt in difficult judgment or decision 
tasks when incentives make decision makers self-conscious about. Scheduling labor is not an 
easy task as it contains the numerous nuances. For example, in a case study of the 
implementation of labor scheduling software at Belk Inc., Bernstein et al. (2014) find that over 
70% of the schedules are over-written by store managers. Thus, the incentive for store managers 
might not work to improve labor scheduling decisions. This alternative explanation argues 
against any negative impacts from the weaker incentive. From these conflicting arguments, we 
propose the following hypothesis favorable to the agency theory: 
Hypothesis 1 (Labor scheduling outcomes): Store managers make overall labor scheduling 
decisions closer to the labor budget under the strong incentive scheme than under the weak 
incentive scheme. 
Economic theory suggests that performance-based incentive contracts can increase an 
organization’s overall performance (1) by attracting and retaining more productive employees 
(selection effect) and (2) by inducing employees to increase or to better allocate their effort 
(effort effect). The selection effect can occur because a performance-based incentive can act as a 
screening device that attracts and retains the most productive employees and discourages the 
least productive employees (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Thus, the weakening of the bonus-
based incentive plan for store managers at our research site could result in high ability managers 
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leaving the firm because their expected future wages under the weak incentive scheme are lower 
than their prior wages and more low ability managers remaining and joining the firm. Several 
experimental studies have provided supporting evidence by documenting that high skilled 
individuals select performance-based incentives when given a choice between piece rate and 
fixed pay. For example, in a laboratory setting, Cadsby et al. (2007) document that the sorting 
effect of performance-based contracts was more important in explaining performance than the 
effort effect. Using a survey of sales managers, Lo et al. (2011) show that sales agents with 
greater selling ability are associated with more high-powered incentives. Lazear (2000) finds that 
performance pay results in the hiring of higher ability workers. Banker et al. (2000) document 
that incentive pay results in attracting of workers who are more productive than those that leave. 
Thus, evidence is accumulating on the sorting effect of financial incentives. 
Sorting mechanism may play a key role when the firm hires many employees from a 
large pool of applicants and when the entrance barrier is low so that many people frequently join 
and leave. Changing store managers, however, is more difficult and rare compared to changing 
sales-force employees. As a result, in our setting, selection effect might not play a significant 
role to improve store managers’ performance due to incentives. To test this idea, we propose the 
following hypothesis which quantifies the effort effect by excluding selection effect: 
Hypothesis 2 (Effort): Store managers make overall labor scheduling decisions closer to the 
labor budget under the strong incentive scheme than under the weak incentive scheme when 
same managers make labor decisions in both periods. 
The outcomes of overall labor scheduling decisions by store managers consist of three 
component tasks: forecasting, labor planning, and execution. In order to have the right amount of 
labor in the store, it is vital to have accurate sales forecasts, plan associates appropriately, and 
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execute to the plan. The performance-based incentive scheme may drive store managers exert 
more effort for each of three tasks. With the strong performance-based incentive, store managers 
may forecast sales more accurately; plan labor closer to its target (i.e., labor budget); and exert 
execution effort to adjust their initial plan according to the new information available in the last 
mile such as demand pattern in the previous week. Accordingly, we propose the following three 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3 (Forecasting): Store managers forecast sales closer to the actual sales under the 
strong incentive scheme than under the weak incentive scheme. 
Hypothesis 4 (Labor planning): Store managers plan labor closer to the labor budget under 
the strong incentive scheme than under the weak incentive scheme. 
Hypothesis 5 (Execution): Store managers exert more effort on adjusting initial plan according 
to the new information in the last mile under the strong incentive scheme than under the weak 
incentive scheme. 
Even though we hypothesize the impact of incentives on managers’ effort for each task, 
we do not think the impact is identical. The performance-based incentive scheme may have 
differential impact on each task for labor scheduling decisions as each task may require different 
types of effort, have different sensitivity to effort, and have different task complexity. First, store 
managers need to exert different types of effort to fulfill each of three tasks in order to make the 
right labor scheduling decisions. For example, forecasting and labor planning may need for 
cognitive effort while execution may demand for relational effort. Forecasting requires managers 
to predict sales in the future under the uncertain environments which may need more cognitive-
intensive effort. Once the forecasting is made, labor planning requires managers to take pre-
existed constraints into account, which may demand cognitive effort (possibly less intensive than 
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forecasting). In contrast, execution requires managers to keep good relationship with associates, 
which can help them find back-up associates when someone is absent or have on-call scheduling 
smoothly if needed. Hence the execution effort is more relational than cognitive. Second, each 
component task for labor scheduling decision might have different sensitivity on effort. In the lab 
setting, prior literature (Libby and Lipe 1992) shows that tasks have different sensitivity on effort 
and the impact of incentive on performance is contingent on this effort-sensitivity. In our context, 
it is possible that effort might have a different marginal effect on performance. For instance, by 
exerting the same amount of effort on labor planning and forecasting, the improvement in 
performance can be much higher for planning task than forecasting task due to uncertain nature. 
Finally, different complexity in each task may affect the relation among incentives, effort, 
and performance. Broadly speaking, task complexity refers to the amount of attention or 
processing a task requires as well as the amount of structure and clarity the task provides. Thus, 
task complexity increases as the required amount of processing (i.e., task difficulty) increases 
and as the level of structure (i.e., task structure) decrease (Wood 1986 and Campbell 1988). 
Empirical findings from lab settings that use both cross-task and within-task definition of task 
complexity have shown that an increase in task complexity attenuates the positive effect of 
incentives on performance. For example, Pelham and Neter (1995) found that subjects performed 
better with incentives for the easy tasks while they did not perform well for the complex tasks. In 
our context, forecasting is a complex task as it is difficult and less structured. Even though 
managers get help from software tools, they still need to make a decision under uncertainty. 
Labor planning is a less complex task than forecasting as it is difficult but more structured. Labor 
planning typically requires managers follow pre-determined list of constraints. Execution is also 
a complex task as it is difficult and less structured. Managers should be capable of identifying 
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signals from noise and responding accordingly. While both forecasting and execution are 
complex tasks, they require different type of effort. Forecasting is more cognitive-intensive 
whereas execution is more interpersonal relation intensive. 
3.3 Data & Methodology 
3.3.1 Data sources 
Our data were obtained from a large U.S. based retailer with annual revenues exceeding 
$600 million. This company has over 100 stores in 22 states as of March 2017, with more than 5 
million square feet of selling space. More than 5,300 associates work on a daily basis in its stores. 
As a discount department store, this retailer sells primarily women’s, men’s, and children’s 
apparel, along with accessories, fragrances, and home furnishing goods. Its target customers are 
35- to 54-year-old working mothers. The study period was from February 2014 to December 
2014, where the retailer had 75 stores. 
We obtained the following data for the study period. First, we obtained weekly labor data 
from payroll database. It contains planned labor ($), actual labor ($) and labor budget ($). Labor 
budget is defined as the amount of labor the store should have had and calculated by a workforce 
software tool based on many factors such as actual sales, size of the store, labor productivity, 
marketing promotional activities, employee training, and cost of backend labor activities. Second, 
we possessed weekly actual and forecasted sales data. We have two different sales forecast for 
each week: (1) sales forecast from the software and (2) sales forecast adjusted by store managers. 
The retail chain invested on the software tool where it generates sales forecast based on historical 
data. Given the software forecast, store managers make their own sales forecast taking into 
account, among many other factors, the current trend and local knowledge. Having these two 
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different sales forecasts help us separate managers’ forecast decisions from their reference (i.e., 
software forecast). 
Now we provide details about labor scheduling process at this retailer and the incentive 
structure for store managers in the following subsections before defining variables and 
explaining empirical methodology. 
3.3.2 Labor scheduling process 
We illustrate store managers’ labor scheduling process at this retailer which consists of 
three main tasks: forecasting, labor planning, and execution. Figure 3.1 describes the labor 
scheduling process along with the time line for each decision. First, the store manager needs to 
accurately forecast sales. The retail chain provides store managers the sales forecast generated by 
the software tool taking into account mainly historical sales performance and seasonality. The 
retail chain ensures the software sales forecast to be available to store managers two weeks in 
advance. The store managers may update sales forecast based on their local knowledge such as 
store specific characteristics, sales trends, upcoming promotions, and new product introductions. 
It is also possible that store managers do not change software sales forecast if they believe the 
forecast is good enough or if they do not want to exert effort to improve forecast accuracy. 
 Second, the store manager needs to plan the appropriate number of associates to ensure 
coverage based on their sales forecast. Typically, retailers provide a scheduling software tool to 
help managers plan the right number of associates in the store. However, managers still need to 
exert effort to adjust plans recommended by the software tool as they often fail to capture 
numerous nuances of scheduling labor. For example, in a case study of the implementation of 
labor scheduling software at one of the large department stores in the U.S., Bernstein et al. (2014) 
find that over 70% of the schedules are over-written by store managers. Labor planning requires 
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the manager to match the availability of workers with labor requirements after taking into 
account a number of pre-existed constraints such as minimum shift length, employee type (part-
time vs. full-time), seniority, fairness, distribution of workers’ skills, budget limit, quality of life 
consideration, and other government or labor union constraints (Quan 2004). These plans are 
generally posted a week or more in advance so that associates can plan accordingly. 
 Lastly, the store manager needs to execute plan flawlessly in order to have the right 
number of associates in the store. Since labor plans are typically generated a week or more in 
advance (as shown in the bottom of Figure 3.1), it is possible that store managers obtain new 
information in the last mile – in the time period between when plan is generated and executed – 
either about demand or supply side. Hence managers need to react to the new information and 
ensure that the right number of associates show up for work at the right time. For the demand 
side information, managers may observe demand signal and use on-call
5
 scheduling. They call 
unscheduled associates to work in a few hours when they encounter an unexpectedly high 
demand whereas they let scheduled associates go home without working when they face an 
unexpectedly low demand. For the supply side information, managers may encounter different 
associates’ availability. Associates might call off for several reasons including illness, either 
associate’s or her child’s, transportation issues, and conflicts with scheduling a second job 
(Lambert and Henly 2010). The store manager exerts effort to find back-up associates to 
maintain the right number of associates in the store. 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 For recent debate on “on-call” shift, see “A push to give steadier shifts to part-timers” by Greenhouse S., The New 
York Times, July 15, 2014. 
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Figure 3.1: Labor Scheduling Process 
 
3.3.3 Incentive scheme 
We provide the details of incentive scheme for store managers used in this retail chain. 
This retail chain implemented a new incentive scheme at the beginning of second half of fiscal 
year 2014 (i.e., August). This quasi-experimental setting allows us identify the impact of 
incentive on store managers' overall outcomes of labor scheduling and its underlying decisions 
that led to those outcomes. 
The store manager’s bonus depends upon their store performance as well as the overall 
company performance. The store performance is measured based on the variance of actual sales 
from prior year’s sales and the variance of actual labor to labor budget. Both variances are 
measured in percentages of sales. The overall company performance is determined based on 
whether the company meets its EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and 
Amortization) goal or not. The way the company accounted for the store performance and 
company performance, and the frequency of payout changed during 2014 as explained below. 
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In the first two quarters of 2014, store managers were paid quarterly bonuses calculated 
in the following way. First, the year-over-year (YOY) sales growth rate was computed for each 
store in that quarter. Stores that had a decline in YOY sales growth did not receive any bonus. 
However, managers of stores with positive growth rate received 1% of their salary as a bonus for 
every 1% YOY growth up to 6% YOY growth. Beyond 6% YOY growth, the managers would 
get 1.3% of salary as an incremental bonus. If a store’s YOY sales growth rate was 107%, then a 
manager whose annual salary is $100,000 would be eligible to receive $7,300 as a bonus.  
Second, the deviation of actual labor from labor budget was calculated. Labor budget is 
calculated based on a workforce scheduling software that determines the amount of labor the 
store should have had based on many factors including actual sales it made in a given period, 
size of the store, labor productivity, marketing promotional activities, employee training, and 
cost of backend labor activities. In general, managers are assumed to spend too much expense on 
labor when actual labor is more than labor budget (i.e., overstaffing). The incentive scheme for 
store managers has a direct impact on bonus in case of overstaffing. For every 0.1% negative 
deviation between actual labor and labor budget (after divided by actual sales), the bonus 
calculated in the first step is reduced by 10%. From the same example above, if a store’s labor 
budget was 9% of sales and the store’s actual labor was 9.4% of sales, then the manager would 
be eligible to obtain only $4,380 as bonus for that quarter. On the contrary, when actual labor is 
less than labor budget (i.e., understaffing), managers are assumed to provide lower customer 
service. This might result in lost sales. Although understaffing does not tie with the bonus 
amount, it can have negative consequences to store managers. The district manager monitors 
store managers’ performance on a daily basis and discusses it if the performance is abnormal 
such as understaffing. As district manager can influence on store managers’ promotion, 
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managers tend to avoid understaffing. Thus, both overstaffing and understaffing could have a 
negative impact on store managers’ utility. 
The managers were paid 50% of the quarterly bonus 45 days after the quarter ended and 
the remaining 50% was paid at the end of the year depending on whether the company met its 
EBITDA goal or not. 
In the second half of 2014, the company made two changes. First, it decided to pay out 
bonuses annually as opposed to making any quarterly payments. Second, it made the manager’s 
bonus contingent on whether the company met its goals. So, if the company did not make its 
goals, then a manager would not receive any payment even if they exceeded sales targets and 
their payroll was less than the target amount. For example, a store manager who was eligible for 
$4,380 as bonus every quarter would have received $8,760 as bonus in that year according to the 
previous plan paid at the end of the quarter even if the company did not meet its EBITDA target 
but now would not receive any bonus if the company fails to do so. Since the profit for this 
retailer had significantly dropped in the previous 5 quarters and became negative in the previous 
quarter, we argue that this new threshold significantly reduced, if not eliminated completely, 
financial incentives for managers. No other organizational change took place during the study 
period. 
Monitoring of store manager performance 
While the financial incentives are paid out quarterly or annually, monitoring of store 
performance was done at daily, weekly, and monthly levels. Store managers reported to district 
managers who monitored the performance of the stores closely. Daily reports of store 
performance were sent to district managers. Unless the performance was abnormal, district 
managers did not discuss the daily reports. However, it was common to have a call every week to 
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review the previous week’s performance. The sales performance and payroll performance were 
discussed in detail during these calls. Greater emphasis was placed in monthly review calls when 
the performance for the previous month was discussed. 
3.3.4 Variables 
For the tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2, total error in overall labor scheduling decisions is 
measured as absolute deviation between actual labor and labor budget in percentages of labor 
budget: 𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 = |
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡
| for store 𝑖 and week 𝑡. This metric 
captures store managers’ effort on scheduling labor to be closer to labor budget as both 
overstaffing and understaffing can cause negative consequences. Overstaffing can result in 
reducing the amount of eligible bonus whereas understaffing can draw district managers’ 
attention as it can signal lower level of customer service. For the test of Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, 
we further disaggregate total error in overall labor scheduling decisions into its component tasks: 
forecasting, labor planning, and execution. Forecasting error is measured as absolute deviation 
between manager sales forecast and actual sales in percentages of actual sales: 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 = |
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡−𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
|. Labor planning error is measured as absolute 
deviation between planned labor and labor budget in percentages of labor budget: 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 = |
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡
|. To understand store managers’ 
underlying decisions for each task, we also use weekly sales (actual and forecasts from manager 
and software) and labor (actual, planned, and budget) variables. 
 The strong incentive period consists of first two quarters in 2014 (fiscal week 1 to 26). 
The weak incentive period consists of the remaining weeks in 2014 until the end of the study 
period (fiscal week 27 to 47). 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a dummy equal to one when weak incentives 
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are in place and zero when strong incentives are in place. Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics 
for the entire period (Panel A), fore the strong incentive period (Panel B) and for the weak 
incentive period (Panel C). The typical store in the studied retail chain during the study period 
generates on average $136,647 of sales per week and spends $6,864 for labor per week, 
indicating labor productivity of $19.91. That is, managers expect to have about $20 of sales for 
every $1 spending on labor. As the second period contains holiday seasons, the average sales and 
labor are higher than those during the first period. So, we exclude holiday seasons (i.e., after 
Thanksgiving holiday) from our analysis as a robustness check and obtain the same results. 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: All sample (N=3,248, 75 stores, week 1-47) 
Variable Mean SD Median Min Max 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 ($) 6,847.13 2,004.39 6,324.5 4,102 14,987 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 ($) 6,864.43 2,027.91 6,337.5 4,119.27 14,861 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 ($) 6,945.98 2,108.04 6,397.5 4,073 16,655 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 ($) 136,646.6 57,031.64 123,828 48,045 379,656 
𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 ($) 136,373.2 58,432.71 122,756.5 42,938 439,466 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 ($) 135,390.7 57,949.81 122,277 37,540 422,796 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 (%) 0.057 0.050 0.042 0.00 0.27 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 (%) 0.056 0.056 0.038 0.00 0.62 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 (%) 0.098 0.093 0.074 0.00 0.82 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 (%) 0.084 0.066 0.069 0.00 0.37 
 
Panel B: Under the strong incentive scheme (N=1816, 75 stores, week 1-26)  
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 ($) 6,038.79 1,245.50 5,772 4,102 1,2139 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 ($) 6,047.23 1,285.33 5,756.4 4,119.27 13,558.64 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 ($) 6,064.65 1,201.55 5,797 4,073 11,503 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 ($) 123,935 40,925.38 118,790.5 48,503 339,154 
𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 ($) 123,615.7 40,838.64 117,795 45,800 321,002 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 ($) 122,749.1 40,772.31 116,543 40,836 365,166 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 (%) 0.046 0.040 0.035 0.00 0.26 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 (%) 0.050 0.049 0.035 0.00 0.33 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 (%) 0.109 0.102 0.085 0.00 0.82 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 (%) 0.088 0.068 0.073 0.00 0.37 
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Panel C: Under the weak incentive scheme (N=1432, 75 stores, week 27-47)  
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 ($) 7,872.22 2,295.16 7,307.5 4,211 14,987 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 ($) 7,900.78 2,305.12 7,345 4,133.4 14,861 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 ($) 8,063.64 2,452.83 7,366 4,299 16,655 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 ($) 152,767 69,216.09 133,604.5 48,045 379,656 
𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 ($) 152,551.8 71,857.97 131,203.5 42,938 439,466 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 ($) 151,422.1 71,073.15 131,545 37,540 422,796 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 (%) 0.070 0.058 0.052 0.00 0.27 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 (%) 0.063 0.063 0.042 0.00 0.62 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 (%) 0.085 0.077 0.066 0.00 0.58 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 (%) 0.079 0.062 0.066 0.00 0.35 
 
3.3.5 Empirical methodology 
We first identify the effect of the change in incentives from strong to weak on outcomes 
of overall labor scheduling decisions by store managers. We estimate the accuracy of store 
managers’ labor decisions (𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡) of store 𝑖 on week 𝑡 using the following panel 
data regression: 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛾𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡. (3.1) 
By including proper controls, we estimate the treatment of the treated, 𝛾𝑇𝑇𝐸(𝑥), using before-
after data (first differences, Ichniowski and Shaw 2009) as follows: 
𝛾𝑇𝑇𝐸(𝑥) = ?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
1 − ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
1  (3.2) 
where 𝑌 represents performance in labor scheduling decisions (𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡). In words, 
the treatment of the treated effect is the difference in the conditional means of the treated group 
before (the strong incentive period), and after (the weak incentive period), the treatment 
(incentive change). Thus, the parameter of interest throughout is 𝛾, namely the effect of the move 
from strong incentive to weak incentive on outcomes of store managers’ overall labor scheduling 
decisions. 
 We include the following controls (𝑥 in (3.2.)). Store fixed effects (𝛽𝑖) capture location-
specific, time-invariant factors. For example, store managers may make a different labor 
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schedule based on the local labor market condition. If it is very hard to find new employees, 
store managers may end up scheduling labor lower than their desired level resulting in larger 
error in outcomes of overall labor scheduling decisions. As the new weakened incentives are 
introduced simultaneously across all stores, it is not possible to control for week fixed effects. 
Instead, we control for time-varying factors at the store (𝑍𝑖𝑡) level. 
 Using a quasi-experimental setting, our identification of the effect of change in incentives 
from strong to weak on labor scheduling decisions arises from a comparison over time of the 
same stores. As initiating financial incentive for only a subset of stores is hard in practice, many 
papers have explored similar before-and-after change in incentive (for example, see Lazear 2000, 
Bandiera et al. 2005, and Anderson et al. 2010). The estimated effect 𝛾 is then biased downward 
to the extent that it captures factors that cause the accuracy in labor scheduling decisions to 
decrease in the second period regardless of the change in incentive schemes. For example, if all 
stores performed badly due to some unexpected demand shock in the second period, then our 
model would over-estimate the treatment effect. In this case we are unable to disentangle the 
effect of incentive from the effect of unexpected demand shock. We overcome this issue by 
controlling for the accuracy of software sales forecast relative to actual sales 
(𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡), defined as the absolute deviation between software sales forecast and 
actual sales in percentages of actual sales. This variable shows the relative performance of actual 
sales (i.e., surprising component) to their expectation (i.e., sales forecast). As this is the key 
consideration in our model, we investigate alternative ways to capture unobserved surprising 
component in demand in the robustness check. 
 Finally, the disturbance term 𝜖𝑖𝑡 captures unobservable determinants of managers’ labor 
scheduling decisions at the store-week level. Labor decision observations within the same store 
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are unlikely to be independent since stores face similar labor market conditions. We account for 
this by clustering standard errors at the store level in all regressions. To be specific, we estimate 
the variance-covariance matrix allowing any correlation pattern within store over time. This 
estimator for the variance-covariance matrix is given by: 
𝑊 = (𝑉′𝑉)−1 (∑ 𝑢′𝑗𝑢𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
) (𝑉′𝑉)−1 
(3.3) 
where 𝑁 is the total number of stores, 𝑉 is matrix of independent variables and 𝑢𝑗  is defined for 
each store to be: 
𝑢𝑗 = ∑ 𝑒𝑗𝑡𝑣𝑗𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
(3.4) 
where 𝑒𝑗𝑡 is the estimated residual for store 𝑗 at week 𝑡 and 𝑣𝑗𝑡 is a row vector of dependent 
variables (including the constant). This methodology can overcome an issue of over-estimating t-
statistics and significant levels because of serial correlation (Bertrand et al. 2004). 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Can incentive improve outcomes of overall labor scheduling decisions? 
3.4.1.1 Model free evidence 
Here we first provide the model free evidence. Our data show that financial incentives for 
store managers seem to help them make better overall labor scheduling decisions as store 
managers have actual labor closer to its target, i.e., labor budget, under the strong incentive 
scheme. Figure 3.2 provides the histogram of accuracy in weekly labor scheduling decisions, 
measured by 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡
, under the strong incentive scheme (left figure) as well 
as that under the weak incentive scheme (right figure). The deviation between actual labor and 
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labor budget is more concentrated on zero under the strong incentive period, indicating better 
outcomes of overall labor scheduling decisions. 
Figure 3.2: Histogram of Labor Scheduling Decisions. 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the mean of 𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 over time. With the introduction of the 
weaker incentive the total error in outcomes of overall labor scheduling rose and remained at a 
higher level. Figure 3.4 provides similar observation. Each dot represents the coefficient of week 
fixed effect from the following regression: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡. The pattern is very 
similar from the one observed in Figure 3.3, indicating worsening in labor scheduling outcoms 
after the transition from strong incentive to weak one. 
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Figure 3.3: Accuracy in Labor Scheduling Decisions Over Time. 
 
Figure 3.4: Accuracy in Labor Scheduling Decisions over Time (Alternative Method). 
 
 Finally, Figure 3.5 shows that the average of weekly 𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 is much 
smaller under the strong incentive scheme compared to the weak incentive scheme (4.62% vs. 
6.96%, diff=-2.34%, p<0.0000). It indicates 50.65% (-2.34/4.64) worsening in outcomes of 
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overall labor scheduling due to incentive change. This model free evidence is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. 
Figure 3.5: Average of Accuracy in Labor Scheduling Decisions. 
 
Although we find model free evidence consistent with our hypothesis, it may be 
confounded by other factors. For example, if all stores under-perform due to unexpected demand 
shock during the second half of the fiscal year 2014, data would show the same result. In 
addition, above observation is possibly driven by few extreme stores, but not other stores. We 
next show the results from econometrics model with proper controls to rule out these potential 
alternative explanations. 
3.4.1.2 Main results 
To examine whether the bonus-based incentive plan for store managers help them 
improve outcomes in their overall labor scheduling decisions, we first run a regression without 
any control (Column (1) in Table 3.2), clustering standard errors by store. Then, we subsequently 
add each control variable one at a time from column (2) to column (3) to deal with potential 
alternative explanations; hence, column (3) is a full model. In column (1), which is equivalent to 
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the model free evidence (Figure 3.5), we observe significant impact of incentive change from 
strong to weak on the accuracy of overall labor scheduling decisions. 
Table 3.2: Incentive Affects Overall Labor Scheduling Decisions 
Dependent variable: 𝑨𝑷𝑬 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕 
 (1) 
Unconditional 
(2) 
Store 
heterogeneity 
(3) 
Unobservable 
surprise 
(4) 
No selection 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡    0.033*** 0.042** 
   (0.01) (0.02) 
Store effect No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3248 3248 3248 1420 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0533 0.1063 0.1096 0.0963 
Note. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard error, clustered by store, is reported in parenthesis.  
 
 Column (2) controls for store fixed effects, so that only variation within a store over time 
is exploited. Controlling for store heterogeneity improves the fit of the model considerably. Store 
fixed effects double the explained variation in accuracy of store managers’ overall labor 
scheduling decisions. The estimated effect of the change in incentives on total error in labor 
scheduling remains significant and of similar magnitude as in column (1). 
 Column (3) controls for other time-varying factor of store managers’ overall labor 
scheduling decisions at the store level. We include a measure of surprising sales relative to the 
expectation to capture the unexpected demand shock over time. The estimated coefficient of 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 is still positive and significant (0.024, p<0.01), indicating 2.44% larger error 
under the weak incentive scheme compared to the strong incentive scheme period. This is a 
substantial difference as the average total error in scheduling labor is 5.65% in our data (Table 
3.1). So, the weak incentives have resulted in 43.19% worsening of labor scheduling by 
managers. It shows that store managers make more accurate labor scheduling decisions under the 
strong incentive scheme, supporting Hypothesis 1. Our surprising finding is not so much that 
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outcomes of scheduling labor become worse with weakening of pay-for-performance but by how 
much. 
 The coefficients’ estimates of the control variables are in the expected direction. The 
accuracy of software sales forecast (𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡) is positively associated with the 
accuracy of labor scheduling decisions. As one of the important factors for store managers to 
schedule labor is the sales forecast, we expect the positive association between accuracy of 
software sales forecast and accuracy of labor scheduling decisions. Moreover, this variable plays 
a key role in our model to account for the unexpected demand shock by capturing a surprising 
portion in realized sales relative to the expectation. As expected, we find significant 
heterogeneity across stores. 
3.4.1.3 Effort vs. selection 
Our main finding based on the before-and-after comparison in the quasi-experimental 
setting has a potential alternative explanation due to selection in managers. As the retailer 
changes bonus-based incentive for store managers from strong to weak, some store managers 
may leave the organization looking for an opportunity with a better outside option. Those 
managers who decide to quit the job are likely to be high-ability managers as they have feasible 
outside options with a higher expected wage when they exert effort. As a result, the remaining 
managers are likely to be low-ability managers who cannot schedule labor as good as high-
ability managers. In addition, the newly hired store managers after the high-ability managers quit 
the job might be low-ability managers as retailer’s incentive is weak. This selection mechanism 
can potentially explain our main result. 
 In order to rule out this alternative explanation, we perform a regression analysis with 
only stores where managers stay without any turnover during the study period. We obtain annual 
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manager turnover data. Among 75 stores, 33 stores (i.e., 44%) have no manager turnover in the 
fiscal year 2014. Column (4) in Table 3.2 shows the result with those 33 stores without manager 
change. We still find that the estimated coefficient of 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 is positive and 
significant (0.023, p<0.01), indicating 2.29% larger error in labor scheduling decision under the 
weak incentive scheme compared to the strong incentive scheme. Comparing to the average total 
error on overall labor scheduling decisions of 5.37% for these stores, the weak incentives have 
resulted in 42.64% worsening in outcomes of overall labor scheduling. Compare to the overall 
sample, we find that even after removing selection effect, we continue to observe significant 
effect of incentive on outcomes of labor scheduling decisions. This result supports Hypothesis 2 
indicating that our main result is mainly due to effort effect, not due to the selection in managers. 
 To sum up, we provide evidence for the impact of financial incentives for store managers 
on outcomes in their overall labor scheduling decisions. We find that store managers make more 
accurate labor scheduling decisions under the strong incentive scheme. Unlike prior literature 
(Lazear 2000 and Banker et al. 2000) where studies the impact of incentive on individual 
workers’ productivity and reports significant effect of sorting mechanism in addition to effort 
effect, we show that labor scheduling decisions become worse-off mainly due to decreasing 
effort. This indicates that incentives play a vital role in making managers exert more effort 
towards labor scheduling decisions. 
3.4.1.4 Robustness checks 
Table 3.3 presents a series of robustness checks. As the change in incentives from strong 
to weak occurs at the same time in all stores, the main concern in our analysis is to capture the 
unexpected demand shock which can confound our result. In the main model, we use the 
accuracy of software sales forecast relative to actual sales (𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡) to capture the 
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surprising component of actual sales relative to their expectation (i.e., sales forecast). 
Alternatively we can calculate the surprising part in sales with respect to its expectation based on 
manager forecast (column (1), 𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡). The estimated effect of the change in 
incentives on total error in overall labor scheduling remains significant and of similar magnitude 
as in column (3) in Table 3.2, indicating that our result is robust with alternative control. 
Table 3.3: Selective Robustness Checks 
Dependent variable: 𝑨𝑷𝑬 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕 
 (1) 
Manager 
SF 
(2) 
Software 
SF 
(3) 
Manager 
SF 
(4) 
Traffic 
(5) 
DV by level 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 323.16*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (24.16) 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡     409.79*** 
     (90.54) 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 0.064***     
 (0.01)     
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡  0.031**    
(w.r.t. last year sales)  (0.01)    
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡   0.015   
(w.r.t. last year sales)   (0.01)   
𝐴𝑏𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡      0.004  
    (0.013)  
Store effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3248 3248 3248 2922 3248 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1130 0.1081 0.1066 0.1131 0.1776 
Note. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard error, clustered by store, is reported in parenthesis.  
 
 Another concern is a reverse causality between actual labor and actual sales. One of our 
controls in the main model is 𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡, which contains actual sales, and our 
dependent variable contains actual labor. The staffing level could drive sales; hence the concern 
of reverse causality arises. To mitigate this reverse causality concern (although it is not our key 
variable of interest and just one of controls), we replace actual sales by last year’s sales to proxy 
unexpectedness relative to software sales forecast (column (2)) and manager sales forecast 
(column (3)). Again, the estimated effect of the change in incentives on total error in overall 
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labor scheduling remains significant and of similar magnitude as in column (3) in Table 3.2, 
mitigating the reverse causality concern. 
 There is another way to control for the unexpectedness in demand using exogenous 
traffic information. This retail chain installed video cameras at store entrances to count the 
number of store visitors. All stores of this chain had this entrance camera during our study period. 
The third party video technology company responsible for the installed technology audited the 
data regularly by manually counting the number of visitors and comparing that count to the 
number from the automated sensors, ensuring the accuracy of at least 95%. Using traffic 
information, we measure absolute traffic growth, defined as the absolute difference between 
average daily traffic for a given week in 2014 and that in 2013 in percentages of the average 
daily traffic in 2013 (𝐴𝑏𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = |
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 2014𝑖𝑡−𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 2013𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 2013𝑖𝑡
|), 
to account for the surprising component in demand. In column (4) of Table 3.3, we again find 
that weakening of incentive has resulted in significant worsening in labor scheduling outcomes 
(p<0.01) We note that the number of observations is reduced due to the paucity of data in last 
year’s weekly store traffic. 
 In addition to capture the unexpectedness in demand using alternative ways, we also 
perform other robustness checks. First, we use alternative approach to address an issue of over-
estimating t-statistics and significance levels because of serial correlation. In addition to the 
method that we used in the main model (Bertrand et al. 2004 call it as arbitrary variance-
covariance matrix), Bertrand et al. (2004) proposed to use block bootstrapping which maintains 
the auto-correlation structure by keeping all the observations that belong to the same group (e.g., 
store) together. Using 200 bootstrap replications, we obtained very similar result. The clustered 
standard error for 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 is 0.0027 with t-statistics of 8.91 while the bootstrap 
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standard error is 0.0028 with t-statistics of 8.65. This result indicates that our main results are not 
suffering an issue due to serial correlation. 
 Second, we examine the stability of the results using different performance measure. In 
the main model, we measure accuracy in store managers’ overall labor scheduling decisions as 
absolute percentage error. We can alternatively use absolute error in level instead of percentage. 
All results are very similar to the ones obtained with percentage measure (column (5)). This 
shows that our substantive results are no artifact of the specific measure chosen in the analysis. 
 Third, we test the validity of our results without holiday seasons. As a large portion of 
sales (20-30% of annual sales, according to National Retail Federation) is generated in this short 
period of time, store operation is often very different during holiday seasons. So, we repeat our 
analysis after excluding holiday seasons (i.e., after Thanksgiving holiday). The main conclusions 
remain unchanged, indicating that our results are not affected by holiday seasons (available from 
the authors upon request). 
 Lastly, some variables in our analysis such as 𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 and 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 are both non-negative (minimum achieved at zero), and have a large right-
skew (signified by a maximum that is typically many times larger than the mean). For example, 
the average number of absolute percentage error for software sales forecast (𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡) 
in a week across stores is 9.8%. However, there are occasions when the software forecasting 
error is high. The observed maximum is 82%, which is more than eight times the average. As a 
robustness check, we transform those non-negative right-skewed variables into their natural 
logarithms ensuring that our hypothesis test statistics follow t-distribution. Our main conclusions 
remain qualitatively the same, indicating that our results are not driven by specific functional 
form (available from the authors upon request). 
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3.4.2 Mechanisms: Underlying decisions for scheduling labor 
As explained in section 3.3.2, labor scheduling process consists of three component tasks. 
They are forecasting, labor planning and execution. In this section, we delve into these three 
component tasks and test for Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 examining whether the financial incentives 
have an impact on each of them, driving outcomes of overall labor scheduling. 
3.4.2.1 Forecasting 
We first examine whether the financial incentive for store managers has an impact on 
their forecasting task for labor scheduling decisions (Hypothesis 3). We use the accuracy of 
manager sales forecast (𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡) as a dependent variable. In column (1) of Table 3.4, 
we do not include the reference forecast from software for store managers. The estimated 
coefficient of 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 is negative and significant (-0.009, p<0.01). It looks like 
manager sales forecast is improved under the weak incentive scheme. However, when we add the 
accuracy in software sales forecast (𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡) in column (2), the estimated 
coefficient of 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 becomes insignificantly differentiable from zero. This indicates 
that managers adjust sales forecast provided by software tool and the financial incentive does not 
affect this adjustment. We do not find support for Hypothesis 3. This result is consistent with 
prior literature (Remus et al. 1998) which finds no evidence that incentives improve forecast 
accuracy in the lab setting. 
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Table 3.4: Mechanism: (1) Forecasting (No impact on accuracy) 
Dependent variable: 𝑨𝑷𝑬 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
Relative to software SF 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.009*** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡   0.404*** 
  (0.03) 
Store effect Yes Yes 
Observations 3248 3248 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0161 0.3339 
Note. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard error, clustered by store, is reported in parenthesis.  
 
 There are, at least, two explanations for the above finding. It is possible that store 
managers do not exert effort to improve forecasting regardless of the financial incentive. It is 
also possible that managers exert effort to improve forecast, but it does not convert into higher 
accuracy in forecasting. Prior literature (see Bonner and Sprinkle 2002 and references therein) 
from lab settings shows that the higher effort due to incentive may not translate into higher 
performance when the task is complex. We examine whether store managers exert more effort on 
forecasting under the strong incentive scheme than the weak incentive scheme by measuring the 
extent for managers to change sales forecast from software forecast (i.e., 
|
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡−𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
|). This variable can capture managers’ effort to improve forecast as 
they can simply take software forecast without changing it if they do not want to exert effort. We 
compare this metric before and after the incentive change. 
 Table 3.5 shows the result. In column (1), the estimated coefficient of 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 
is negative and significant (-0.027, p<0.01), indicating that managers change forecast more from 
the one recommended by the software during strong incentive period compared to weak 
incentive period. Together with the previous finding of no incentive impact on forecasting 
accuracy, it appears that store managers exert more effort on improving forecasting, but this 
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higher effort does not translate into higher accuracy in forecasting. This finding compliments 
previous literature on task complexity in a laboratory setting (Pelham and Neter 1995) where 
finds that subjects perform better with incentives for the easy version of a task while they do not 
for the complex version. 
Table 3.5: Mechanism: (1) Forecasting (More effort) 
Dependent variable: 
|
𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝑺𝑭𝒊𝒕 − 𝑺𝒐𝒇𝒕𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝑺𝑭𝒊𝒕
𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒕
| 
 (1) (2) 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.027*** -0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡   0.491*** 
  (0.034) 
Store effect Yes Yes 
Observations 3248 3248 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0795 0.3753 
Note. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard error, clustered by store, is reported in parenthesis.  
 
 There could be an alternative explanation. If the software forecast becomes more accurate 
in the second period, then managers do not need to modify it. This might confound our results. 
However, the forecasting algorithm of software has remained the same throughout the study 
period, mitigating the concern of systematic change in software forecast. Nevertheless, we 
control for the accuracy of software sales forecast (𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡) in column (2). We still 
find the same conclusion, indicating that the systematic change in software forecast is not an 
issue in our analysis. 
 The forecasting error comprises with bias and noise. We further examine the impact of 
financial incentive on the forecasting bias. In column (1) of Table 3.6, we find that store 
managers are in general optimistic in forecasting as the estimated coefficient of 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 is 
0.911 (p<0.01), indicating that actual sales are smaller than manager sales forecast. When we add 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 and the interaction between 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 in column 
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(2), we find that store managers are more optimistic in forecasting sales under the strong 
incentive scheme compared to the weak incentive scheme. When managers expect sales to be 
$1,000, the actual sales is on average $809 under the strong incentive scheme whereas that is 
$906 under the weak incentive scheme. It is conceivable as strong incentive ties managers’ 
bonus to sales performance. We obtain similar results when we further add weekly store traffic in 
column (3) as a proxy for the store demand. This result indicates that managers’ effort on 
forecasting due to incentive in fact increases optimistic bias. Together with previous findings, it 
further indicates that the incentive reduces noise in forecasting as the overall forecasting error 
remains the same. 
Table 3.6: Mechanism: (1) Forecasting (Optimistic bias) 
Dependent variable: 𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒕 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡  0.911*** 0.809*** 0.546*** 
 (0.008) (0.03) (0.05) 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡
× 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 0.097*** 0.073*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  -8636.08*** -6565.21** 
  (2868.73) (2821.72) 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡    8.63*** 
   (1.76) 
Store effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3248 3248 3248 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0795 0.3753 0.9487 
Note. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard error, clustered by store, is reported in parenthesis.  
 
 To summarize, we find that under the strong incentive scheme store managers exert effort 
on forecasting by making changes on software forecast based on their local knowledge, but this 
effort does not convert into more accurate forecast. In addition, managers tend to have more 
optimistic bias on forecasting sales during the strong incentive period compared to the weak 
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incentive period, indicating that stronger incentive might increase bias but reduce noise; hence, 
the forecasting error is unaffected. 
3.4.2.2 Labor planning 
Here we examine whether the financial incentive for store managers has an impact on 
their labor planning task for labor scheduling decisions (Hypothesis 4). To estimate the impact of 
incentive on labor planning error, we control for the accuracy in managers’ sales forecasting 
decision as labor planning is based on manager forecast. This variable is also important to 
account for the unexpected demand shock. Table 3.7 contains the results. 
Table 3.7: Mechanism: (2) Labor planning 
Dependent 
variable: 
𝑨𝑷𝑬 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕 
 Full Enough labor case 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕
> 𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕 
(3) 
𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕
> 𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
(4) 
𝑷𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕
> 𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  0.013*** 0.019*** 0.0099*** 0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡  0.103*** 0.155*** 0.078*** 0.064*** 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.02) (0.021) 
Store effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3248 1647 1832 1804 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0773 0.1322 0.0416 0.0479 
Note. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard error, clustered by store, is reported in parenthesis. 
 
 In column (1), the estimated coefficient of 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 is 0.013 (p<0.01), 
indicating that the labor planning error is on average 1.3% larger under the weak incentive 
scheme compared to the strong incentive scheme. This is a substantial difference as the average 
labor planning error is 5.6% in our data (Table 3.1). So, the weak incentives have resulted in 
23.21% worsening on labor planning decisions by managers. It indicates that the financial 
incentive for store managers improves their labor planning decisions, supporting Hypothesis 4. 
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 It is possible, however, that store managers may face a shortage in labor from the local 
labor market. It may exacerbate the labor planning error as managers cannot find enough labor to 
plan at the desired level. If this happens more severely during the second period, then our result 
could be confounded with this labor supply issue. To mitigate this concern, we consider the case 
where managers had enough labor using three alternative ways. First, if actual labor appears to 
be higher than planned labor, it could indicate that managers had enough labor to plan when they 
make a planning decision. In column (2), we find that the impact of incentive is even stronger. 
The labor planning error is 1.9% (p<0.01) larger during the weak incentive period than the strong 
incentive period. Second, if planned labor to be higher than planned labor or actual labor last 
week, it could indicate that managers had enough labor to plan this week. In columns (3) and (4), 
we still find the similar results. These results show that our substantive results are no artifact of 
the supply shortage issue in labor. 
3.4.2.3 Execution 
Finally, we examine whether the financial incentive for store managers has an impact on 
their execution task for labor scheduling decisions (Hypothesis 5). As we illustrated in section 
3.3.2, there are time gap between planned labor and actual labor. Since labor plans are typically 
generated a week or more in advance, it is possible that store managers obtain new information 
in the last mile (see Figure 3.1). Hence managers need to exert execution effort on reacting to the 
new information and ensuring that the right number of associates shows up for work at the right 
time. Two types of information might be available in the last mile. One is the demand 
information. Managers may observe demand signal and adjust staffing accordingly. They may 
call unscheduled associates to work in a few hours when they encounter an unexpectedly high 
demand whereas they may let scheduled associates go home without working when they face an 
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unexpectedly low demand. Another one is the supply information. Managers may encounter 
different worker availability and need to adjust staffing accordingly. Associates might call off for 
several reasons including illness, either associate’s or her child’s, transportation issues, and 
conflicts with scheduling a second job (Lambert and Henly 2010). So, store manager needs to 
exert effort to find back-up associates according to the new information about associate 
availability to maintain the right number of associates in the store. We have data on demand side 
information while we do not possess supply side information. So we focus on the new 
information in the last mile on the demand side shock. 
 In the queueing theory, the number of employees is determined by so-called square root 
staffing formula (Feldman et al. 2008): 𝑠 = 𝑑 + 𝛼√𝑑, where 𝑠 denotes the number of staffs, 𝑑 
denotes workload (i.e., demand), and 𝛼 indicates the quality of service (i.e., service level). 
Accordingly, store managers might adjust their staffing based on two demand information: mean 
demand and volatility of demand. First, managers might increase staffing level when they see 
higher demand (than expectation) as 𝑠 increases when 𝑑 increases. We use store traffic as a 
proxy for the demand. We measure 𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 as a difference between average 
daily traffic for week 𝑡 − 1 in 2014 and that in 2013 to capture additional information in terms of 
average demand relative to last year’s mean demand. We use difference in mean demand relative 
to the last year’s mean demand because store managers typically set their expectation based on 
last year’s information. Thus, the difference measure could be a good proxy to capture the 
unexpected part in the mean demand. Second, managers might increase staffing level when they 
observe more volatile demand (than expectation). To keep the service level (𝛼) constant, 
managers need more employees to satisfy high demand when demand fluctuates a lot. We 
measure 𝐶𝑉 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 as a difference between coefficient of variation (CV, defined 
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as standard deviation divided by mean times 100) of daily traffic for week 𝑡 − 1 in 2014 and that 
in 2013 to capture additional information in terms of demand volatility relative to last year. For 
the same reason with mean demand, we use difference in demand volatility relative to the last 
year’s volatility. 
 Table 3.8 shows the results. We use 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡, defined as 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 −
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡, as a dependent variable to capture the extent for managers to adjust labor from 
initially planned one. We only have 𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 in column (1). We do not find 
significant adjustment on actual labor according to the traffic growth information in the last week. 
However, when we add 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 and the interaction between 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 
𝐶𝑉 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 in column (2), we find that the average traffic change information in 
the last week is significantly associated with labor adjustment this week (0.374, p<0.01) under 
the strong incentive scheme. When there are 100 more store visitors in the last week, store 
managers on average increase labor adjustment this week by $37.4 under the strong incentive 
scheme. On the contrary, managers do not exert effort on adjusting initial labor plan according to 
the new available information on average traffic (0.374-0.552=-0.178, p=0.261) under the weak 
incentive scheme. We test other information regarding traffic variability in columns (3) and (4) 
and find similar results. In column (4), we find that the change of variability in traffic 
information in the last week is significantly associated with adjusting labor this week (3.78, 
p<0.01) under the strong incentive scheme. In contrast, managers do not exert effort on adjusting 
initial labor plan according to the new available information on variability in traffic (3.78-5.87=-
2.07, p=0.282) under the weak incentive scheme. When we have both information on mean 
demand as well as volatility in demand in column (5), we obtain directionally similar results, but 
the interaction between weak incentive indicator and change of variability in traffic is marginally 
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insignificant (p=0.131). These results provide support for Hypothesis 5 that the financial 
incentive for store managers make them exert more execution effort on adjusting in the last mile 
according to the new information in the demand side. 
Table 3.8: Mechanism: (3) Execution (Last mile adjustment effort) 
Dependent variable: 𝑳𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕 
 Average traffic change CV traffic change Both 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡  -0.065*** -0.103*** -0.066*** -0.102*** -0.102*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 0.056 0.374***   0.39*** 
 (0.1) (0.1)   (0.1) 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡
× 𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 -0.552***   -0.536** 
 (0.18)   (0.22) 
𝐶𝑉 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡   1.07 3.78*** 4.03*** 
   (1.12) (1.34) (3.05) 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡
× 𝐶𝑉 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 
   -5.87** -4.67
+
 
   (2.39) (3.05) 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡    200.61***  231.27*** 204.4*** 
  (31.32)  (32.69) (31.31) 
Store effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2866 2866 2866 2866 2866 
Adjusted R
2
 0.9300 0.9325 0.9300 0.9322 0.9327 
Note. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard error, clustered by store, is reported in parenthesis. 
+
 indicates p=0.131 
 
 To summarize, we provide empirical evidence for the differential impact of financial 
incentive on each of three tasks in store managers’ labor scheduling decisions: forecasting, labor 
planning, and execution. We find that incentives make store managers exert more effort on all of 
three tasks, but the consequences and procedures are different. The weakening of incentive does 
not affect the accuracy in forecasting although managers exert more effort on forecasting by 
changing it from the software forecast. In addition, managers are more optimistic on sales 
forecasting under the strong incentive scheme, indicating that incentive increases optimistic bias 
but decreases noise. The new weakened incentive has resulted in 23.21% more error in labor 
planning. Finally, managers exert effort on last mile adjustment under the strong incentive 
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scheme whereas they do not exert such effort under the weak incentive scheme. These results 
might be because each task requires different types of effort, has different sensitivity to effort 
(Libby and Lipe 1992), and has different complexity (Pelham and Neter 1995). 
3.4.2.4 Robustness check 
We perform several robustness checks for the mechanism as follows. We examine the 
stability of the results for store without manager change to rule out selection mechanism. The 
high ability managers, who exert more effort, might quit the job due to weakened financial 
incentive and the low ability managers, who do not exert effort as high as the high ability 
managers do, might remain on duty resulting in reduction in overall effort level. By considering 
only 33 stores without any manager change during the study period, we still find qualitatively the 
same results for forecasting, labor planning, and execution (available from the authors upon 
request). It supports our argument based on change in store manager’s behavior towards exerting 
more effort due to incentive and mitigates the possibility of selection explanation. 
 Similar to the previous robustness checks for the main result on outcomes of overall labor 
scheduling, we also test the validity of our results without holiday seasons and alternative model 
specifications using log transformation. The main conclusions remain unchanged, indicating that 
our results are not affected by holiday seasons as well as our choice of model specification 
(available from the authors upon request). 
3.5 Conclusion 
Our analysis suggests that performance-based incentive for store managers improves 
outcomes of overall labor scheduling decisions by managers. Our estimates indicate that, by 
comparing the strong incentive to the weak one, there is a positive and statistically significant 
effect of incentive on the accuracy of overall labor scheduling decisions and that its magnitude is 
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42.64%. We also show that this result is mainly driven by change in effort than selection 
mechanism, indicating that incentives play a vital role in making managers exert more effort 
towards labor scheduling decisions. More importantly, we find that the financial incentive has 
differential impact on three underlying tasks (i.e., forecasting, labor planning, and execution) for 
overall labor scheduling decisions. This finding complements previous literature in lab settings 
where finds that the impact of incentive on performance is dependent upon types of task as each 
task requires different types of effort, has different sensitivity to effort (Libby and Lipe 1992) 
and complexity (Pelham and Neter 1995). The results obtained from our analysis provide a first 
step toward understanding the overall impact of incentive on operational outcomes (specifically, 
labor scheduling) as well as underlying decisions that lead to those outcomes. 
The main results presented in this paper have a number of implications. First, by 
providing empirical evidence that financial incentives improve store managers’ labor scheduling 
decisions, we show the importance of financial incentives for managers even when they are 
aided by underlying software. Many organizations have invested heavily in software-based 
solutions under the current trend of using data analytics techniques such as machine learning and 
artificial intelligence for decision making. The role of managers, however, is not diminished as 
they can potentially improve the decisions made by software. Hence, incentives still play a key 
role to motivate managers to expend the effort to make the right decisions. 
Second, our result shows the importance of considering task-sensitivity in the effect of 
incentive on performance when organizations design it. By studying underlying decisions on the 
overall labor scheduling, we find that the financial incentive improves labor planning and 
execution decisions, but not forecasting decisions. It is possible that the incentive tied with labor 
planning or execution is more effective on improving performance than the one tied with 
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forecasting. In general, organizations can maximize the effect of incentive by considering the 
differences across tasks such as sensitivity of effort and task complexity. 
 Although our analysis provides firm evidence that supports these conclusions, it is not 
free of limitations. As the change in incentives from strong to weak occurs at the same time in all 
stores, we do not have a comparison group. It is very hard, however, in practice to find cases 
where a financial incentive is effective for only a subset of managers. In fact numerous papers 
have investigated similar before-and-after change in incentive (for example, see Lazear 2000, 
Bandiera et al. 2005, and Anderson et al. 2010). The key challenge in this case is to control for 
the unexpected time-related shocks which can potentially confound the treatment effect. We 
overcome this issue by using various alternative controls to capture unexpectedness in demand. 
We consider a surprise component in sales relative to their expectation (defined by two different 
sales forecasts from software and manager), current expectation relative to last year’s sales, and 
exogenous traffic growth rate. Another limitation arises due to data availability. We have 
relatively short period of data before and after the incentive change, which makes us focus on 
immediate impact of incentive. An interesting avenue of future research is to analyze the long-
term effect of incentive on operational outcomes and their underlying decisions by incorporating, 
for example, learning effect. Despite the limitations, we believe that our study provides valuable 
insights to practitioners who are continuously striving to improve operational decisions using 
pay-for-performance incentives. 
 In this paper we present one of the few studies that empirically estimate the impact of 
performance-based incentive on operational outcomes as well as their underlying decisions. 
Although we cannot claim that the conclusions obtained in this study are applicable to all other 
firms, our findings are of interest, not only to the retail industry but also to all industries in which 
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financial incentives are an important driver of improving operational decisions that leads to 
better firm performance. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Determinants of Excess Inventory Announcement  
and Stock Market Reaction in the Retail Sector 
4.1 Introduction 
On May 28, 2015 Abercrombie and Fitch Co. (Ticker: ANF) announced that it had 
accumulated excess inventory so it was writing-down $26.9 million of inventory. Abercrombie’s 
management blamed sluggish sales as the reason for its excess inventory. Abercrombie’s 
management was not alone; blaming sluggish sales for the buildup of excess inventory is the 
most popular reason given by retail managers. Hendricks and Singhal (2009) note that 67.59% of 
firms that provided a reason for their excess inventory announcements during 1990 to 2002 
claimed sluggish demand as the primary reason. If unexpected softening of demand is the 
primary reason for excess inventory announcements, then likelihood of retailers making such 
announcements should be independent of whether they are operationally competent or not. 
Prima facie, there is theoretical basis behind such a claim. In the commonly used 
newsvendor model, left-over inventory occurs when realized demand is lower than the forecasted 
demand. So, excess inventory announcements may be an inevitable outcome of demand 
uncertainty. Furthermore, we observe that excess inventory announcements are made even by 
firms that are renowned for their operational excellence. Toyota, for example, announced that it 
cut-down production in order to reduce excess inventory in 2009 (Linebaugh 2009) while Wal-
Mart announced that excess inventory had accumulated in its apparel products’ category 
(McWilliams and Dodes 2007). So, it is not clear whether there is a link between operational 
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competence and excess inventory announcements. Our first research question explores the 
presence of this link. 
More importantly, it is unclear whether the stock market believes the retailers’ 
explanation for excess inventory. In other words, does the stock market treat these 
announcements as the outcome of a bad draw from a random demand and penalize all excess 
inventory announcements similarly or is the stock market response to excess inventory 
announcements conditional on operational competence of the announcing firm? If it is the latter, 
then does the stock market penalize highly competent firms more for the disappointing 
announcement or does it penalize the low competent firms more as they are skeptical of their 
ability to manage the excess inventory and take appropriate actions to overcome the problem? 
Our second research question examines if the stock market reaction to such announcements is 
conditional on the operational competence of the announcing firm. 
We study these two questions for the following reasons. Excess inventory announcements 
have generated considerable interest in the business press and academic research because of their 
large negative impact on firm performance (Hendricks and Singhal 2009). Since excess 
inventory announcements are the result of supply-demand mismatches, many researchers have 
emphasized operational improvements to reduce their occurrences (Fisher et al. 2000; Billington 
et al. 2002; Chopra and Sodhi 2004; Narayanan and Raman 2004; Tang 2006). For example, 
Fisher et al. (2000) show that four elements – forecasting; supply-chain speed; inventory 
planning; and accurate, available data – form the foundation of rocket science retailing to 
achieve “Right Product in the Right Place at the Right Time for the Right Price.” Yet a direct 
link between operational performance and excess inventory announcements has not been 
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established so far. Such a link, if present, needs to be established so we could demonstrate the 
value of operational improvements to managers. 
In addition, we scrutinize the stock market response to excess inventory announcements 
to glean insights on whether the stock market holds a premium for operationally competent firms. 
If so, we would expect a sharper decline in stock market valuation when an operationally 
competent firm announces excess inventory as the market is likely to be more disappointed than 
if a less competent firm made such an announcement.  
Recent literature has pointed to several disadvantages of using inventory turnover (IT) as 
a metric of inventory productivity (Gaur et al. 2005) so we use a different measure of operational 
competence to study these two questions. We measure operational competence using the total 
factor productivity (TFP) metric. We choose TFP as our primary measure of operational 
competence as it is a well-studied metric across multiple fields and there exists strong evidence 
that higher TFP is associated with better operations through various internal drivers such as 
management practices, employee knowledge, and information technology (see Syverson 2011 
for a review). Using data from 245 stores of a UK retailer, Siebert and Zubanov (2010) find that 
different skills of store manager explain about 27-35% of variation in store-level TFP. In 
addition, we use inventory turnover, adjusted inventory turnover (AIT) metric from Gaur et al. 
(2005), and gross margin return on inventory (GMROI) as alternate metrics of operational 
competence.  
We focus on the U.S. retail sector and collect data from three separate databases to 
perform our analysis. The first, obtained from Compustat through Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS), includes firm level financial data during 1962 to 2011 such as sales; operating 
income before depreciation and amortization; the number of employees; gross, property, plant, 
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and equipment; and capital expenditure. We collect our sample from 1962 because Compustat 
data for earlier than 1962 have a serious selection bias (Fama and French 1992). We supplement 
this data with output and investment deflators from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and 
annual average wage index from the Social Security Administration (SSA). Estimated firm level 
TFP, using Compustat data, is merged with two other datasets to investigate whether the firm 
level TFP is associated with excess inventory announcement. The second dataset, obtained from 
Factiva, collects 85 excess inventory announcements made by publicly traded U.S. retailers in 
the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and Dow Jones News Service (DJNS) during 1990 to 2011. It 
allows us to use the event study methodology to examine the stock market’s reaction on excess 
inventory announcement. In order to conduct the event study methodology, we used the last 
dataset which gathered information on daily stock prices from the Center for Research on Stock 
Prices (CRSP). 
Our primary findings are as follows. We find support for our argument that operationally 
competent retailers have fewer excess inventory announcements. High TFP retailers, those in the 
top 90th percentile of TFP, are 3.53 times less likely to report excess inventory in the following 
year compared to low TFP retailers, those in the bottom 10th percentile. Therefore, we conclude 
that operationally competent retailers manage inventory better, thus having fewer excess 
inventory announcements than their less competent peers. We obtain consistent results even 
when we measure operational competence using IT but TFP appears to be a better predictor of 
excess inventory announcements than IT. These results cast doubt on managers’ attribution of 
excess inventory to sluggish sales.  
Our stock market response analysis yields the following results. Consistent with 
Hendricks and Singhal (2009), we find that excess inventory announcements are associated with 
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2.53% decline in stock market valuation over a two-day period (the day of the announcement and 
the day before the announcement) in the retail sector. However, we find that the market penalizes 
excess inventory announcements made by high TFP retailers much more severely than those 
made by low TFP retailers. Our analysis shows that an increase in one-year-lagged mean-
adjusted TFP by one-standard-deviation is associated with -4.14% in the stock return over a two-
day period. This result contrasts with prior findings that the stock market does not penalize high 
and low IT retailers differently (Hendricks and Singhal 2009). Our results suggest that when high 
TFP retailers announce excess inventory, the market might be more disappointed as it had higher 
expectations from these firms. Thus, we find that the stock market does not fully believe excess 
inventory announcements to be the results of a bad draw of a random demand, as claimed by 
retail managers.  
Interestingly, we observe that over 47% of retailers had positive increase in stock price 
following the excess inventory announcement. In other words, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in the market’s response to the announcement. To explain this anomaly, we also 
considered the information provided by the retailers for the reasons for excess inventory 
accumulation and actions that they have taken or plan to take to handle the excess inventory. Our 
analysis shows that providing follow-up actions moderates the negative association between 
firm’s operational competence and abnormal stock returns due to excess inventory 
announcement. Retailers in the top 50th percentile of TFP face a -3.78% (median) decline in 
stock returns when they announce excess inventory without providing follow-up actions but face 
a 1.74% (median) increase in stock returns when they provide follow-up actions. We conjecture 
that the market trusts the competent companies to turn-around their operations when provided 
with a definite plan-of-action. In contrast, we do not find any difference in stock market reaction 
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to whether retailers in the bottom 50th percentile of TFP provide follow-up actions or not to 
fixing the excess inventory problem.  
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we undertake, to the best of 
our knowledge, the first empirical examination on determinants of excess inventory. Although 
excess inventory has been well studied, what drives excess inventory has been remained unclear. 
In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by showing empirical evidence that operationally 
competent retailers have fewer excess inventory announcements than their less competent peers. 
This finding is important as it shows that excess inventory is not a random phenomenon merely 
driven by demand uncertainty, which is typically harder for managers to control, but by 
management practices.  
Second, our paper contributes by expanding the literature on the relationship between 
operational performance and financial performance. Previous literature shows that excess 
inventory has a negative financial impact on stock market valuation (Hendricks and Singhal 
2009). We find heterogeneity in such negative financial impact of excess inventory 
announcement on stock returns: Specifically, high TFP retailers are impacted more negatively by 
such an announcement compared to low TFP retailers.  
Third, recent literature has shown that investments based on inventory turns yield higher 
abnormal stock market returns (Kesavan and Mani 2013; Alan et al. 2014). There are two 
possible explanations offered for this finding. The stock market might not be fully incorporating 
inventory information in pricing stocks (Kesavan et al. 2010; Kesavan and Mani 2013) or high 
IT retailers could be riskier than the low IT retailers as they have higher returns (Alan et al. 
2014). Our study provides evidence for the former and against the latter. By contrasting with 
TFP, our study finds that the stock market reaction differs across high TFP and low TFP retailers 
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but there is no significant difference in market reaction to announcements from high IT and low 
IT retailers. This result suggests that the stock market may not be distinguishing between high IT 
and low IT retailers, leading to abnormal returns in the future. In addition, we show that the low 
IT retailers are potentially riskier than high IT retailers because they have a greater likelihood of 
announcing excess inventory compared to high IT retailers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is presented in §4.2. 
In §4.3, we develop our main hypotheses of the paper. Section 4.4 deals with the first main 
research question: the determinants of excess inventory announcement. It contains the estimation 
of the firm level TFP, data description with econometrics model, and results. The second 
research question about the market reaction to excess inventory announcement is investigated in 
§4.5. It includes event study methodology, model specification, and results. Section 4.6 
concludes the paper. 
4.2 Literature Review 
We first look at the firm-level productivity literature. One of two common findings in the 
productivity literature (we discuss both findings in the U.S. retail sector in detail in the Appendix) 
is that large and persistent differences in estimated productivity levels across firms are 
ubiquitous. This finding has fueled diverse research questions in a number of fields: 
microeconomics, industrial organization, trade, and labor in economics literature (Syverson 
2011); information technology (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Dewan and Kraemer 2000), 
organizational change (Bertschek and Kaiser 2004), and inventory (Lieberman and Demeester 
1999) in business literature. The main focus of such productivity literature has been shifted from 
“what?” question to “why?” question since Bartelsman et al. (2000) first surveyed the micro-data 
productivity literature. Drivers of productivity, also, have been well documented and classified 
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by internal and external factors (Syverson 2011). Especially, in the internal factors, previous 
literature shows that productivity is closely related to management practices (Bloom and Van 
Reenen 2007); managerial ability (Bertrand and Schoar 2003); worker’s education (Ilmakunnas 
et al. 2004); and information technology (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Dewan and Kraemer 
2000). These factors, especially information technology, have also been identified as drivers of 
good inventory management (e.g., Barua et al. 1995; Mukhopadhyay et al. 1995). However, the 
link between productivity and better inventory control has been sparsely studied. So, we examine 
if productive (i.e., high TFP) firms have fewer excess inventory announcements compared to low 
TFP firms. 
We aware of one paper that shows the link between labor productivity and better 
inventory control. By studying 52 Japanese automotive companies, Lieberman and Demeester 
(1999) show that reducing work-in-process (WIP) inventory increases labor productivity. Unlike 
Lieberman and Demeester (1999), we do not study the antecedents of productivity but whether 
high productivity firms have fewer excess inventory announcements. We also consider retail 
sector, as opposed to manufacturing that was studied by Lieberman and Demeester (1999), and 
use total-factor-productivity (TFP) which is commonly regarded as a more appropriate measure 
of productivity rather than single-factor-productivity measures such as labor productivity. 
There has been huge interest in empirically showing the link between inventory 
performance and financial performance measures. Rumyantsev and Netessine (2007), for 
instance, observe that inventory responsiveness is positively associated with profitability, but not 
inventory leanness by analyzing panel data for a sample of more than 700 firms. Some research 
has used stock returns as a financial performance metric. For example, Thomas and Zhang (2002) 
and Chen et al. (2005) investigate the relationship between long-term stock returns and levels of 
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inventory turnover. They analyze the long-term stock returns based on annual data covering 
more than 20 years. In contrast, other researchers analyze the short-term stock returns around the 
time when firms announce some events by conducting the event study methodology (e.g., 
Hendricks and Singhal 2009; Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). For example, Hendricks and Singhal 
(2009) find significant negative impact of excess inventory announcement on stock returns. 
Based on a sample of 276 excess inventory announcements made during 1990-2002, they find -
6.79% to -6.93% abnormal returns over a two-day period. 
To answer our second research question we also examine the market reaction to excess 
inventory announcement by using the event study methodology. However, our work is different 
from Hendricks and Singhal (2009) in the following aspects. First, Hendricks and Singhal (2009) 
include growth prospect, firm size, and IT in their econometrics model to see the different 
market reaction to excess inventory announcement under a certain condition. On the contrary, in 
addition to growth rate, firm size, and IT, we also contain TFP as a proxy of firm’s operational 
competence to examine whether the market reacts differently to excess inventory announcement 
based on the announcing firms’ operational competence. Second, our analysis considers the 
moderating role of specific information (i.e., action) in the announcement to the adverse 
association between TFP and abnormal returns due to excess inventory announcement. Although 
Hendricks and Singhal (2009) explore the main effect of various actions and reasons on 
abnormal returns, they do not consider moderating impacts on the relationship between the 
announcing firm’s operational competence and abnormal returns. Third, the sample used in this 
paper is different from that in Hendricks and Singhal (2009). While they use a sample of 276 
excess inventory announcements from all sectors during 1990-2002, we use a sample of 85 
excess inventory announcements from only retail sector during 1990-2011. 
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Our paper is also related to the body of literature that has shown that investments based 
on IT yield higher abnormal stock market returns (Kesavan and Mani 2013; Alan et al. 2014) 
although Gaur et al. (2005) documented several disadvantages of using IT as a metric of 
inventory productivity. There are two possible explanations offered for this finding. One is 
information-based argument: the stock market might not be fully incorporating inventory 
information in pricing stocks (Kesavan et al. 2010; Kesavan and Mani 2013). The other is risk-
based argument: high IT retailers could be riskier than low IT retailers as they have higher 
returns (Alan et al. 2014). Such a risk-based argument, in the opposite direction, has been offered 
for the abnormal returns observed when investing in TFP based portfolios where low TFP 
retailers yield higher returns and are expected to be riskier compared to high TFP retailers 
(Imrohoroglu and Tuzel 2014). By studying the predictors of excess inventory announcement 
and the market response to the announcement, we provide evidence for the information-based 
argument and against the risk-based argument for investment in IT; but our paper supports for 
the risk-based argument for investment in TFP.  
By using quarterly firm-level data of 183 U.S. retailers between 1985 and 2012, Kesavan 
et al. (2016) have shown that low IT retailers have larger abnormal inventory growth compared 
to high IT retailers. However, the paper does not use excess inventory announcements. Our paper 
shows that low IT retailers are more likely to announce the buildup of excess inventory in the 
following year, which is consistent with the finding of Kesavan et al. (2016). 
4.3 Hypothesis Development 
4.3.1 Determinants of excess inventory announcement 
We derive our null hypothesis from theoretical operations management literature and 
observations in practice. In the commonly used newsvendor model, left-over inventory occurs 
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when realized demand is lower than the forecasted demand. So, excess inventory announcements 
may be an inevitable outcome of demand uncertainty. This is supported by anecdotal evidence 
from practice where we observe majority of retailers claiming sluggish demand as the reason for 
excess inventory announcements. So, high and low operationally competent retailers have 
similar likelihoods of excess inventory announcements.  
Alternatively, it is possible that operationally competent retailers have fewer excess 
inventory announcements. Excess inventory announcements are the result of supply-demand 
mismatches and many researchers have emphasized operational improvements to reduce their 
occurrences (Fisher et al. 2000; Billington et al. 2002; Chopra and Sodhi 2004; Narayanan and 
Raman 2004; Tang 2006). For example, Fisher et al. (2000) show that four elements – 
forecasting; supply-chain speed; inventory planning; and accurate, available data – form the 
foundation of rocket science retailing to achieve “Right Product in the Right Place at the Right 
Time for the Right Price.” However, a direct link between operational competence and excess 
inventory announcements has not been established so far. Accordingly, we develop our first 
hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) High operationally competent retailers have fewer excess inventory 
announcements compared to low operationally competent retailers. 
4.3.2 Market response on excess inventory announcement 
The negative impact of excess inventory announcement on the stock returns has been 
well documented (Hendricks and Singhal 2009). If the stock market considers excess inventory 
announcements to be outcomes of randomness in demand, then its negative reaction should not 
vary across high and low competent retailers. On the contrary, if the market believes such 
announcements to signal operational (in)competence of the announcing firm, then its reaction 
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could vary based on the type of firm. We argue for two possible reactions based on the type of 
firm.  
One may argue that the market penalizes excess inventory announcements made by high 
operationally competent retailers more severely than those made by their less competent peers. 
This is because the stock market on average could have a high expectation for operationally 
competent retailers and a low expectation for less competent retailers. So, when operationally 
competent retailers announce excess inventory, the market may be surprised by it, resulting in a 
sharp drop in the stock price. In contrast, when their less competent peers announce excess 
inventory, the market may have been expecting it so the stock price decline may not be too 
severe.  
Alternatively, it is possible that the market might react more negatively to excess 
inventory announcements made by low competent retailers for the following reason. Excess 
inventory announcement only implies that the firm has excess inventory. The market may expect 
operationally competent retailers to recover from excess inventory problem sooner than their less 
competent peers. Hence the market does not penalize severely when high operationally 
competent retailers announce excess inventory while it may severely penalize when low 
operationally competent retailers announce an accumulation of excess inventory. Following 
above explanations, therefore, we develop two competing hypotheses as follows: 
Hypothesis 2A (H2A) The stock market reaction to excess inventory announcements will be 
more negative for high operationally competent retailers compared to low operationally 
competent retailers. 
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Hypothesis 2B (H2B) The stock market reaction to excess inventory announcements will be less 
negative for high operationally competent retailers compared to low operationally competent 
retailers. 
4.4 Determinants of Excess Inventory Announcement 
To study the impact of operational competence on excess inventory announcement, we 
first explain why we measure operational competence by TFP, and then how to estimate it in the 
following section. 
We choose TFP as our primary measure of operational competence because it is a well-
studied metric across multiple fields and there exists strong evidence that higher TFP is 
associated with better operations through various internal drivers such as management practices, 
employee knowledge, and information technology (Syverson 2011). Using data from 245 stores 
of a UK retailer, Siebert and Zubanov (2010) find that different skills of store manager explain 
about 27-35% of variation in store-level TFP. As the firm-level TFP is a sum of store-level TFP, 
we expect to capture retailer’s operational competence such as a capability of store management 
team by considering the firm-level TFP. In addition, we use inventory turnover, adjusted 
inventory turnover (AIT) metric from Gaur et al. (2005), and gross margin return on inventory 
(GMROI) as alternate metrics of operational competence. 
4.4.1 Estimation of TFP 
Total factor productivity (TFP) is a measure of overall efficiency in operations: how 
much output (e.g., revenue) is obtained from a given set of inputs such as capital, labor, and 
intermediate materials. It is also called multifactor productivity, which is conceptually opposite 
to single-factor productivity. Unlike single-factor productivity, TFP does not suffer from the 
different intensity problem of excluded input usage. For example, suppose that we estimate labor 
110 
 
productivity for firm A and B, where firm A is a high technology firm while firm B is not. In this 
case, although firm A and B have exactly same labor level, labor productivity is affected by both 
labor and different intensity of excluded input such as technology because the importance of 
labor for firm A is relatively smaller than that of firm B. 
The most popular way to measure the firm level TFP is to get a residual, which is the 
deviation between observed output and predicted output, from the Cobb-Douglas production 
function estimated by ordinary least square (OLS). However, such estimation may suffer from 
simultaneity bias (Marschak and Andrews 1944). Olley and Pakes (1996, abbreviated as OP) and 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003, abbreviated as LP) introduce methods to control such bias so that 
allowing us to estimate consistent parameters of the production function, and thus obtain reliable 
TFP estimates. 
The main difference between two approaches is that OP use investment while LP use 
intermediate inputs like energy and materials used in operations to control for correlation 
between inputs (i.e., explanatory variables) and the unobserved productivity shock (i.e., error 
term). Investment is a good proxy for the firm which has positive investment, but as LP pointed 
out there is a “zero investment” problem. In this case, investment proxy may not smoothly 
respond to the productivity shock, violating the consistency condition. Therefore, we use LP as a 
main method to estimate the firm level TFP although we report all result with OP as a robustness 
check. 
We estimate the production function based on labor and physical capital as two main 
inputs. The production function is given by: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + ϵ𝑖𝑡 
ϵ𝑖𝑡 = Ω𝑖𝑡 + η𝑖𝑡 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the log of value added for firm i in period t (We use value added, total output – 
intermediate materials, as an output. Therefore, we exclude intermediate materials from a set of 
inputs.); 𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝑘𝑖𝑡 are log of labor and capital inputs; and ϵ𝑖𝑡 is an error term. The error term is a 
sum of two errors: Ω𝑖𝑡, the TFP, and η𝑖𝑡, the an unexpected idiosyncratic productivity shock. 
Both LP and OP assume that TFP, Ω𝑖𝑡, is observed by the decision maker in the firm before the 
firm makes its input decisions, which gives rise to the simultaneity problem. That is, inputs are 
correlated with the realization of the TFP. Specifically, labor, 𝑙𝑖𝑡, is the only variable input, thus 
its value can be affected by current TFP, Ω𝑖𝑡, while capital, 𝑘𝑖𝑡, is a fixed input at time t, and its 
value is only affected by the conditional distribution of Ω𝑖𝑡 at time t – 1. Therefore, Ω𝑖𝑡 is a state 
variable which has an impact on firms’ decision making. For example, firms that observe a 
positive productivity shock in period t will consume more intermediate inputs, 𝑚𝑖𝑡, and hire 
more labor, 𝑙𝑖𝑡, in that period. Note that OP uses investment instead of intermediate inputs with 
the similar logic. 
Demand for the intermediate input, 𝑚𝑖𝑡, is assumed to depend on the firm’s state variables, 
Ω𝑖𝑡 and 𝑘𝑖𝑡: 
 𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚(Ω𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡) (4.3) 
This intermediate input equation is based on the assumption that future TFP is strictly 
increasing in current TFP, Ω𝑖𝑡, so firms which observe a positive productivity shock in period t 
will require more intermediate inputs in that period, for any capital, 𝑘𝑖𝑡. This assumption is 
supported by the fact that TFP is not fleeting. For example, autoregressive coefficient of TFP is 
0.64 in the U.S. retail sector (in the Appendix). Since 𝑚𝑖𝑡 is strictly positive, we can write the 
inverse function for the unobserved productivity shock, Ω𝑖𝑡, as 
 Ω𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚
−1(𝑚𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡) = ℎ(𝑚𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡) (4.4) 
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which is strictly increasing in 𝑚𝑖𝑡. The unobservable TFP is now expressed solely as a function 
of two observed inputs, 𝑚𝑖𝑡 and 𝑘𝑖𝑡. 
LP further assume that TFP is governed by a first-order Markov process 
 Ω𝑖𝑡 = 𝔼[Ω𝑖𝑡|Ω𝑖,𝑡−1]  + ξ𝑖𝑡 (4.5) 
where ξ𝑖𝑡 is an innovation to TFP that is uncorrelated with 𝑘𝑖𝑡, but not necessarily with 𝑙𝑖𝑡; this is 
one source of the simultaneity bias. 
Using equation (1), (2), and (4), we can obtain 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖𝑡(𝑚𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡) + η𝑖𝑡 (4.6) 
where 𝜙𝑖𝑡(𝑚𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  ℎ(𝑚𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡), and approximate 𝜙𝑖𝑡 with a third-order 
polynomial series in capital and intermediate inputs. Approximation with a higher order 
polynomial does not significantly change the results. This first stage estimation results in an 
estimate for ?̂?𝑙 which controls for the simultaneity problem.  
However, the first stage does not identify 𝛽𝑘. To do that, we begin by computing the 
estimated value for 𝜙𝑖𝑡 using 
 
𝜙𝑖?̂? = 𝑦𝑖?̂? − 𝛽?̂?𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0̂ + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑙?̂?
3−𝑙
𝑗=0
3
𝑙=0
𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑗 − 𝛽?̂?𝑙𝑖𝑡 (4.7) 
For any candidate value 𝛽?̃?, we can compute (up to a scalar constant) a prediction for Ω𝑖𝑡 
for all periods t using 
 Ω𝑖?̂? = 𝜙𝑖?̂? − 𝛽?̃?𝑘𝑖𝑡 (4.8) 
Using these values, a consistent (nonparametric) approximation to 𝔼[Ω𝑖𝑡|Ω𝑖,𝑡−1] is given 
by the predicted values from the regression 
 Ω𝑖?̂? = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1Ω𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2Ω𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾3Ω𝑖,𝑡−1
3 + υ𝑖𝑡 (4.9) 
which LP call 𝔼[Ω𝑖𝑡|Ω𝑖,𝑡−1]
̂ . 
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Given 𝛽?̂?, 𝛽?̃?, and 𝔼[Ω𝑖𝑡|Ω𝑖,𝑡−1]
̂ , LP write the sample residual of the production function 
as  
 ξ𝑖𝑡 + η𝑖𝑡̂ = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽?̂?𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽?̃?𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 𝔼[Ω𝑖𝑡|Ω𝑖,𝑡−1]
̂  (4.10) 
We can estimate 𝛽?̂? by solving  
 min
𝛽?̃?
∑ ∑ (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽?̂?𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽?̃?𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑖
− 𝔼[Ω𝑖𝑡|Ω𝑖,𝑡−1]
̂ )
2
 
(4.11) 
Finally, the TFP is estimated by: 
 𝑇𝐹𝑃(𝐿𝑃)𝑖𝑡 = exp (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽0̂ − 𝛽?̂?𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽?̂?𝑘𝑖𝑡) (4.12) 
By using all data available up until that year, we estimate the production function 
parameters every year to eliminate a potential look-ahead bias in the TFP estimates. We calculate 
the firm level TFP for each year using that year’s data (𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡, and 𝑚𝑖𝑡) and the 
corresponding production function parameters for that year ( 𝛽?̂? and 𝛽?̂?). For example, to 
calculate TFP values for 2010, we use all data up to and including 2010 to estimate parameters 
and then use the 2010’s data to calculate TFP value for each firm. These values would then be 
used to predict the likelihood of announcing excess inventory in 2011.  
Our estimation of TFP is consistent with prior literature that has shown large and 
persistent differences in productivity (Syverson 2011). For the large differences in TFP, we find 
a significant dispersion in the firm-level TFPs in the U.S. retail sector. The overall 90-10 TFP 
ratio in the U.S. retail sector is 2.54 (2.04 in OP). Prior study has shown the similar differences. 
For example, Syverson (2004) finds the average 90-10 TFP ratio of 1.92 in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector and Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014) report the same measure of 1.8 in all 
U.S. sectors. For the persistent differences in TFP, we find the autoregressive coefficient of 0.64 
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(0.73 in OP) in the retail sector. It is robust with productivity literature, which ranges 
autoregressive coefficients between 0.6 and 0.8 (e.g., Abraham and White 2006; Foster et al. 
2008). We provide details in the Appendix. 
4.4.2 Data and variables 
We use three different databases to test our hypotheses. 
4.4.2.1 Firm level TFP 
The first main data source for estimating TFP (explained above in §4.4.1) is Standard and 
Poor’s Compustat from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). We use the Compustat 
fundamental annual data from 1962 to 2011. Our sample for production function estimation is 
comprised of all U.S. retail firms by SIC code between 5200 and 5999. The sample is an 
unbalanced panel with approximately 1,773 distinct retail firms; the total number of firm-year 
observations is approximately 18,281. This is only for estimating TFP. The sample size reduces 
after we merge the Compustat data with other datasets such as Factiva and daily stock price to 
test our hypotheses. 
The key variables for estimating the firm level TFP are the value added (𝑦𝑖𝑡), 
employment (𝑙𝑖𝑡), and physical capital (𝑘𝑖𝑡). Firm level financial data is supplemented with three 
additional data: 1) price index for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as deflator for the value added; 
2) price index for private fixed investment as deflator for capital, both from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA); and 3) national average wage index from the Social Security 
Administration (SSA). 
We use revenue-based measure of TFP, which is highly correlated with physical 
quantity-based measure (Foster et al. 2008), so value added (𝑦𝑖𝑡) is calculated as Sales – 
Materials, deflated by the GDP price index. Sales is net sales (SALE in Compustat), which is 
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gross sales minus cash discounts, returned sales, etc. Materials (𝑚𝑖𝑡) is measured as total 
expenses minus labor expenses where total expenses is approximated as Sales minus Operating 
Income Before Depreciation and Amortization (OIBDP in Compustat) and labor expenses is 
calculated by multiplying the number of employees (EMP in Compustat) by average wage index 
from the SSA. Thus our value added definition is proxied by Operating Income Before 
Depreciation and Amortization plus labor expenses. 
The labor input (𝑙𝑖𝑡) is computed by the number of employees (EMP in Compustat). The 
capital stock (𝑘𝑖𝑡) is measured by gross property, plant, and equipment (PPEGT in Compustat) 
and deflated by the price index for private fixed investment (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003).  
4.4.2.2 Excess inventory announcement 
The second data set, obtained from Factiva, collects excess inventory announcements 
made by publicly traded U.S. retailers in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and Dow Jones News 
Service (DJNS) during 1990 to 2011. We use a set of keywords to search for announcements 
regarding excess inventory based on Hendricks and Singhal (2009). Specifically, we collect 
announcements which have the word “inventory or inventories” within five words of terms such 
as “obsolete, excess, glut, buildup, reduce, bloated, charge, adjust, loss, write-off, write-down, 
liquidate, accumulate, or revalue.” More details about searching algorithm which used in this 
paper are available on the Online Supplement of Hendricks and Singhal (2009). We obtain 
exactly the same number of announcements, 4612 (as reported in Hendricks and Singhal 2009), 
when we follow their algorithm to check consistency. 
The final sample consists of 85 excess inventory announcements (73 unique firms) for 
retail firms in the U.S. between 1990 and 2011. We found 95 announcements initially, but after 
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merging with other datasets, we end up having 85 announcements because of missing data, 
bankruptcy, etc. Here are some examples of announcement: 
 Best Buy Co. has started 12-month no-interest financing specials to trim PC inventory 
which will become obsolete when new technology arrives. (WSJ, 19 December 1996) 
 Gap Inc. cut prices to spark slow sales and reduce inventory which results in flat gross 
profit margins. (WSJ, 5 May 2000) 
 Wal-Mart's inventories jumped 10.3% in the fiscal first quarter, ended April 30, to $35.2 
billion from a year earlier, driven by unsold apparel, home decor and outdoor products. 
(WSJ, 21 May 2007) 
Figure 4.1 shows the number of announcements by year. Nearly 52% of announcements 
are made during 1990’s and 48% are during 2000’s. Further investigation of the timing of 
announcement indicates that more announcements are reported during the first and the fourth 
quarters (i.e., from October to March), with 32.94%, 18.82%, 18.82%, and 29.41% in the first, 
second, third, and fourth quarters, respectively. This result differs from an observation made by 
Hendricks and Singhal (2009) which has nearly equally distributed across the four quarters. 
Different fiscal year across industries may cause this variation. Considering retailer’s fiscal year, 
which ends in general at the end of January and earnings report date is couple of months later, 
our sample represents retailers’ tendency to announce excess inventory before earnings report 
date. Based on the National Bureau of Economic Research, our sample embraces two recession 
periods: 1) March 2001 to November 2001; and 2) December 2007 to June 2009. Our data show 
that 9.41% of our announcements (8 out of 85 announcements) are made during the recession 
period. We test the effect of recession on our main models as a robustness check, but we do not 
find any statistically significant difference between recession and non-recession periods. 
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Excess Inventory Announcements by Year 
 
Note: This time period includes two recession periods according to National Bureau of 
Economics Research: 1) March 2001 to November 2001 and 2) December 2007 to June 2009. 
The number of sample in each period is 2 and 6, respectively. 
 
Our sample consists of firms in retail sector from eight different industries based on two-
digit standard industrial classification (SIC) codes between 5200 and 5999. Table 4.1-a illustrates 
the distribution of excess inventory announcements by industry. Since our sample does not have 
any excess inventory announcement in SIC 58, we exclude it from our analysis. Miscellaneous 
retail (SIC 59) represents 32.94% of the sample while Food stores (SIC 54) represents 1.18% of 
the sample.  
Some announcements provide detail information including the reasons of accumulating 
excess inventory (Table 4.1-b) and the actions that a firm has taken or plans to take to deal with 
excess inventory (Table 4.1-c). 35.42% of the sample mentions sluggish sales and 5.21% of the 
sample mentions obsolete and discontinued inventory as a main reason of excess inventory 
buildup. Interestingly, many firms (35.42%) blame external factors such as sluggish sales as a 
main reason of building excess inventory whereas very few firms (4.71%) mention internal 
factors such as internal inefficiency and poor execution as a main reason of excess inventory, 
suggesting that the randomness in demand is the key driver of excess inventory, but not 
operational incompetence. For action information, 38.61% of firms states markdowns and 
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promotions and 23.76% of firms states inventory write-down as their primary actions to cope 
with excess inventory problem. As action is verifiable by the market, but reason is not, the stock 
market may respond differently by action but not reason. We explore this idea in §4.5.4. 
Table 4.1-a: Distribution of Excess Inventory Announcements by Industry 
SIC 2 digit # of announcement % of sample 
52 Building materials & garden supplies 4 4.71% 
53 General merchandise stores 12 14.12% 
54 Food stores 1 1.18% 
55 Automotive dealers & service stations 5 5.88% 
56 Apparel and Accessory stores 21 24.71% 
57 Furniture and home furnishings stores 14 16.47% 
59 Miscellaneous retail 28 32.94% 
    85 100.00% 
Note: Since our sample does not have any excess inventory announcement in SIC 58, Eating and 
drinking places, we exclude it in the analysis. 
 
Table 4.1-b: Reasons of Excess Inventory Announcement 
Reasons # of announcement % of sample 
Sluggish sales  34 35.42% 
Obsolete and discontinued inventory 5 5.21% 
Other reasons 20 20.83% 
No reasons given 37 38.54% 
  96 100.00% 
Note: 74 and 11 announcements provide single and multiple reasons, respectively. 
 
Table 4.1-c: Follow-up Actions to Excess Inventory Announcement 
Actions # of announcement % of sample 
Inventory write down 24 23.76% 
Markdowns and promotions 39 38.61% 
Other actions 23 22.77% 
No action indicated 15 14.85% 
  101 100.00% 
Note: 69 and 16 announcements provide single and multiple reasons, respectively. 
 
4.4.2.3 Daily stock price 
Final data set is obtained from CRSP, which provides daily stock prices for all public 
firms. Using them, we estimate the expected return during the event window for each of 
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announcing firms when they announce excess inventory. See the details about the event study 
methodology in §4.5.1. 
4.4.2.4 Variables 
To test our hypothesis, we generate the following variables for our analysis. 
Dependent Variables: 
 𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡 = {
1, if firm 𝑖 announces excess inventory in year 𝑡
0, otherwise
 
Independent Variables:  
 𝑇𝐹𝑃(𝐿𝑃)𝑖𝑡 = estimated TFP by LP for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
 𝑇𝐹𝑃(𝑂𝑃)𝑖𝑡 = estimated TFP by OP for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
 𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = inventory turns for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 =
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝐿𝐼𝐹𝑂 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡
 
 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = sales growth for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
 
 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = market value of the firm
′s common equity for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
= closing stock price (PRCC_F in Compustat)
× the number of shares outstanding (in millions of shares, CSHO in Compustat) 
We use mean-adjusted variables for the measure of operational competence such as TFP 
and IT for the following reasons. First, different industries within the U.S. retail sector have 
different levels of TFP and IT. Our data show that the estimated firm level TFP (both LP and OP) 
varies significantly by two-digit SIC (Table 5.2.1 in the Appendix). Overall mean TFP by LP is 
2.54 with standard deviation of 0.35. Heterogeneity in IT across industries in the U.S. retail 
sector is well documented by Gaur et al. (2005). Second, firm’s TPF and IT may vary over time 
even in the same industry by, for example, introducing new technology or changing the top 
management team. To account for heterogeneities both across industries and across years, we 
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calculate the mean TFP and IT for each year in each industry, then subtract them from raw 
values. Hence, we use mean-adjusted variables (i.e., 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡) in our 
analysis. For a robustness check, we also report the results with (1) median-adjusted and (2) raw 
values of TFP and IT without any adjustment. 
Summary statistics and the Pearson correlation coefficients among all variables used in 
our analysis are provided in Tables 4.2-a and 4.2-b, respectively. Mean-centered variables are 
used to compute the correlation coefficients because of panel structure of our data. We note that 
correlation between mean-adjusted TFP estimated by LP and that by OP is 0.95, indicating that 
both estimates are robust each other. We trim the top 1% and bottom 1% of observations based 
on TFP by LP and OP, IT, sales growth, and market value of the firm’s common equity. This 
approach ensures that our analyses are not influenced by extreme outliers. 
Table 4.2-a: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡   Overall 0.018 0.133 0 1 
 Between  0.081 0 1 
 Within  0.123 -0.482 0.968 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃(𝐿𝑃)𝑖,𝑡−1  Overall -0.007 0.169 -0.422 0.821 
 Between  0.169 -0.415 0.796 
 Within  0.088 -0.673 0.799 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃(𝑂𝑃)𝑖,𝑡−1  Overall -0.003 0.123 -0.386 0.524 
 Between  0.115 -0.320 0.469 
 Within  0.071 -0.433 0.459 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 Overall -1.181 5.110 -9.790 36.307 
 Between  5.553 -8.970 35.161 
 Within  2.196 -18.130 28.553 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1  Overall 1.123 0.195 719 2.332 
 Between  0.168 0.807 2.145 
 Within  0.159 0.562 2.243 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 Overall 1734.193 4045.649 1.533 35615.55 
 Between  2772.876 1.771 19854.83 
 Within  2178.522 -12967.22 21529.26 
Note: Outliers are removed (<1% & >99%). SIC 58 is not included in our sample since it does 
not have an excess inventory announcement. The number of observations is 4739 and the 
number of firms is 578 for all variables except 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃(𝑂𝑃)𝑖,𝑡−1 which has 4711 
observations with 576 firms. Average length of years is 8.20. 
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Table 4.2-b: Pearson Correlation  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1)𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡    1    
  
(2)𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃(𝐿𝑃)𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.0470 1     
(3)𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃(𝑂𝑃)𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0417 0.9514 1    
(4)𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑗𝑑_𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0258 0.0342 0.0413 1   
(5)𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 0.0230 0.1059 0.1299 -0.0210 1  
(6)𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.0117 0.0296 0.0336 0.0279 0.0013 1 
Note: All bold coefficients have p<0.01 and italicized coefficients have p<0.05. All variables are 
mean-centered except 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡. 
 
4.4.3 Model specification and analysis 
This section presents the econometrics model to test Hypothesis 1 about the impact of 
operational competence on excess inventory announcement. We propose the following probit 
model: 
Pr(𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑿) = Φ(𝑿
′𝛽) (13) 
where Φ denotes standard normal cdf and X is a vector of covariates including two-digit SIC 
industry fixed effect (𝑏𝐼), year fixed effect (𝑎𝑡), main variables of interest to measure firm’s 
operational competence (𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1), and two control variables 
( 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1). 
In our empirical model specification, we include year specific dummies (𝑎𝑡) and two-
digit SIC industry specific dummies (𝑏𝐼) to account for time- and industry-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity (i.e., selection on observables). By using all explanatory variables in a lagged form 
(i.e., imposing pre-existing condition), we can minimize the concern of simultaneous problem 
and estimate conditional probability of announcing excess inventory at time t given all the 
information available at time t-1. Two control variables other than time fixed and industry fixed 
effects are used: sales growth controls for different growth rate across retail firms; and market 
value of firm’s common stock controls for firm size.  
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We run a random effect probit model instead of fixed effect for the following reasons. 
First, our dependent variable, an indicator of excess inventory announcement, has only 85 
observations (73 unique firms) with value 1. If we use a fixed effect model, we cannot use the 
firms that only have one value of dependent variables (i.e., no time variation over time). For 
example, if firm A does not report any excess inventory announcement, firm A is omitted from 
our sample to run a fixed effect model because all observations of dependent variable in firm A 
are 0. Thus, we have to use a small sample of 73 unique firms if we run a fixed effect model, 
which result in a huge loss in sample size. Second, recent papers in economics literature 
(Arellano and Honore 2001; Hahn 2001; Laisney and Lechner 2003; Greene 2004; Cerro 2007), 
by analyzing the fixed effects model on binary choice dependent variable (e.g., probit model), 
show that the fixed effect estimator is inconsistent and substantially biased away from zero. 
Third, an analysis of decomposed overall variation into between and within variations supports 
our use of random effect model. In Table 4.2-a, all explanatory variables have larger between-
variation than within-variation. We use probit model as a main model; however, we also check 
the robustness of our result with different model specifications such as logit and complementary 
log-log models. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Results: Determinants of excess inventory announcement 
Table 4.3 presents regression results to unveil determinants of excess inventory 
announcement. We report the result with only control variables in column (1); then add TFP and 
IT in columns (2) and (3), respectively. Finally both TFP and IT are entered in column (4).  
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Table 4.3: Regression Result for Productivity and Excess Inventory Announcement (Probit 
Model) 
DV: 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒚𝒊𝒕 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  -1.24
***
  -1.22
***
 
  (0.35)  (0.36) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1   -0.03
**
 -0.03
*
 
   (0.017) (0.016) 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 0.07 0.31 0.08 0.32 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 7.39×10
-6
 -6.71×10
-6
 9.63×10
-6
 -5.28×10
-6
 
 (1.2×10
-5
) (1.31×10
-5
) (1.21×10
-5
) (1.32×10
-5
) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of observations 4739 4739 4739 4739 
# of firms 578 578 578 578 
Log likelihood -410.03 -402.96 -407.22 -400.57 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Consider the results from column (2) that support our conjecture that operationally 
competent retailers have fewer excess inventory announcements. The coefficient of one-year-
lagged mean-adjusted TFP captures the impact of operational competence on the probability of 
announcing excess inventory in the following year. As we expected, we find that one-year-
lagged mean-adjusted TFP has negative impact on the probability of announcing excess 
inventory (-1.24, p<0.01). High TFP retailers, those in the top 90
th
 percentile of TFP, are 3.53 
times less likely to announce excess inventory than low TFP retailers, those in the bottom 10
th
 
percentile. Thus, we find evidence supporting Hypothesis 1 and conclude that TFP is a predictor 
of excess inventory announcement. While the direction of this result is intuitive, it is still useful 
to not only document this finding but, more importantly, the large magnitude we observe. 
When we use IT as a measure of operational competence as shown in column (3), we find 
that one-year-lagged mean-adjusted IT has negative impact on the probability of announcing 
excess inventory (-0.03, p<0.05). High IT retailers, those in the top 90
th
 percentile of IT, are 2.33 
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times less likely to report excess inventory than low IT retailers, those in the bottom 10
th
 
percentile. When we use IT and TFP in the same model as shown in column (4), we find that the 
coefficients of both IT and TFP remain similar indicating that this pair of variables have low 
correlation, confirmed in Table 4.2-b, but we find that significance of IT reduces to 10% level. 
So, it appears that TFP is a better predictor of excess inventory announcement than IT. 
We note that the coefficients’ estimates of the control variables are in the expected 
direction. The year fixed effect and two digit SIC industry fixed effect are significant in the 
entire models, implying that unobserved year specific error and industry specific error (i.e., 
selection on observables) should be controlled. The market value of the firm’s common stock, 
which is the proxy for firm size, and sales growth are not significantly associated with the chance 
of reporting excess inventory in our data. 
4.4.4.2. Robustness checks  
We perform a number of tests to show the robustness of our result, namely the negative 
impact of operational competence on excess inventory announcement (Table 4.4).  
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Table 4.4: (Robustness Check) Regression Result for Productivity and Excess Inventory 
Announcement 
DV: 
𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒚𝒊𝒕 
Alternative Model 
Specifications 
Alternative 
Adjustment 
Alternativ
e TFP 
Alternative 
Inventory 
Efficiency 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Logit 
Complementa
ry log-log 
Median 
adjusted 
Raw OP AIT GMROI 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 -2.95
***
 -2.91
***
    -1.20
***
 -1.20
***
 
 (0.87) (0.86)    (0.38) (0.35) 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1   -1.14
***
     
   (0.35)     
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1    -1.25
***
    
    (0.36)    
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃(𝑂𝑃)𝑖,𝑡−1     -1.36
***
   
     (0.45)   
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.07
*
 -0.07
*
   -0.03
*
   
 (0.04) (0.04)   (0.016)   
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1   -0.04
**
     
   (0.02)     
𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1    -0.03
**
    
    (0.02)    
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐴𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1      0.02  
      (0.11)  
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐺𝑀𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1       -0.03 
       (0.03) 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 0.78 0.76 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.24 0.31 
 (0.54) (0.53) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -1.28×10
-5
 -1.27×10
-5
 -3.51×10
-6
 -5.60×10
-6
 8.57×10
-7
 -2.99×10
-6
 -6.51×10
-6
 
 (3.08×10-5) (3.03×10-5) (1.31×10-5) (1.33×10-5) (1.26×10-5) (1.31×10-5) (1.31×10-5) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of observations 4739 4739 4739 4793 4711 4534 4734 
# of firms 578 578 578 578 576 571 577 
Log likelihood -400.75 -400.78 -400.77 -399.89 -401.88 -384.72 -402.23 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Alternative Model Specifications: We examine the stability of the results using different model 
specifications. In the main model, we use probit model (equation (4.13)) where we assume the 
cumulative standard normal distribution as a link function. We can alternatively use logit model 
where a link function is assumed by the cumulative logistic distribution (i.e., Pr(𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑿) =
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[1 + 𝑒−𝑿
′𝛽]
−1
). As the binary dependent variable in our data is asymmetric, we can also use a 
complementary log-log model specification which assumes Pr(𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑿) = 1 − 𝑒
−𝑒𝑿
′𝛽
as a 
link function. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4.4 show the results with logit model and 
complementary log-log model, respectively. The results are very similar to the ones obtained 
with probit model (Table 4.3). This shows that our substantive results are no artifact of the 
specific model chosen in the analysis. 
Alternative Data Adjustments: We test the validity of our theoretical model using alternative 
adjustments for TFP and IT. In the main model, we adjust TFP and IT by their mean values 
calculated by each industry in each year. It helps us control for both heterogeneities across 
industries and across years. The mean, however, is sensitive to extreme values and median is 
preferable in this case. Hence we use median-adjusted TFP and IT instead of mean-adjusted TFP 
and IT. As a further robustness check, we also report the result using raw variables without any 
adjustment. As seen in columns (3) and (4) in Table 4.4, the conclusions remain unchanged, 
indicating that our main result is not affected by extreme values. 
Alternative TFP: We examine the sensitivity of the results to an alternative measure of TFP 
introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996). As we discussed in §4.4.1, OP is an alternative way of 
measuring the firm level TFP. Since the correlation between mean-adjusted TFP estimated by 
OP and that by LP is 0.95 (shown in Table 4.2-b), we expect to see robust results. The main 
conclusions do not change with TFP estimated by OP (column (5) in Table 4.4). 
Alternative Inventory Efficiency: We repeat our analysis with alternative proxies of inventory 
efficiency. We use two additional metrics other than IT: growth margin return on inventory 
(GMROI) and adjusted inventory turnover (AIT). See Alan et al. (2014) for details of definition 
and computation. The results are reported in columns (6) and (7) in Table 4.4 for mean-adjusted 
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AIT and GMROI, respectively. Our main finding, the negative impact of TFP on the probability 
of announcing excess inventory, is still consistent. Interestingly, the both proxies for inventory 
efficiency are not significantly associated with the likelihood of announcing excess inventory 
any more. Using other adjustments such as median-adjusted or raw variables still estimate 
insignificant coefficients for the proxies of inventory efficiency.  
Recession Period: We rerun the regression with recession dummies instead of year specific 
dummies. The main result is unchanged and recession dummies are not statistically significant 
(table is omitted), implying that the probability of announcing excess inventory does not differ 
from recession period to non-recession period.  
To sum up, we find that excess inventory announcement is not just a function of 
randomness in demand; it is systematically correlated with the announcing firm’s operational 
competence. We also find that TFP is a better metric of overall operational competence than IT. 
4.5 Market Reaction 
4.5.1 Event study methodology 
Our main measure for the second research question about market reaction is the short-
term abnormal returns (AR) accruing from excess inventory announcements to the focal firm, 
estimated by the event study methodology (see Brown and Warner 1985 for a review of this 
methodology). Using stock price (i.e., shareholder value) as a performance metric has several 
advantages: It is forward looking, integrates multiple dimensions of performance, and is less 
easily manipulated by managers than other measures (Gielens et al. 2008). Event studies usually 
enable 1) to test for the existence of information effects of event (e.g., the impact of the excess 
inventory announcement on market value of stock price) and 2) to identify factors that enlighten 
changes in market value of stock price (e.g., announcing firm’s operational competence). 
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Consistent with the approach used in many event studies (Brown and Warner 1985), we 
measure abnormal returns over a two-day event period (i.e., the day of the announcement and the 
day before the announcement date). If the excess inventory announcement is made before 4 PM 
Eastern Standard Time (EST), the event window includes the day of announcement and the 
preceding trading day to account for the possibility that the information about the event may 
have been released the day before the announcement. If the excess inventory announcement is 
made after 4 PM EST, then the event window consists of the day of the announcement and the 
trading day after the announcement to account for the fact that the market cannot act until the 
next trading day. We translate calendar days into event days as follows. For announcements 
made before 4 PM EST, the announcement calendar day is Day 0 in event time, the next trading 
day is Day +1, and the trading day before the announcement is Day -1, and so on. For 
announcements made after 4 PM EST, the announcement calendar day is Day -1 in event time, 
the next trading day is Day 0, and the trading day before the announcement is Day -2, and so on. 
In addition to a two-day event period, we also use a three-day event window (from Day -1 to 1) 
as a robustness check. 
The information effects of excess inventory announcements are assessed by computing 
the difference between the observed return, 𝑅𝑖𝑑, on the event date and the expected return, 
𝔼[𝑅𝑖𝑑], estimated on a benchmark model.  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑑 = 𝑅𝑖𝑑 − 𝔼[𝑅𝑖𝑑] (4.14) 
The observed return, 𝑅𝑖𝑑, is expressed as the percentage change in stock price: 
𝑅𝑖𝑑 =
𝑃𝑖𝑑 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑑−1
𝑃𝑖,𝑑−1
 (4.15) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑑 is the closing stock price for announcing firm 𝑖 on day 𝑑. The price 𝑃𝑖𝑑 incorporates 
the long term impacts of the additional information becoming public on the day d. It follows the 
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“efficient market” (or “rational expectation”) paradigm which assumes a complete and 
immediate investor response to any available information. Consistent to the literature (e.g., 
Kalaignanam et al. 2013; Hendricks et al. 2014), we estimate the expected return, 𝔼[𝑅𝑖𝑑], using 
the Fama-French four-factor model that includes the three factors identified by Fama and French 
(1993) and the momentum factor identified by Carhart (1997): 
𝔼[𝑅𝑖𝑑] = [?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑑 + 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑑 + 𝛿𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑑 + ?̂?𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑑] (4.16) 
where 𝑅𝑚𝑑 is the stock return of the benchmark market portfolio, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑑 is the difference 
between rate of returns of small and big stock firms, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑑 is the difference in returns between 
high and low book-to-market ratio stocks, and 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑑 is the momentum factor defined as the 
difference in returns between firms with high and low past stock performance. 
We estimate the expected daily stock returns for each firm using OLS regression over the 
estimation period from day -220 to day -21. In estimating the parameters we require that a firm 
must have a minimum of 40 stock returns during the estimation period of 200 trading days. 
Abnormal returns are estimated as the difference between the observed returns, 𝑅𝑖𝑑, and the 
expected returns, 𝔼[𝑅𝑖𝑑]: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑑 = 𝑅𝑖𝑑 − 𝔼[𝑅𝑖𝑑] = 𝑅𝑖𝑑 − [?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑑 + 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑑 + 𝛿𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑑 + ?̂?𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑑] (4.17) 
The abnormal returns are aggregated for a firm over an event window [−𝑑1, 𝑑2] and are given by  
𝐶𝐴𝑅[−𝑑1, 𝑑2] = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑑
𝑑2
𝑑=−𝑑1
 (4.18) 
When information leakage (for 𝑑1 days before the event) and/or dissemination over time (for 𝑑2 
days after the event) occur, the abnormal returns for a firm are aggregated over the “event 
window” [−𝑑1, 𝑑2] into a cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Because the event study is 
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conducted across N different events, the individual CARs can be averaged into a cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR). 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅[−𝑑1, 𝑑2] = ∑
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑛[−𝑑1, 𝑑2]
𝑁
𝑁
𝑛=1
 (4.19) 
4.5.2 Model specification  
This section presents the econometrics model to test our hypotheses about the market 
response to excess inventory announcements. We propose the following model:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖[−1, 0] = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑏𝐼 + 𝜃1𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖 + 𝜃2𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐼𝑇𝑖 
                                                 +𝜃3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝜃4𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(4.20) 
Similar to the previous model in equation (13), we include two fixed effects. First, year 
fixed effect (𝑎𝑡) is included to account for the unobservable yearly shock which can impact on 
multiple announcements made in a specific year. Second, industry fixed effect (𝑏𝐼) is added to 
account for the unobservable industry shock which can impact on announcements made in a 
specific industry. Two control variables are used: sales growth controls for different growth rate 
across retailers; and natural logarithm of sales for firm size. Note that we ensure that all 
explanatory variables are in the most recent fiscal year completed before the date of the excess 
inventory announcement (i.e., typically one-year-lagged form). 
4.5.3 Results 
4.5.3.1 Results: Main effect of excess inventory announcement on stock price  
We examine the cumulative average abnormal returns for the 85 excess inventory 
announcements across different event windows. We find a statistically significant abnormal 
return on the announcement day (-2.18%, p<0.01). Table 4.5 shows the results for four different 
event windows using the four-factor model with statistics such as the cross-sectional variance-
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adjusted Patell test statistic. Notice that all four event windows show significantly negative mean 
abnormal returns. For example, 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅[−1, 0] is -2.53% (p<0.01), meaning that the stock market 
reflects the information of holding accumulated inventory by penalizing the announcing firm’s 
stock price. Although 47.06% of the companies are positively affected, the CAR is negative for 
52.94%. To reduce the influence of outliers, we supplement the t-statistic with non-parametric 
test, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. It shows that the median abnormal return is statistically 
different from zero (p<0.10).  
Table 4.5: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns across Different Event Windows  
Window 
Mean Abnormal 
return (%) Patell t-statistic % Positive
a
  
Rank test Z-
statistic 
[-1, 0] -2.53 -4.21*** 47.06 -1.56* 
[0, +1] -2.06 -3.42*** 37.65** -0.92 
[-1, +1] -2.41 -3.27*** 44.71 -1.19 
[-2, +2] -2.60 -2.73*** 48.24 -1.56* 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The p-values are one-tailed. The sample size is 85. 
a 
p-value is calculated based on Binomial sign test. 
 
We find two interesting observations. First, 47.06% of the retailers have positive 
abnormal stock market returns around the excess inventory announcement. Hendricks and 
Singhal (2009) observed only 27% of firms to have positive stock market reaction. In other 
words, there is considerable heterogeneity in the market’s response to the announcement. To 
explain this anomaly, we consider the information provided by the retailers for the reasons for 
excess inventory buildup and actions that they have taken or plan to take to handle the excess 
inventory, later in the section 4.5.4. 
Second, comparing to Hendricks and Singhal (2009) that show the decline in the stock 
price by -6.79% to -6.93% due to excess inventory announcement, our finding is smaller in 
magnitude. This is because we focus on the retail sector whereas Hendricks and Singhal (2009) 
study all sectors in the U.S. It may indicate that the stock market perceives the excess inventory 
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announcement more negatively when non-retailers announce it. In fact, Hendricks and Singhal 
(2009) show that if the excess inventory is with customers, the announcing firm has additional 
penalty of approximately 2.5% in the stock price. As retailers are the customer of other firms, but 
not the opposite, we expect to observe a smaller decline in the stock price when retailers 
announce excess inventory. Hence, our finding is consistent with Hendricks and Singhal (2009).  
4.5.3.2 Results: Market reaction across the announcing firm’s operational competence 
Consistent with the approach used in many event studies (e.g., Brown and Warner 1985; 
Hendricks and Singhal 2009; Kalaignanam et al. 2013; Hendricks et al. 2014), we use a CAR 
measure in two-day event period as a dependent variable in our cross-sectional analysis. We 
estimate equation (20). In order to reduce the endogeneity issue, we ensure that all explanatory 
variables are in the most recent fiscal year completed before the date of the excess inventory 
announcement (i.e., one-year-lagged form). The results are presented in Table 4.6. We initially 
include TFP (i.e., 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖) and IT (i.e., 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐼𝑇𝑖) separately in columns (1) and (2), 
respectively, and then add both metrics in column (3). As a robustness check, we also report 
results with a three-day event window (i.e., 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖[−1, 1]) in columns (4)-(6).  
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Table 4.6: Regression Result for Productivity and Cumulative Abnormal Return  
 
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊[−𝟏, 𝟎] 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊[−𝟏, 𝟏] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖 -29.35**  -29.98* -39.12***  -39.03*** 
 (14.42)  (15.17) (14.18)  (14.14) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐼𝑇𝑖  0.18 0.34  -0.26 -0.05 
  (0.74) (0.75)  (0.81) (0.77) 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 -8.98 -10.98 -8.27 -12.38 -16.01* -12.48 
 (7.65) (7.86) (7.79) (7.68) (8.38) (8.02) 
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 -4.08*** -2.51** -4.21*** -5.08*** -2.84** -5.06*** 
 (1.28) (1.17) (1.33) (1.56) (1.41) (1.56) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Adjusted R
2
 0.198 0.119 0.187 0.180 0.079 0.165 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard error is reported in the parenthesis. 
 
Consider the result from columns (1) and (4). We find that one-year-lagged mean-
adjusted TFP is significantly and negatively associated with the cumulative abnormal returns in a 
two-day event window (-29.35, p<0.05) and in a three-day event window (-39.12, p<0.01). This 
means that the stock market penalizes more severely when the announcing firm is indeed high 
TFP retailer. Ceteris paribus, an increase in one-year-lagged mean-adjusted TFP by one-
standard-deviation (i.e., 0.141) is associated with -4.14% in the stock return over a two-day 
period (the day of the announcement and the day before the announcement) and -5.52% over a 
three-day period (from the day before the announcement to the day after the announcement). 
Hence, we find supporting evidence of Hypothesis 2A. 
Consistent with Hendricks and Singhal (2009), we find that one-year-lagged mean-
adjusted IT is not associated with the cumulative abnormal returns in two-day and three-day 
event windows (columns (2) and (5)). It can substantiate prior literature (e.g., Kesavan et al. 
2010; Kesavan and Mani 2012) which finds that the stock market does not fully incorporate the 
information contained in inventory. When we use IT and TFP in the same model as shown in 
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columns (3) and (6), we find that our results remain qualitatively the same, so we use it for 
further robustness checks. 
We note that the coefficients’ estimates of the control variables are in the expected 
direction. The natural log of sales, which is the proxy for firm size, is negatively associated with 
the abnormal return (-4.21, p<0.01). It implies that larger retailers experience more negative 
abnormal returns than smaller retailers. The sales growth, which is the proxy for firm’s growth 
rate, is not associated with the abnormal return in our data. It may imply that the market does not 
differentiate its response to excess inventory announcement across the growth rate of announcing 
firm.  
4.5.3.3 Robustness checks 
In addition to using alternative dependent variable (i.e. 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖[−1, 1]) in columns (4)-(6) 
in Table 4.6, we perform following robustness checks for our main results, more negative 
reaction of the stock market to excess inventory announcement when the announcing firm is a 
high TFP retailer (Table 4.7): alternative adjustments for TFP and IT by using median-adjusted 
and raw variables shown in columns (1) and (2), respectively; alternative measure of TFP by 
using OP approach presented in column (3); alternative measure of inventory efficiency by using 
AIT and GMROI shown in columns (4) and (5), respectively; and using recession dummies 
instead of yearly dummies (omitted). The substantive conclusions remain unchanged throughout 
all different models, indicating that our main results are robust.  
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Table 4.7: (Robustness Check) Regression Result for Productivity and Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
DV:  
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊[−𝟏, 𝟎] 
Alternative Adjustment 
Alternative 
TFP 
Alternative Inventory 
Efficiency 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Median 
adjusted 
Raw OP AIT GMROI 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃
𝑖
    -33.84* -28.65* 
    (16.94) (12.49) 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖 -28.55*     
 (15.87)     
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖   -31.01**    
  (14.97)    
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃(𝑂𝑃)𝑖   -33.25*   
   (17.01)   
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐼𝑇𝑖   0.27   
   (0.73)   
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐴𝐼𝑇𝑖    1.47  
    (3.58)  
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐺𝑀𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖     0.54 
     (0.99) 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐼𝑇𝑖 0.39     
 (0.78)     
𝐼𝑇𝑖  0.40    
  (0.79)    
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 -8.37 -8.13 -8.09 -11.80 -8.72 
 (7.56) (7.80) (7.84) (7.79) (7.57) 
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 -4.12*** -4.25*** -3.64*** -4.78*** -3.94*** 
 (1.32) (1.30) (1.19) (1.47) (1.28) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of observations 85 85 85 80 85 
Adjusted R
2
  0.179 0.192 0.183 0.221 0.189 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard error is reported in the parenthesis. 
 
4.5.4 Value of information in excess inventory announcements 
Another aspect to explore is whether our finding, the negative association between the 
announcing firm’s operational competence and abnormal returns due to excess inventory 
announcement, differs by the information contained in the announcement. Previous literature 
(Sorescu et al. 2007) shows the positive impact of the information offered in the announcement 
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on short-term abnormal returns. They use price and time to introduction of new product as key 
information in the announcement as this information can reduce uncertainty on the future cash 
flow of the announcing firm.  
In the excess inventory announcement, the actions that the firm has taken or plans to take 
to deal with excess inventory and the reasons of building excess inventory are potential 
information that investors can utilize. Providing information on follow-up actions to handle the 
buildup of excess inventory can reduce the investor’s uncertainty on the future cash flow of the 
announcing firm. The stock market might perceive this information credible as the market can 
verify action information provided in the announcement. The announcing firm is also likely to 
fulfill its claim (i.e., action) because increasing reliability (i.e., the extent to which the firm has 
fulfilled claims it made) is a component of firm reputation (Sorescu et al. 2007). With an 
expectation that operationally competent retailers have high reputation compared to their less 
competent peers, competent retailers are more likely to keep their promise (i.e., action) as the 
costs of a loss of reputation are greater. Hence, the action information may moderate the negative 
link that we found in the previous section, so that the stock market may penalize less severely 
when operationally competent retailers announce excess inventory with follow-up action 
information compared to when they do not provide such action information. 
On the contrary, providing information on why the announcing firm accumulated excess 
inventory might not help investors visualize the announcing firm’s future cash flow. As the true 
reason of holding excess inventory is not observable to the stock market, the announcing firm is 
less likely to reveal it. Consistent with this argument, many retailers (35.42%) blame external 
factors such as sluggish sales as a main reason of building excess inventory whereas very few 
retailers (4.71%) mention internal factors such as internal inefficiency and poor execution as 
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shown in section 4.2.1. Knowing this, the stock market might not perceive reason information 
credible. Hence, the reason information may not have a moderating effect. 
To formally test this idea, we create two indicator variables: 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  and 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖. 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  (𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖) is defined as 1 if the announcement provides action (reason) information, and 
zero otherwise. We also create two interaction variables with TFP. Then we re-estimate the 
model in equation (4.20) with those created variables. Columns (1) – (3) in Table 4.8 are the 
main results and (4) – (7) are robustness checks, respectively. We find that providing action 
information in the announcement moderates the negative association between firm’s operational 
competence and abnormal stock returns. An increase in one-year-lagged mean-adjusted TFP by 
one-standard-deviation (i.e., 0.141) is associated with -6.35% in the stock returns over a two-day 
period without action information whereas it is associated with -1.61% in the stock returns over a 
two-day period with action information as shown in column (1). In contrast, we do not find such 
moderating effect with reason information in column (2). These observations are consistent with 
our argument above.  
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Table 4.8: Regression Result for Moderator of Productivity and Cumulative Abnormal 
Return 
 
Main models 
Alternative 
DV 
Alternative 
Adjustment 
Alternative 
TFP 
DV: 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊[−𝟏, 𝟎] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Action Reason Both 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊[−𝟏, 𝟏] 
Median 
adjusted 
Raw OP 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖 -45.05*** -20.81 -38.07 -58.11***    
 (13.24) (24.18) (26.81) (11.82)    
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖     -43.41***   
     (13.68)   
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖      -43.54***  
      (12.49)  
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃(𝑂𝑃)𝑖       -49.36*** 
       (15.50) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐼𝑇𝑖 0.43 0.59 0.65 0.06   0.45 
 (0.72) (0.75) (0.72) (0.74)   (0.72) 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝐼𝑇𝑖     0.46   
     (0.72)   
𝐼𝑇𝑖      0.53  
      (0.74)  
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 2.14  1.82 0.82 1.29 -14.19* 1.73 
 (4.81)  (5.30) (4.57) (4.75) (7.49) (4.55) 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
× 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖 
33.61*  29.35 37.89**    
(17.06)  (19.33) (16.52)    
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
× 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖 
    33.31*   
    (17.04)   
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 × 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖      31.73**  
      (13.98)  
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
× 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃(𝑂𝑃)𝑖 
      37.46* 
      (21.21) 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖  -5.26* -4.44     
  (2.99) (3.06)     
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖
× 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖 
 -8.65 -4.05     
 (25.32) (25.68)     
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 -10.67 -8.82 -10.78 -14.69* -11.00 -11.09 -10.15 
 (7.94) (7.66) (7.79) (8.50) (7.85) (7.97) (7.93) 
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 -3.51** -3.71*** -3.16** -4.42** -3.45** -3.73*** -3.17*** 
 (1.49) (1.31) (1.51) (1.69) (1.46) (1.40) (1.27) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Adjusted R
2
 0.199 0.203 0.204 0.173 0.189 0.209 0.188 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard error is reported in the parenthesis. 
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Note that when we add both action and reason indicators with corresponding interactions 
in column (3), we have directionally the same result although main variables are insignificant 
due to multicollinearity and small sample. Hence, we use model in column (1) for robustness 
checks. We show the robustness of our result with following tests: alternative dependent variable 
by using 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖[−1,1] (column (4)); alternative adjustment of TFP and IT by using median-
adjusted (column (5)) and raw variables (column (6)); and alternative measure of TFP by using 
OP approach (column (7)). All results are consistent. 
Our results show that when high TFP retailers announce the buildup of excess inventory, 
they can still be largely unscathed if they can explain how they plan to tackle the problem. In 
other words, when an operationally competent retailer announces excess inventory and explains 
the follow-up action, then the market is willing to minimize the penalty. When we divide 85 
announcements into four groups (high vs. low TFP and with vs. without actions), we find that 
retailers in the top 50
th
 percentile of TFP face a -3.78% (median) decline in stock returns when 
they announce excess inventory without providing follow-up actions but face a 1.74% (median) 
increase in stock returns when they provide follow-up actions. We conjecture that the market 
trusts the competent companies to turn-around their operations when provided with a definite 
plan-of-action. Hence, the worst case scenario is really when high competent firms announce 
excess inventory and do not provide follow-up actions. This seeds doubts about the company’s 
competency and makes the stock price decline the most. In contrast, we do not find such 
difference in stock market reaction to whether retailers in the bottom 50
th
 percentile of TFP 
provide follow-up actions or not to fixing the excess inventory problem (-0.75% vs. -1.86% in 
median). 
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4.6 Summary and Conclusion  
Based on an analysis of a combined dataset of excess inventory announcements, annual 
financial statements, and daily stock prices of publicly traded retailers in the U.S. during 1990-
2011, we document that excess inventory announcement is negatively affected by the 
announcing firm’s operational competence, measured by TFP. We also show two findings from 
the stock market’s response to excess inventory announcements. First, the market more severely 
penalizes the announcing firm’s stock price when the firm is high TFP retailer. Ceteris paribus, 
an increase in one-year-lagged mean-adjusted TFP by one-standard-deviation (i.e., 0.141) is 
associated with -4.14% in the stock returns over a two-day period (the day of the announcement 
and the day before the announcement). Second, providing action information in the 
announcement can mitigate the negative abnormal returns when high operationally competent 
retailers announce excess inventory. An increase in one-year-lagged mean-adjusted TFP by one-
standard-deviation is associated with -6.35% in the stock returns over a two-day period without 
action information whereas it is associated with -1.61% in the stock returns over a two-day 
period with action information. 
The main results presented in this paper have a number of implications. First, by 
suggesting empirical evidence that firm’s operational competence is negatively associated with 
the likelihood of announcing the buildup of excess inventory in the following year, we show that 
excess inventory is not a random phenomenon merely driven by demand uncertainty, which is 
typically harder for managers to control, but by management practices. Hence, excess inventory 
appears to be manageable through better operations. 
Second, our result shows a potential value of using the firm level TFP as an important 
metric. By adding it to the current important metrics like IT, retailers may enjoy following 
141 
 
benefits. Retailers will be able to predict the odd of announcing excess inventory as we find that 
TFP is a better predictor of excess inventory announcement than IT. In addition, retailers will be 
able to anticipate the stock market’s response in the future when they announce excess inventory 
for a given level of their TFP. So, retailers can make a better plan for the future.  
Third, our results provide a possible explanation for an observation made in operations 
management literature. Recent papers have shown that investments based on inventory turns 
yield higher abnormal stock market returns (Kesavan and Mani 2013; Alan et al. 2014). There 
are two possible expositions offered for this finding. One is information-based argument: the 
stock market might not be fully incorporating inventory information in pricing stocks (Kesavan 
et al. 2010; Kesavan and Mani 2013). The other is risk-based argument: high IT retailers could 
be riskier than low IT retailers as they have higher returns (Alan et al. 2014). Our study provides 
evidence for the former and against the latter. By contrasting with TFP, our study finds that stock 
market reaction differs across high TFP and low TFP retailers but there is no significant 
difference in market reaction to announcements from high IT and low IT retailers. This result 
suggests that the stock market may not be distinguishing between high IT and low IT retailers 
(i.e., information-based argument), leading to abnormal returns in the future. In addition, we 
show that the low IT retailers are potentially riskier than high IT retailers because they have a 
greater likelihood of announcing excess inventory compared to high IT retailers (i.e., against 
risk-based argument for IT). For the risk-based argument for TFP, consistent with Imrohoroglu 
and Tuzel (2014), we find that the low TFP retailers are riskier than high TFP retailers by 
providing evidence that low TFP retailers is more likely to announce excess inventory compared 
to high TFP retailers. 
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As with all studies, our work has limitations that bear noting and offer opportunities for 
future work. We find the heterogeneity of the firm level and industry level TFP in the U.S. retail 
sector (explained in details in the Appendix). This paper, however, does not describe the reasons 
why the firm level TFP varies across firms and across industries as that is not the main focus of 
this paper and hence beyond the scope of this work. By using firm specific and industry specific 
characteristics, the future research might be able to give rigorous expositions. Moreover, what 
causes differences in firm level TFP between online retailers and brick-and-mortar retailers 
would be fruitful avenue of future research. 
Our study has a caveat on measurement that may be examined in future research. Our 
measure of excess inventory is a binary variable based on public announcement of excess 
inventory. We are unable to perform an analysis based on the magnitude of excess inventory 
since our data lack such information. For example, the available data only allow us to examine 
the probability of announcing excess inventory based on the operational competence in the 
previous year, but we do not know how much excess inventory the firm suffers from. If more 
sophisticate data are available in the future, one can extend our model to incorporate the 
magnitude of excess inventory into the relationship between firm’s operational competence and 
excess inventory announcement. 
Altogether this paper fills the gap suggested by Hendricks and Singhal (2009): “It could 
be useful to build an understanding of some of the underlying drivers of excess inventory and to 
find whether the negative effect of excess inventory varies by these drivers.” We show that 
firm’s operational competence, measured by TFP, is an underlying driver of excess inventory 
and the negative market reaction varies by it. 
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APPENDIX I: VALIDATING THE INVERTED U-SHAPED  
RELATIONSHIP AT RETAILER B 
 
In this section, we present additional results for Chapter 2. 
Table 5.1.1: Inverted-U Relationship with Hourly dummies (Retailer A) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Sales (𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒉) 
 
(1) 
interaction between hour-block dummies 
and day-of-the-week dummies 
(2) 
hourly dummies 
 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 1.69*** 1.51*** 
(0.45) (0.46) 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2  -0.04*** -0.03*** 
(0.003) (0.003) 
𝐴_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 13.71*** 12.09*** 
(0.29) (0.34) 
𝐴_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2   0.001  0.006*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ 17.40*** 14.38*** 
(3.48) (3.48) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 -106.81*** -80.23*** 
(24.03) (23.97) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Observations 5312 5312 
Adjusted R
2
 0.8204 0.8240 
Note. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Controls include interactions between hour-block dummies and day-of-the-week dummies, and 
monthly dummies in column (1) and hourly dummies, day-of-the-week dummies, and monthly 
dummies in column (2), respectively. In column (2), store traffic and its square have VIFs 
beyond ten. It indicates multicollinearity issue, making harder to interpret coefficient estimates 
for these two variables. 
 
To see whether our result is robust to other retailers, we further test the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between fitting room traffic and store sales at another retailer (retailer B), where the 
fitting room layout is completely different from that of retailer A. We have only 24 hourly data 
points (6 hours per day for four days) that we collected by observing each customer in the period 
of a field study, as retailer B had not installed technology to obtain traffic data.  
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Table 5.1.2-a shows the inverted U-shaped relationship between fitting room traffic and 
sales at the nearest checkout counter from the studied fitting room area. Model (1) does not 
control for any time effect as we have limited sample size. Model (2) includes hour dummies, 
Model (3) includes a Saturday indicator, and Model (4) includes both. Throughout different 
model specifications, even though the sample size is small, we find that coefficient of 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ is positive and statistically significant (p<0.1) and 𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2 is negative 
and statistically significant (p<0.1) and the peak point is within the data range (0, 35); again, this 
supports Hypothesis 1b. We also conduct several robustness tests for the inverted U-shape. For 
example, Fieller’s interval of [10.26, 34.27] for the peak point is within the data. The spline 
regressions in Table 5.1.2-b shows that the coefficient of the first spline is positive and 
significant (p<0.05), whereas the second is negative and insignificant (p=0.103), partially 
supporting the inverted U-shaped relationship between fitting room traffic and sales. The 
conclusions are similar when we consider the case with three knots, as shown in column (2). 
Since we have very limited sample size, coefficients are not significant, but they are all on the 
right direction. 
In conclusion, we find the inverted U-shaped relationship between fitting room traffic 
and store sales for both retailers A and B. Since these two retailers are different in terms of 
location, carried products, gross margin, and notably fitting room layouts, this finding could be 
robust to any retailer that uses fitting rooms. 
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Table 5.1.2-a: Inverted-U Relationship (Retailer B) 
Dependent Variable: 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒉 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 128.06*** 121.82*** 96.44** 84.69* 
 (31.43) (33.63) (40.87) (43.05) 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ
2  -4.54*** -4.27*** -3.49** -3.03* 
 (1.31) (1.44) (1.57) (1.68) 
Saturday dummy No No Yes Yes 
Hour dummies No Yes No Yes 
Observations 24 24 24 24 
Adjusted R
2
 0.4417 0.4193 0.4527 0.4462 
Note. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5.1.2-b: Robustness Checks Using Spline Regressions (Retailer B) 
Dependent Variable: 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒉 (1) One knot (2) Two knots 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 1 72.64** 54.42 
 (25.82) (38.33) 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 2 -26.90 32.47 
 (15.75) (29.56) 
𝐴_𝐹𝑖𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ 3  -48.30 
  (42.18) 
Saturday dummy Yes Yes 
Observations 24 24 
Adjusted R
2
 0.4965 0.3829 
Note. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 5.1.3: Phantom Stockouts (Details on day 1, Sunday) 
Time 
(each visit) 
Total items brought by 
associate (each visit) 
# items available in the store Phantom 
Stockouts 
(each visit) 
1 2 3 4 Over 5 
11:45 4 0 2 0 0 2 0.00 
12:15 18 5 9 2 0 2 0.28 
12:40 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.00 
12:48 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.00 
13:02 2 1 0 1 0 0 0.50 
13:10 4 2 2 0 0 0 0.50 
13:13 1 1 0 0 0 0 1.00 
13:25 5 1 4 0 0 0 0.20 
13:35 7 1 4 0 2 0 0.14 
13:50 5 0 2 1 2 0 0.00 
13:56 12 7 4 1 0 0 0.58 
14:24 3 2 1 0 0 0 0.67 
14:40 11 6 1 3 0 1 0.55 
14:52 3 2 1 0 0 0 0.67 
14:55 6 1 4 1 0 0 0.17 
15:24 11 4 6 1 0 0 0.36 
15:35 18 7 6 1 3 1 0.39 
15:50 24 8 12 1 1 2 0.33 
16:00 8 3 4 0 1 0 0.38 
16:18 24 7 6 6 3 2 0.29 
16:30 13 7 4 2 0 0 0.54 
16:48 4 2 2 0 0 0 0.50 
17:05 1 1 0 0 0 0 1.00 
17:20 5 1 1 0 0 3 0.20 
17:25 14 5 6 1 2 0 0.36 
17:40 13 3 3 3 2 2 0.23 
17:58 5 1 2 1 0 1 0.20 
Total 223 78 88 25 16 16 0.37 
Note. Phantom stockouts (each visit) is defined as “#items with availability of 1 (each visit) / 
Total items brought by associate (each visit),” where the total items brought by associate is a part 
of items left behind in the fitting room area. 
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Table 5.1.4: Phantom Stockouts with Price, Size, and Category (Details on day 2, Saturday) 
   
# items available in the store 
  
Total 1 2 3 4 Over 5 
 
# items 336 138 106 55 22 15 
 
(%) 1.00 0.41 0.32 0.16 0.07 0.04 
 
 
Petite 45 23 14 8 0 0 
 
(%) 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Clearance 18 10 6 1 0 0 
 
(%) 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Swimming 53 21 20 8 2 2 
 
(%) 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.09 0.13 
 Price mean 53.77 61.53 53.29 45.62 37.27 39.73 
 
s.d. 28.52 34.37 26.05 13.33 16.96 13.87 
 
median 49 50 48.5 49 40 42 
 
min 9.97 11.97 9.97 9.99 11.97 11.97 
 
max 160 160 151.95 69 69 58 
 Size 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 
 
4 1 0 1 0 0 0 
 
6 9 6 1 2 0 0 
 
8 12 5 6 0 1 0 
 
10 7 3 4 0 0 0 
 
12 17 10 3 3 1 0 
 
14 23 4 10 7 1 1 
 
16 14 9 3 0 0 2 
 
18 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 
XS 6 6 0 0 0 0 
 
S 36 17 11 6 1 1 
 
M 46 19 14 4 7 2 
 
L 72 15 28 18 5 6 
 
XL 45 19 10 7 6 3 
 
4P 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 
6P 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 
8P 3 2 0 1 0 0 
 
10P 2 1 1 0 0 0 
 
12P 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 
PP 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 
PS 13 4 6 3 0 0 
 
PM 12 4 5 3 0 0 
 
PL 8 7 1 0 0 0 
 
PXL 3 2 1 0 0 0 
Note. Average price of 3200 SKUs in this section, the immediate sales floor from the studied 
fitting room area, is $46. 
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APPENDIX II: ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF THE INCENTIVE CHANGE 
 
            In this section, we provide additional results for Chapter 3. 
An alternative view of the incentive change is to increase the relative importance of 
dependent component to the independent component in the bonus scheme. While the way to 
calculate the amount of eligible bonus based on the store performance (i.e., independent 
component) is unchanged, managers obtain bonus only when entire retail chain has a positive 
profit (i.e., dependent component). This transition might boost cooperation among stores as the 
bonus is strongly linked with how other stores perform. In general, the role of cooperative 
actions such as helping and knowledge sharing in improving organizational performance has 
been widely acknowledged (Cummings 2004). Hence, it is possible that the change in incentive 
improves the overall performance of the retail chain. 
An opposite viewpoint is also possible for the following reasons. First, performance 
improvement due to cooperation among stores such as helping and knowledge sharing requires 
stores to be linked with each other. Siemsen (2007) identified three distinct types of linkages: (1) 
outcome linkages, (2) help linkages, and (3) knowledge linkages. In our setting, none of them is 
strong enough to influence each other. Store outcomes such as sales are not dependent upon 
other stores’ outcomes. Store managers in one location cannot directly help the other managers 
in a different location. Knowledge sharing might be possible, but it would be limited due to 
heterogeneity across stores with local knowledge. Second, the profit for this retailer had 
significantly dropped in the previous 5 quarters and became negative in the previous quarter. 
This trend might make store managers pessimistic about getting bonus. As a result, it is possible 
that the new incentive considerably reduced the motivation for store managers, resulting in lower 
performance of the retail chain.  
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We test these arguments using similar model specification proposed in the main analysis. 
We use sales growth, defined as difference between sales in 2014 and that in 2013 in percentages 
of sales in 2013 (i.e., 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 2014𝑖𝑡−𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 2013𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 2013𝑖𝑡
), to capture overall store sales 
performance. We use traffic growth, defined as difference between average daily traffic in 2014 
and that in 2013 in percentages of the average daily traffic in 2013 (i.e., 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 =
𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 2014𝑖𝑡−𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 2013𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 2013𝑖𝑡
), to capture the unexpected demand shock. Table 
5.2.1 shows the results. We do not have controls in column (1) and add store fixed effect in 
column (2). We further add traffic growth to account for the time-related demand shock in 
column (3). Finally, we rule out selection mechanism in column (4) by considering 33 stores 
with no manager change during study period. Throughout all columns, we find that overall store 
sales performance is smaller under the post-incentive change period compared to the pre-
incentive change period. This result indicates that we can see the change in incentive as a 
transition from the strong incentive to the weak one. We use this interpretation in Chapter 3. 
Table 5.2.1: Overall Store Performance is Smaller in the Post-Incentive Change Period 
Dependent variable: 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒕 
 (1) 
Unconditional 
(2) 
Store 
heterogeneity 
(3) 
Unobservable 
surprise 
(4) 
No selection 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.016* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡     0.51*** 0.56*** 
   (0.09) (0.07) 
Store effect No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3248 3248 2922 1197 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0110 0.0925 0.3410 0.3646 
Note. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard error, clustered by store, is reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
150 
 
APPENDIX III: HETEROGENEITY OF FIRM LEVEL AND  
INDUSTRY LEVEL TFP IN THE U.S. RETAIL SECTOR 
 
            In this section, we provide additional results for Chapter 4. 
We find that the overall retail productivity has been increased in the U.S. during 1963 to 
2011 (Figure 5.3.1). However, the different industry shows different tendency during the recent 
five decades. Even in the same industry, each firm has different TFP over time. Figure 5.3.2 and 
5.3.3 depict the heterogeneity of retail productivity across industries and years during 1963-2011, 
respectively. For example, while the retail giant Wal-Mart (SIC 53) shows a decreasing trend of 
productivity, the online retailer Amazon.com (SIC 59) has an increasing trend of productivity. In 
the same industry (SIC 52), Home Depot and Lowe’s show different tendency though both firms 
have a decreasing trend of productivity.  
Figure 5.3.1: Mean Retail Productivity across Years (1963~2011) 
Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) Olley & Pakes (1996) 
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Figure 5.3.2: Heterogeneity of Retail Productivity across Industries (SIC2) 
Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) Olley & Pakes (1996) 
  
 
Figure 5.3.3: Heterogeneity of Retail Productivity across Years (1963~2011) 
Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) Olley & Pakes (1996) 
  
 
The two main robust findings in the productivity literature also show heterogeneity across 
industries in the U.S. retail sector. The first finding, which is the ubiquity of the estimated 
productivity gap, is supported by all retail industries, but the magnitude differs by industry. 
Table 5.3.1 illustrates the 90-10 TFP ratio across two-digit SIC industries. The overall 90-10 
TFP ratio in the U.S. retail sector is 2.54 and the standard deviation is 0.352 while Syverson 
(2004) finds the average 90-10 TFP ratio of 1.92 and standard deviation of 0.173 in the U.S. 
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manufacturing sector. It indicates that the U.S. retail sector has a larger productivity gap than 
U.S. manufacturing sector and the former has larger difference between industries than the latter. 
For instance, the SIC 55, Automotive dealers & service stations, shows the largest productivity 
gap between the firms in 90
th
 and 10
th
 productivity distribution (2.919)  followed by SIC 59, 
Miscellaneous retail, while the SIC 54, Food stores, has the least productivity gap (2.055). We 
note that SIC 59 includes online retailers like Amazon.com.  
Table 5.3.1: 90-10 TFP Ratio across Industries (SIC2) 
sic2 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 Overall Stand.Dev. 
LP 2.726 2.479 2.055 2.919 2.139 2.450 2.078 2.874 2.540 0.352 
OP 2.055 1.828 1.618 2.387 1.786 1.931 1.738 2.405 2.035 0.294 
 
The second finding, stickiness of tremendous and persistent productivity gap, is also 
supported by all retail industries, but again the magnitude varies across industries. Table 5.3.2-a 
presents the overall autoregressive coefficients in the retail sector and Table 5.3.2-b and 5.3.2-c 
describe the autoregressive coefficients across industries in LP and in OP, respectively. We find 
the autoregressive coefficient of 0.64 in the retail sector. It is robust with productivity literature, 
which ranges autoregressive coefficients between 0.6 and 0.8 (e.g., Abraham and White 2006; 
Foster et al. 2008). Interestingly, SIC 55, Automotive dealers & service stations, has the highest 
autoregressive coefficients of 0.862 while SIC 53, General merchandise, shows the lowest 
autoregressive coefficients of 0.292. It implies that SIC 55 shows very sticky productivity over 
year while SIC 53 has less sticky productivity across years. 
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Table 5.3.2-a: Autoregressive Coefficients 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 LP OP 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.644 0.730 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
# of observations 16387 15136 
R
2
 0.585 0.637 
Note: All bold coefficients have p<0.01.  
 
Table 5.3.2-b: Autoregressive Coefficients across Industries (LP) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.834 0.292 0.787 0.862 0.614 0.527 0.794 0.641 
 (0.019) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009) 
# of 
observations 
680 2302 2364 709 2006 1127 3533 3666 
R
2
 0.749 0.295 0.778 0.800 0.335 0.478 0.7265 0.582 
Note: All bold coefficients have p<0.01.  
 
Table 5.3.2-c: Autoregressive Coefficients across Industries (OP) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.805 0.265 0.796 0.851 0.761 0.676 0.835 0.758 
 (0.023) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.25) (0.018) (0.008) (0.009) 
# of 
observations 
680 2302 2364 709 2006 1127 3533 3666 
R
2
 0.653 0.243 0.755 0.767 0.320 0.562 0.740 0.672 
Note: All bold coefficients have p<0.01. 
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